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INTRODUCTION
This study examines the relations among the British 
government, her provincial governors, and the American 
colonists in mid-eighteenth century New York. The subject 
is worthy of intensive study because it provides insight 
into the functioning of the British imperial system, the 
colonial political system, and their interactions.
Studies of the first British empire have emphasized 
the legislative and economic aspects of colonial adminis­
tration. ̂ While these approaches to the history of the Old 
Empire are undoubtedly significant, they do not describe its 
actual workings with complete fidelity. Legislation and 
economic theories describe a nation's conception of the 
operations of its government; but they do not necessarily 
depict how it performs. In mid-eighteenth century Britain 
there was a considerable gap between the theory and practice 
of government.
As this study will concentrate on examining the practice 
of politics in mid-eighteenth century New York, it will tend
^George Louis Beer, The Old Colonial System 1660-1754 
(2 vols., New York, 1913, reprinted 1933).
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to ignore laws and economic theories because they had little 
effect on the actual behavior of the British government, the 
colonial governors, and the New Yorkers. This approach will 
result in a picture of imperial administration which differs 
somewhat from that found in traditional studies. The Acts 
of Trade and Navigation, the Secretary of State for the 
Southern Department, and the Board of Trade will be reduced 
to a subordinate role in the narrative because, despite the 
volume of space they occupy in the records of the period, 
they had little affect on the government of New York.
This emphasis on the practical aspects of colonial ad­
ministration leads to a re-evaluation of the role of the 
men who governed Britain's North American colonies. Most 
historians have based their evaluations of the governors 
on the formal descriptions of their duties and responsi- 
bilities, and as those formulations bore little resemblance 
to the actual functions of the office, the governors have 
been misunderstood by both students of the Old Empire, and 
by students of the individual colonies.
Historians of the Empire have apparently regarded the 
governors as primarily local, American officials, and there­
fore studies of English colonial administration in the 
eighteenth century have generally ignored the contribution
^Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Government in America 
(New Haven, Conn., 1930, reprinted 1958).
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the governors made to the development and maintenance of the 
Empire. The monumental Cambridge History of the British 
Empire  ̂glosses over the role of the governors; they are 
almost totally ignored in Edward Raymond Turner's studies 
of the Privy Council and the Cabinet (the bodies which 
nominally supervised the activities of the governors), * and 
in The Secretaries of State, by Mark Thomson.-* Histories 
of British colonial administration have also slighted the 
governors. For example, the governors are treated only in­
cidentally in George Louis Beer's exhaustive examination of 
colonial policy and practices in the century between 1660 
and 1754, and in Arthur Basye's study of the Board of 
Trade.® Even the recent intensive examinations of the role 
of patronage in the political system of mid-eighteenth 
century England have emphasized the machinations involved in
^The Old Empire: From the Beginnings to 1783, vol. I,
The Cambridge History of the British Empire, J. Holland 
Rose, A.P. Newton, E.A. Benians, eds. (New York, 1929).
^Edward Raymond Turner, The Cabinet Council of England 
1622-1784 (2 vols., Baltimore Md., 1930-2), The Privy 
Council of England, 1603-1784 (2 vols., Baltimore, Md., 
1927-8).
^Mark A. Thomson, The Secretaries of State, 1681-1782 
(Oxford, 1932).
®Arthur Basye, The Lords Commissioners of Trade azid 
Plantations (New Haven, Conn., 1925).
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obtaining and retaining office, and ignored the actual work 
of the colonial administrators.^
Although historians interested in the development of 
the American colonies have not, for their part, neglected 
the governors, they too have distorted the governors' role. 
They have been so intent on examining the relations between 
the governors and the Assemblies that they have neglected 
virtually all other aspects of the governors' activities.
The "Whig" interpretation of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries which frequently presented the governors 
as indigent, incompetent, dependents of British magnates who 
were dispatched to America because no suitable positions 
were available for them in England and Ireland® has gener­
ally been superseded with the more objective assessment of 
their abilities advocated by Leonard Woods Labaree. There 
is still, however, a strong tendency among students of the 
colonial period to regard the governors as passive figures 
whose role in the government was clearly subordinate to the
^James A. Henretta, "Salutary Neglect" Colonial Admin­
istration Under the Duke of Newcastle (Princeton, N.J., 
1972), Stanley Nider Katz, Newcastle's New York (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1968).
®Edward Channing, A History of the United States, vol. 
II (New York, 1908, reprinted 1937), Herbert L. Osgood, The 
American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century (4 vols., New 
York, 1924-5, reprinted 1958) for example.
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Assembly.^ This dismal view of the governors' role may be 
the product of lacunae in the evidence.
The most accurate record of political developments 
is often found in the private papers of the men who engaged 
in the decision making process. Unfortunately, neither the 
papers of the governors, nor the colonial politicians pro­
vide insight in these areas. The surviving records are 
meager, and contain few references to political develop­
ments. Nor are the newspapers of the period of much assis­
tance to the historian. While both^ were deeply involved 
in the political struggles of the colony neither engaged 
in rational discussion of issues. The editors of both 
papers were content to hurl invective at their opponents.
The lack of direct evidence compels the historian 
to base his examination of the politics of mid-eighteenth 
century New York on inference. While this approach is 
clearly less precise than one based on direct evidence, it 
can be used to create a reliable understanding of the period. 
The recent interest in the political history of mid-eight­
eenth century New York has generated a number of studies
^Samuel Eliot Morison, Henry Steel Commager, William E. 
Leuchtenburg, The Growth of the American Republic, 6th ed.
(2 vols.. New York, 1969), Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious 
People; Politics and Society in Colonial New York (New York, 
1971).
^ New York Gazette, New York Weekly Journal.
which, when combined with earlier works^l enables the 
historian to make judgments of the political issues in­
volved. The alternative to this approach is to simply 
ignore the period.
Neglecting the period would, however, be unwise.
The years between 1717 and 1753 were the pinnacle of the 
imperial government in New York; the Royal government 
reached its highest degree of success. In 1717 Governor 
Hunter had reached an accommodation with the Assembly and 
the next thirty-seven years were marked by the evolution 
of that agreement. In that period the Governor and Assembly 
jockeyed for dominance in the colony. The contest ended in 
1753 when James DeLancey became acting governor of New York 
and surrendered his remaining authority to the Assembly.
In those years the contest was close, and the governors 
faced a difficult situation. Their objective in accepting 
office was economic; they went to the New World to repair 
their fortunes. To do this, it was necessary for the 
Governor to perpetuate himself in office, and for him to re­
tain the good will of the Assembly which voted his emolu­
ments. The Governor had to serve two masters.
Their task, although Herculean, was not impossible
H-For example, Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", Katz, 
Newcastle's New York, Bonomi, Factious People.
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only because the British government was not (despite the 
language of legislation and Royal Decrees) very interested 
in colonial government. The colonial administrative 
structure, composed of the Crown, Privy Council, Secretary 
of State for the Southern Department, and the Board of Trade 
seemed impressive and efficient but it was only a small, 
very insignificant part of the British government. Con­
sequently, the men in London charged with administering 
the colonies paid little attention to them. They intruded 
in provincial affairs only if there were complaints from 
British merchants, a breakdown in public order, or an 
obvious political breakdown in the colony. Thus, it was 
important for the Governor to satisfy London in these areas.
The New Yorkers were not so easily satisfied. The 
colonists thought of themselves as virtually self-governing, 
and demanded that the governor support locally beneficial 
programs regardless of British interests. As the colonial 
Assembly controlled his salary, the Governor had little 
choice in the matter; he was in New York for economic 
reasons, not to advance abstract principles of Empire.
This meant that to succeed, the Governor of New York 
had to be an exceptionally perceptive and adroit poli­
tician. He had to identify the issues which might offend 
either the English or the Americans, and then adopt policies 
which would please both. An examination of the methods 
utilized by the six men who ruled New York between 1717 and
1753 to resolve this paradox will reveal the attitudes of 
the British government towards New York, the limits the 
British placed on the governors' authority, the nature of 
the provincial political system, and the political acumen 
of the governors.
CHAPTER ONE
GOVERNMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD
For most of the colonial period the British government 
seems to have had absolutely no desire to control the in­
ternal administration of its North American colonies. This 
lack of concern for the colonies was not as peculiar as it 
might first appear to be since the British government was 
almost equally disinterested in maintaining anything like 
direct control over county affairs at home. Although the 
central government had been increasing its sphere of 
authority since the reign of Henry VIII, the British concept 
of "government" was apparently a narrow one, which did not 
extend to matters of local administration, in either the 
English counties or the colonies abroad.
From the late fifteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries^ 
the duties of the central government at home had been (with 
one exception) limited to the preservation of the social 
order. The government had defended society against attacks




from within by attempting to prevent riots and disorders, 
and had punished rioters and criminals. It had maintained 
armed forces to protect the nation from external t h r e a t s . ^
Although these functions had not been expanded for 
several centuries, it had of course become necessary, as 
English society and the world grew more complex, to expand 
the machinery of government to enable it to carry out its 
tasks. The creation of special committees and boards appar­
ently had never brought the national government into direct 
contact with the people.^
It seems to have been the gentry, the respected, land­
owning families of England, who linked the national govern­
ment to the people of England. The gentry possessed the 
Parliamentary franchise, provided many of the members of the 
House of Commons, and, by virtue of a monopoly of the post 
of Justice of the Peace,* dominated county government 
everywhere.
The English county government normally consisted of a
2 Alan G.R. Smith, The Government of Elizabethian 
England (New York, 1967), p. 42.
^George Clark, The Later Stuarts, 1660-1714, second 
edition, volume 10 in The Oxford History of England, editor 
(Oxford, 1956), p. 13.
^Charles Austin Beard, The Office of Justice of the 
Peace in England in its Origin and Development (New York, 
1904), p. 54 (hereafter cited as Justice of the Peace).
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coroner, a high constable, justices of the peace, a sheriff, 
a lord lieutenant, and, in counties on the sea, a vice- 
admiral. These officials shared the responsibility for 
maintaining order, respect for the laws, and military 
security in the community. Since the system had evolved in 
response to specific necessities, the duties of each o* the 
offices was never precisely defined and there were over-
Clapping jurisdictions. The coroner and high constable were 
police officials, and others acted as liaison between the 
Crown and people.
A man of great standing and influence in the community, 
the Lord Lieutenant, was primarily a military official. He 
raised, trained, equipped, and led the county's militia, re­
cruited men to serve in the King's army, and maintained the 
county's defenses.6 In addition he might be asked to per­
form additional, non-military chores for the central govern­
ment.
The vice-admiral exercised the Crown's authority over 
maritime affairs. He was charged with suppressing piracy, 
salvaging wrecks, impressing seamen, enforcing embargoes, 
registering captures made at sea, and conducting a court
Sj.B. Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, 1558-1603, second 
edition, volume 8 in The Oxford History of England, George 
Clark, editor (Oxford, 1959), p. lTI
^Black, Reign of Elizabeth, pp. 214-215.
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which adjudicated maritime disputes.^
The "sherivality" which had once been onerous and ex­
pensive had, by the end of the seventeenth century, become 
a post with great prestige but few responsibilities. The 
sheriff's duties were limited to conducting Parliamentary 
elections and opening the county courts' sessions.®
The duties of all these officials, while important, 
were rather limited in scope. It would be possible for an 
English citizen to have only the most fleeting contact with 
them. Much, if not most, of the communication between the 
national government and the populace was through the jus­
tices of the peace, the most important local officials. The 
justices' primary duty was the preservation of public order. 
This responsibility was carried out at the Quarter Session, 
the short, two-to-four-day, court terms where a panel of 
justices dealt with the crime, and the quarrels of the commu-
Qnity. Since the Quarter Sessions could impose capital pun­
ishment,^ it was important for the authority of the justices
^Black, Reign of Elizabeth, p. 215.
^Wallace Notestein, The English People on the Eve of 
Colonization, 1603-1630 (New York, 1954), pp. 203, 209 
(hereafter cited as Eve of Colonization).
^Notestein, Eve of Colonization, pp. 213, 216-218.
l®Black, Reign of Elizabeth, p. 213.
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who constituted the Court to be recognized by the community. 
Respect for the justices was insured by selecting them from 
the wealthiest, most influential families of the area.H
Had their duties been limited to sitting in the Quarter 
Sessions, the justices of the peace, too, would have had 
little influence on the operations of government. Conducting 
the Quarter Sessions was, however, only one of the justices' 
many duties. They were also responsible for supervision of 
the county's records, H  r0ad maintenance, binding appren­
tices, licensing taverns, administering the laws which con­
trolled laborers' wages and the price of exported grain, and 
poor relief. In addition, the justices, who did not ordi­
narily exercise civil jurisdiction, might be called upon to 
assist the bishop in investigating the state of the local 
church.13 Men with such wide responsibilities were terribly 
important for the smooth operation of government; without 
their cooperation, no decision of the central government 
could be transmitted to the people of the country.H
UNotestein, Eve of Colonization, p. 212.
12Beard, Justice of the Peace, p. 79.
l^Black, Reign of Elizabeth, p. 213. This is only a 
partial list of tne justices' duties. Eirenarcha (1581) 
requires over 600 pages to describe their duties fully.
l^Smith, Government of Elizabethian England, p. 99.
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Since the justices were socially secure and unpaid 
officials, the government in London had no way of coercing 
them to follow its instructions. They would implement 
policy only if it was acceptable to them.15 If not, the 
justices could distort and weaken,15 or simply ignore it.
The failure of Queen Elizabeth I to destroy the Catholic 
Church in Lancashire,1? and the failure of King James II to 
secure legal toleration for Catholics, for example, were due 
to the opposition of the justices of the peace.
The county governments which rested on the shoulders of 
the justices of the peace were not the only local govern­
ments in England. In rural areas the parish clerk and 
parish council supervised local taxation, road maintenance, 
and poor relief. Many towns received royal charters which 
freed them, to some extent, from the authority of the 
county.18 The charters varied, but all established a self- 
perpetuating body of men called a corporation, which exer­
cised the rights granted in the charter. As long as the
15Ibid.
15Roger Lockyer, Tudor and Stuart Britain, 1471-1714 
(New York, 1964), p. 7.
■^Smith, Government of Elizabethian England, p. 99.
15Kingsley B. Smellie, A History of Local Government 
(London, 1963), p. 9, Black, Reign of Elizabeth, pp. 263-7.
15
corporation did not violate the terms of its charter, it 
could act without fear of outside interference.19 One 
privilege held by all municipal corporations was the right 
to return a member to the House of Commons. Thus, whoever 
controlled the corporation controlled the election of a 
member of Parliament. During the sixteenth century many of 
these seats came under the control of the gentry.20
Similarly, the authority of the colonial governments 
also rested on the delegation of specific powers, under 
specifically defined conditions. Charters gave the colonial 
governments, like their counterparts in England, control 
over local affairs, while reserving final control of their 
legal and economic systems to Britain.21 Even if the English 
government had wanted to control colonial local government, 
it would have been unable to do so. There were too few Royal 
officials in the colonies to monitor effectively the activ­
ities of any colonial government. England was apparently 
concerned with profiting from the colonies, not controlling
l^Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 108.
^David Ogg, England in the Reigns of James II and
William III (Oxford, 1963), pp. 58-59 (hereafter citedas
Englan<f)~l
^Charles M. Andrews, The Colonial Period of American
History, volume IV (New Haven, Conn., 1964), pp. 3-4.
16
their internal affairs,22 an(j the principal Royal officials 
in the colonies were those concerned with protecting England's 
economic interests.23 This made the task of colonial admin­
istration much simpler for England, but it also meant that 
the government in Westminster was dependent upon the volun­
tary cooperation of the colonial governments whenever it 
wished to implement its policies in the colonies. The 
English, moreover, were seldom inclined to interfere in the 
colonies' local affairs.2^
22Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, pp. 
13-21, Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Instructions to British 
Colonial Governors, 1670-1776 (New York, 1967), passim.
23Royal officials included the Governor, the customs 
collector, the surveyor, and the surveyor of the woods. All 
were concerned with protecting the economic interest of the 
Crown.
2^Certainly in the case of New York it seems the Board 
of Trade went to great trouble to avoid intervening in local 
government. Robert Hunter struggled five years to keep the 
Assembly from asserting control over the colony’s finances. 
Despite repeated appeals to London, nothing concrete was 
done to support Hunter. Under George Clinton conflict be­
tween the governor and the Assembly led to the virtual paral­
ysis of government. After an eight month investigation the 
Board of Trade issued a voluminous report which concluded 
that after the tempers aroused by seven years of conflict had 
cooled, it might be wise to dispatch a new governor with in­
structions which might be somewhat more exact than Clinton's 
to re-establish cooperation between the governor and Assembly 
in New York. Neil Ovadia, "The Struggle for Financial Con­
trol, New York, 1674-1720" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Queens 
College, 1968), pp. 56-59, E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents 
Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, 
volume VI (Albany, N.Y., 1861), pp. 259-260, 586, 614-636 
(hereafter cited as N.Y.C.D.).
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Only once in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
had there been an attempt to subordinate local governments 
in England, and in the colonies, to the national adminis­
tration. The attempt was an important part of King James 
II's effort to secure legal toleration for Roman Catholics 
in England, an effort which culminated in James losing his 
throne.
James, who was fifty-four years old when he came to the 
throne in 1685, was so determined to regularize the position 
of his c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s 2 ^ that he ignored, and then collided 
with, the strong anti-Catholicism of the Anglican gentry.2*> 
This was not opposition to Catholicism per se,27 but the 
fear, present since the reign of Elizabeth, of the re-estab- 
lishment of "Papal authority" in England.2® The declaration 
of loyalty to the Anglican Church, which James made before 
his Privy Council only minutes after ascending the throne, 
and l-;>ter issued as a proclamation,2® was apparently intended 
to quiet those fears. The King's subsequent actions, how­
ever, seem to have exacerbated them.
2^John Carsell, The Descent on England (New York, 1969), 
p. 113.
2®Lockyer, Tudor and Stuart Britain, p. 355.
2^Stuart Prall, The Bloodless Revolution (Garden City, 
N.Y., 1972) p. 90.
2®Carswell, Descent on England, pp. 66-68.
2®Prall, Bloodless Revolution, pp. 89-90.
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Despite the fact that the Jesuit fathers were regarded 
by the English as the vanguard of Papal attempts to re­
conquer England,30 James brought a Jesuit, Edward Petre, 
into the Royal Court. Petre, the King's confessor,31 was 
even appointed Clerk of the Royal Closet.32
Father Petre1s presence at Westminster was not the 
only manifestation of James' disdain for his subjects' 
attitude towards Catholicism, and towards religious toler­
ation. In June 1685, he began issuing dispensations from 
the Test Act,33 which, since 1673, required every holder of 
civil or military office to take the Anglican Communion, an 
oath of loyalty to the Church of England, and to subscribe 
to a declaration denying the Roman Catholic doctrine of 
transubstantiation,3^ and commissioning Roman Catholics in 
the a r m y . 35 James' policy was tested in the Courts, which 
affirmed his powex to dispense the laws. Quite naturally
30()gg, England, pp. 165-166.
33-Lockyer, Tudor and Sruart Britain, p. 359.
opOgg, England, p. 165.
33Prall, Bloodless Revolution, p. 109.
34Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 80.
3^Prall, Bloodless Revolution, p. 110.
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the Protestant gentry regarded the Catholic led army of some 
16,000 men, which James concentrated at Hounslow Heath just 
outside London during the summers of 168 5 to 1688®® as a 
threat to their liberties.®^
As threatening as the dispensing power was to Anglicans, 
it was only the first step toward James' goal of giving Roman 
Catholics complete equality in England. The King realized 
that the Church of England would oppose toleration and so, in 
July 168 6, as head of the church, he created an Ecclesias­
tical Commission which was intended to force the church to 
accept toleration by silencing opponents of the King's 
policy,3® and by placing Roman Catholics, who were sympathetic 
to toleration, into influential church offices. The commis­
sion was moderately successful in accomplishing these tasks, 
but its accomplishment was Pyrrhic. James' coercion of the 
church offended the Anglican community, and alienated it 
from its traditional loyalty to the Crown.®® Thus the King's 
efforts at furthering toleration seriously undermined his 
throne.
®®Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 122.
o 7Maurice Ashley, The Glorious Revolution of 1688 
(New York, 1966), p. 120.
38Lockyer, Tudor and Stuart Britain, p. 359.
"^Clark, Later Stuarts, pp. 124-125.
20
The final step in the King's program came on April 14, 
1687, when he issued a Declaration of Indulgence which 
suspended the Test Acts, and permitted Catholics and Prot­
estant dissenters to worship publically.40 Since his power 
to suspend a law was not as clearly established as his dis­
pensing power,4  ̂James prudently expressed the belief that 
the Parliament which was not in session would approve the 
Declaration when it met. Since the House of Commons, as it 
was then constituted, would not have consented to the sus­
pension of the Test Acts, and of the Penal law which forbade 
non-Anglican worship, James dissolved it in July 1687.42 
The King then had to face the problem of securing the elec­
tion of a House of Commons which would endorse toleration.
Finding support was difficult. Parliamentary elections 
were decided by the gentry, who by virtue of their influence 
in county and municipal government, controlled most of the 
seats,43 and as early as June, 1685, the gentry, which had 
been the mainstay of the monarchy for two centuries,44 dem­
onstrated its opposition to King James by failing to take
40Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 125.
41Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 80.
42Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 125.
4^Prall, Bloodless Revolution, pp. 80-81, Ogg, England, 
pp. 58-59.
44Lockyer, Tudor and Stuart Britain, pp. 6, 351.
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strong action against King Charles il's illegitimate son, 
James Scott, the Duke of Monmouth, when he invaded England 
to seize the throne.4  ̂ None of his policies had endeared 
James to the traditional ruling class.
The King did have a small foundation to build on. His 
policy of toleration had resulted in the appointment of some 
Catholics and dissenting justices of the peace,4® and in the 
conversion of a few Anglican justices to the Roman faith. 
Attrition and conversion would not, however, change the 
loyalty of local government rapidly enough to meet James' 
electoral needs.47 To speed the process, he began replacing 
Anglican officials with Catholics and non-conformists. Many 
of James' appointees did not have the position in the commu­
nity which was traditionally associated with a Commission of 
the Peace. This seemed to the Anglican gentry to be an 
attempt to end its customary influence over local affairs, 
and confirmed its opposition.4®
James’ policy of replacement had insured that the 
Anglican gentry, who dominated the ranks of the justices of
4®Lockyer, Tudor and Stuart Britain, pp. 356-358, 
Prall, Bloodless Revolution, p. 107.
*^Prall, Bloodless Revolution, p. 156.
^Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 123.
4®Lockyer, Tudor and Stuart Britain, pp. 36-361.
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the peace and the municipal corporations, would not support 
him. Since it was not possible to replace all 3,000 of 
England's justices of the peace, ^  James had to find some 
way to coerce those traditionally independent authorities 
into supporting his policy of toleration.50
The King decided to use the personal prestige and 
position of the Lord Lieutenant to overawe the Anglican 
justices. James had the peers ask each justice to agree to 
vote for a parliamentary candidate committed to toleration, 
to support that policy if he was elected to the Commons, and 
to pledge himself to support the principle of toleration 
among Christians; James hoped that the justices would not 
be willing to oppose the Royal will when questioned by one 
of the most powerful men in the kingdom. 2̂ Affirmative re­
sponses would have committed the most influential segment 
of the community to support, however reluctantly, the King's 
policy. The justices were, however, not so easily dominated; 
most of them refused to support toleration.53 This left
4Q̂Smellie, History of Local Government, p. 11.
^Prall, Bloodless Revolution, pp. 81-82.
^Carswell, Descent on England, pp. 105-106.
^Ashley, Glorious Revolution of 1688, p. 88.
53Carswell, Descent on England, p. 111.
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only the municipalities as possible sources of support for 
54James' policy.
The man responsible for "convincing" the municipalities 
to select members of parliament in support of the King's 
policy was Robert Brent, a Catholic lawyer. Brent's agents 
reminded the post-masters and the revenue officers in the 
boroughs that they were obliged, as servants of the Crown, 
to support the King's policy, and to use their influence to 
secure the election of members of Commons who would do the 
same. To insure effective communication between the Crown 
and its local supporters, Brent appointed a correspondent 
in every parliamentary borough.55 if it appeared that the 
political party Brent was building would be unable to con­
trol the election in a borough, then other methods for in­
suring the voters' "cooperation" could be a p p l i e d .56
James' system for bringing recalcitrant municipalities 
to heel was identical to the one his brother Charles had 
used earlier. The charter of a municipality was at once a 
source of strength and of weakness. As long as the pro­
visions of the charter were scrupulously observed, the
54Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 126.
^Carswell, Descent on England, pp. 113-115. 
56Ibid.
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corporation was inviolate, but even a trivial violation of 
its terms provided legitimate grounds for withdrawing the 
charter and the privileges it granted. When a municipality 
had refused to cooperate with King Charles II, he had used 
the inevitable minor breaches of the charter as justifica­
tion for recalling it and issuing a new document which 
forced the corporation to recognize his authority.5  ̂ James, 
like his brother, now used his authority over the municipal 
corporations to compel them to return Parliamentary candi­
dates he approved of.5® The King pressured the munici­
palities for support throughout the winter of 1688.^9
At the same time that he was attempting to make local 
government in England responsive to his will, James, who had 
a "passion for organization,"5® inaugurated a restructuring 
of England's system of colonial administration. He intended 
to increase the effectiveness of the laws of trade and navi­
gation by uniting several colonial governments, and by 
greatly reducing the colonists' authority over their own 
affairs.
57clark, Later Stuarts, pp. 107-109.
CO 0gg, England, p. 61.
5®Prall, Bloodless Revolution, pp. 182-183.
6®Carswell, Descent on England, p. 113.
5lviola Florence Barnes, The Dominion of New England 
(New York, 1960), pp. 31-33.
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The process of unification began in the colonies (as it 
had in the English municipalities) with the institution of 
proceedings against the charters of Massachusetts, Connect­
icut, and Rhode Island.^ in England, the Crown claimed
that the colonies had violated their charters,63 and, as in 
England, the corporations could not resist the Crown.64 on 
December 20, 1686, the colonies of Massachusetts, New Hamp­
shire, Plymouth, Connecticut, and Rhode Island were joined 
to create a single administration for all the New England 
colonies. One judicial and military system for all of New 
England was much easier for the English government to con­
trol than several colonies, each with its own privileges.65 
The Crown's interest in uniformity in colonial adminis­
tration was illustrated by the Instructions issued to Edmund 
Andros, the Governor of the Dominion of New England, which
fi 2Barnes, Dominion of New England, pp. 32-33. Massa­
chusetts' charter was withdrawn on October 23, 1684, Rhode 
Island's was suspended on June 22, 1686, and Connecticut's 
was suspended on December 28, 1686. Charles M. Andrews,
The Fathers of New England, volume 6 in The Chronicles of 
America Series, Allen Johnson, editor (New Haven, Conn., 
1919), pp. 163, 180, Barnes, Dominion of New England, p. 37.
®3Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the 
Seventeenth Century, volume III (Gloucester, Mass., 1957), 
pp. 396-397.
^ A n d r e w s ,  Colonial Period of American History, IV, 
p. 373.
^ B a r n e s ,  Dominion of New England, pp. 31-33.
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were identical to those issued to the governor of the neigh­
boring Royal province of New York. The most obvious mani­
festation of the King's interest in ruling effectively the 
new union was the presence of sixty British regulars, the 
first to serve in New England, who arrived with Andros.®6 
The Dominion was, however, not complete. In August, 
1688, New York and the Jerseys were added to it,®^ and a 
new charter was issued. That document made James' desire 
to control tightly local government absolutely clear. There 
was no Assembly in the Dominion to challenge the governor's 
authority; the governor and his Council were the legis­
lators. To keep the governor, whom he appointed, and the 
Councilors, whom the governor appointed, from forgetting 
their obligations to the mother country, James mandated that 
all Dominion laws be reviewed in England. Similarly, the 
decisions of the Governor and his Council, who constituted 
the highest court (as well as furnishing the occupants of 
most of the colony's other offices) could be appealed to 
the Royal Courts in cases involving more than £300.®®
®®Osgood, American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, 
III, pp. 393, 400.
^^Osgood, American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, 
III, p. 400.
®®Barnes, Dominion of New England, pp. 41, 72.
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The Dominion of New England simply established the 
effective national control of local government in the new 
world that James was endeavoring to create in England.
Since James was admittedly Catholic, advised by a Jesuit, 
and pressing a policy of toleration, many Anglican members 
of the English gentry concluded the King was attempting to 
destroy their religion, re-establish the Church of Rome, 
seize their property, abrogate their traditional liberties, 
and rob them of their place in society.69 This, of course, 
he denied.
To save themselves from what they considered a growing
despotism on the French model,7** seven Englishmen invited
William of Orange to invade England. William was not asked
to attack King James, but to protect the English people from
71the King's army while his opponents prepared a revolt. x
Apparently a large portion of the English people shared 
the "Immortal Seven's" belief that James was building a 
tyranny. Although their statement that "nineteen parts of 
twenty of the people...are desirous of a change..."72 cannot 
be confirmed, disloyalty to King James II was widespread.
^^Ashley, Glorious Revolution of 1688, pp. 122,201.
7**Carswell, Descent on England, pp. 67-68.
^Ashley, Glorious Revolution of 1688, pp. 201-202.
72Ashley, Glorious Revolution of 1688, p. 201
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A list now at the Hague lists eighty-five of one hundred 
sixty-one English peers as being definitely opposed to 
James, and thirty-five others as probably opposing him. The 
loyalty of the Royal Navy, which James had commanded in 
battle,73 also crumbled. The captains of some of the ships 
which had been ordered to keep William from landing, held a 
Council of War and formally agreed to join the Prince of 
Orange's fleet, not to oppose it. Even the army, which had 
been considered the backbone of James' despotism, turned 
against him. On November 20, 1688, only two weeks after 
William landed, the leading officers of the King's army 
joined h i m . 74 Among the desserters was James' second in 
command, John Churchill. Churchill had served the King 
since the beginning of the reign, and his wife Sarah was one 
of Queen Mary of Modena's l a d i e s - i n - w a i t i n g . 75 The gentry 
had made its attitude toward James clear as early as 1685, 
when the Duke of Monmouth had attempted to seize the throne.
The almost universal welcome which William received in 
England, made the failure of James' policies of toleration 
and centralization absolutely clear. As national control of
73Michael Lewis, The History of the British Navy 
(Fair Lawn, N.J., 1959), p. 93.
74Ashley, Glorious Revolution of 1688, pp. 120, 158,
167.
^Prall, Bloodless Revolution, pp. 229-230..
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local government had been closely associated with the hated 
policy of toleration, it had become an anathema to the 
gentry. Fortunately, William had neither the need nor the 
desire to control the local governments. He had invaded 
England to insure that she would remain steadfastly anti- 
French. 76 AS the gentry strongly supported this policy, 
William was sure of the voluntary support of Parliament, and 
so could and did recognize the right of the gentry to con­
trol local governments and their parliamentary s e a t s . 78
News of the Glorious Revolution did not reach Boston 
until April 4, 1689, two months after the Revolutionary 
Settlement had been completed in England. Governor Andros 
responded to the news, not by proclaiming William and Mary, 
but by jailing John Winslow who had carried the report from 
Nevis. This convinced the people of Boston, who had never 
been sympathetic to the Dominion, that the governor intended 
to surrender them to the French; this brought the city to 
the edge of rebellion. A tenuous peace was preserved until 
April 17, when a militia company from Maine, which had muti­
nied against its Catholic officers, arrived in Boston.
?6prall, Bloodless Revolution, p. 211.
^Carswell, Descent on England, p. 68.
78Prall, Bloodless Revolution, pp. 319-320.
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Their arrival set off the revolt which had been smoldering. 
The Maine insurgents were soon joined by the Boston and 
Charlestown militias. Andros responded by prudently with­
drawing to the fort with his small force of regulars. The 
next day he foolishly left the safety of the fort to meet 
the rebel leaders at the town-house. They arrested him and 
obtained the surrender of Andros1 troops by the simple ex­
pedient of informing them that the Governor had ordered them 
to capitulate. On April 20, a Council of Safety was formed 
to govern Boston, and a little more than a month later, on 
May 22, a colony wide convention decided to resume govern­
ment under the old charter. News of the rebellion spread 
rapidly, and by July 2, 1689 all of the constituent parts of 
the Dominion had broken away and formally proclaimed William 
and Mary.
The people of America, like the people of England, had 
taken advantage of the first opportunity to recapture the 
control of their local governments which James had taken 
from them. As in England, William was willing to allow to 
local governments in America freedom from national control.
He had come to the throne as an opponent of James' despotism, 
and therefore could not have justified continuing one of 
James' most repugnant policies, in the face of popular 
opposition. The new King had no inclination to defend
^Barnes, Dominion of New England, pp. 239-250, 
N.Y.C.D., III, pp. 596-5^7.
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James' colonial policy. He was concerned with European, not 
American affairs, and viewed the colonies only as sources of 
wealth which would make England better able to oppose France. 
The decentralized, almost nebulous system, which James had 
replaced with the Dominion, was admirably suited to William's 
ends, so he returned to it.®®
Although William did make some minor changes in the 
organs of colonial administration, neither he nor his suc­
cessors, until the 1760's, made any fundamental changes in 
the colonial system. The English were concerned only with 
regulating colonial trade, not the internal government of 
the colonies. This gave the colonies seventy years of vir­
tually complete internal autonomy to develop their own polit­
ical institutions. New Yorkers took full advantage of that 
freedom.
®®George Herbert Guttridge, The Colonial Policy of 
William III in America and the West Indies (Hamden, Conn., 
1966) , pp. 41, 42,99.
CHAPTER TWO
THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT AND THE COLONIES:
AUTHORITY AND INDIFFERENCE
The failure of the English government to concern itself 
with governing its American possessions,! and to develop a 
coherent policy for controlling them^ was apparently inherent 
in the English political system. In the second quarter of 
the eighteenth century England was going through profound 
economic, social, and political changes, and many English­
men, especially among the gentry found security^ by closing 
their minds to as many alterations as p o s s i b l e .4 sir Robert 
Walpole, who dominated England's government from 1722 to
^-Stanley Nider Katz, Newcastle's New York (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1968), p. 10.
John Harold Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole (2 vols., 
Boston, 1956, 1961), II, 77.
^Plumb, Walpole, I, 35-6.
^James A. Henretta, "Salutary Neglect" Colonial 
Administration Under the Duke of Newcastle (Princeton, 
N.J., 1972), pp. 312-20.
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1742, 8 understood, and to some extent shared, the fears of 
the gentry, the backbone of his Parliamentary support® and 
essential to the survival of his administration. To retain 
such support Walpole adopted policies of peace and low 
taxes? which were directly responsive to the gentry's needs 
and concerns.® Walpole saw no reason to concern himself, 
or his government, with matters which were unimportant to 
his supporters— if he almost completely ignored the colonies 
they were, after all, far outside the ordinary interests of 
the English gentry.
Unconcern with the colonies was rife; virtually all 
civilian officials neglected North America.® The papers of 
men who wielded influence and power in Parliament, the min­
istry, the Court, and the judiciary, during the period from 
1717 to 1753, all clearly indicate that the men in London 
legally responsible for governing America regarded it as 
nothing more than a source of advantage for English merchants 
and politicians.
Spiumb, Walpole, II, 245.
®Plumb, Walpole, I, 42, Michael Kammen, Empire and 
Interest (Philadelphia, 1970), p. 43.
?Plumb, Walpole, II, 202.
8Plumb, Walpole, I, 3.
®Henretta, Salutary Neglect, p. vii.
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For example, Spencer Compton, Earl of Wilmington served 
as Speaker of the House of Commons from 1715 to 1727, and 
Lord President of the [Privy] Council from 1730 to 1742.10 
Although he headed the bodies which legislated for, and 
heard appeals from, the colonies, none of his letters men­
tion America or the individual American colonies. Only the 
presence of some appeals from America in his correspondence 
indicate that Compton was in any way aware of the existence 
of Britain's over-seas possessions.H
Nor were individual Members of Parliament more inter­
ested in the colonies than their one-time Speaker. Edward 
Knatchbull was one of the few truly independent members of 
the Commons. Occupant of a family seat for the County of 
Kent,!2 his rather detailed diary of the proceedings of the 
House of Commons from 1722 to 1730 mentions America only 
twice! On February 21, 1724, Knatchbull noted that some 
investors in the ill-fated Bahama Island Company had
10”Compton, Spencer," Dictionary of National Bio 
graphy, IV, 906-7.
^Great Britain Historical Manuscripts Commission, 
Eleventh Report, Appendix, Part IV, The Manuscripts of 
the Marquess Townshend, pp. 127-144, 201-45,258-9 (includes 
Wilmington manuscripts) (hereafter Townshend, MSS.).
!2Plumb, Walpole, II, 143-4, William Cobbett, Parlia­
mentary History x?f England from the Norman Conquest, VIII 
(New York, 1966, reprint of London, 1810 edition),p. 7.
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unsuccessfully petitioned for assistance in recovering their 
investments.^ More than five years later, on March 6 and 
March 13, 1729, Knatchbull found another piece of American 
business worthy of mention. He reported that merchants 
trading with America had presented petitions complaining of 
Spanish attacks on their s h i p s h e  did not, however, see 
fit to record the House's action on their complaints. As 
these were not the only discussions of colonial affairs in 
Commons between 1722 and 173015 it seems significant that 
the only colonial matters Knatchbull recorded affected 
British merchants as much as, if not more than, colonies.
It is likely, therefore, that Knatchbull's concern was for 
English merchants, merchants who happened to trade with the 
colonies, and not with the colonies themselves.
Unlike Knatchbull's diary, which rarely mentions the 
colonies, the diary of John Perceval, first earl of Egmont, 
which covers the years 1730 to 1747, betrays its author's 
disinterest in colonial affairs with frequent references to
l^Edward Knatchbull, The Parliamentary Diary of Sir 
Edward Knatchbull, 1722-1730 (London, 1963) , pp. 27-8.
14Knatchbull, Parliamentary Diary, pp. 89, 91-2.
■^See Leo Francis Stock, Proceedings and Debates of
the British Parliaments Respecting North America (5 vols., 
Washington, D.C., 1924-41), IV (hereafter Stock, 
Proceedings).
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one of the colonies. Egmont, an Irish peer, and member of
the English House of Commons, considered himself a leader
of the House, and of its "Irish Interest; he was also an
active member of the Georgia Board of Trustees.1? His diary
contains many references to Georgia,and South Carolina,
1 Qits nearest neighbor. * There is, however, only one entry 
which demonstrates any interest in the other colonies. It 
records a discussion between Sir Robert Walpole, and General 
James Oglethorpe, the chairman of the Georgia Trustees, in 
which Oglethorpe emphasized the importance of a strong colo­
nial defense establishment to the continued security of 
G e o r g i a . 20 There is only one mention of the colonies which 
is not directly linked to the development of Georgia.
Egmont discussed the unwillingness of the West Indian 
colonies to provide adequate salaries for their governors 
with Queen Caroline on July 28, 1732, but apparently the
Ôpiurnb, Walpole, II, 144-5.
17,'Perceval, John," DNB, XV, 813-5.
18 .Great Britain Historical Manuscripts Commission,
Sixteenth Report, Diary of Viscount Perceval afterwards
First Earl of Egmont, R.A. Roberts, editor (3 vols., London,
1920-1933) , III, 428-36 (hereafter Egmont, Diary).
^Egmont, Diary, III, 394-5.
20Egmont, Diary, II, 339-41, Feb. 5, 1736/7.
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subject was not of much interest to Her Majesty, for after 
opining that the matter could be resolved only by an act of 
Parliament she turned the conversation to Egmont's real 
interest, Georgia.2  ̂ Despite, or perhaps because of, its 
recurrent references to Georgia, Egmont's Diary reflects no 
interest in the development of the British empire as a whole, 
and leaves the imp?‘ession that Egmont looked upon North 
America only as an adjunct to Georgia.
The Earls of Marchmont, of the Scotch nobility, were no 
more interested in America than was Egmont, an Irish peer. 
They were the descendants of Patrick Hume, a Scot so passion­
ately devoted to the maintenance of a Protestant monarchy in 
Great Britain that he had joined James Scott, the Duke of 
Monmouth, Charles II's illegitimate but Protestant son, in a 
plot to insure the Protestant succession.22 Exposure of the 
Rye House plot had forced Hume to flee to Holland where he 
became an advisor of William of Orange. He returned to 
Britain with William's invading army, and was rewarded for 
his loyalty with the Earldom of Marchmont in the Scotch 
peerage.22 His son, Alexander Campbell, the second earl of
2^Egmont, Diary, I, 288.
^George Clark, The Later Stuarts 1660-1714, 2nd ed­
ition, volume X, The Oxford History of England,George 
Clark, editor (Oxford, 1961), pp. 104-5.
23"Hume, Patrick," DNB, X, 233.
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Marchmont, was also active in politics. Selected as one 
of the sixteen Scotch peers to sit in the House of Lords 
at Westminster,24 he was a strong advocate of the Union of 
England and Scotland, and of the Hanoverian s u c c e s s i o n . 25 
Yet despite his great interest in British unity, Marchmont 
was almost totally unconcerned with the colonies which com­
prised much of Britain's empire. The only reference to 
them in his letters is a note, dated December 9, 1739, from 
John Dalrymple, second earl of Stair, which mentions the 
possibility of English and American troops joining in an 
assault on Havana in case of war with Spain.26
Alexander's son, Hugh Campbell, was active in politics 
until his father's death (when his inability to secure elec­
tion as one of the Scotish Representative Peers ended his 
career) and while in the Commons, Campbell was an active 
opponent of Walpole.Apparently, however, he did not 
quarrel with Walpole's neglect of the colonies for his 
papers never mention America!
2*Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 289.
25"Campbell, Alexander," DNB, III, 760.
2®Marchmont, A Selection from the Papers of the Earls 
of Marchmont, George H. Rose, editor (3 vols., London, 1831), 
II, 170-1.
27"campbell, Hugh," DNB, III, 60.
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Walpole's own lack of concern with the colonies is 
reflected in the papers of his youngest son, Horace, fourth 
earl of Oxford, the noted letter writer and wit.28 Horace 
Walpole's voluminous correspondence28 contains detailed de­
scriptions of all aspects of life which were of interest to 
his compeers: English politics, European affairs, The War
of the Austrian Succession, Court gossip, the continual 
search of English politicians for preferment, the rising of 
1745 in Scotland, and the opera; but although America is 
occasionally mentioned in Horace's extensive correspondence, 
the sparsity and brevity of the references reflects the un­
importance of America in his thinking.
Horace apparently shared his father's lack of concern 
with America for on October 22, 1742 (O.S.) he dismissed 
Admiral Edward Vernon's success in the West Indies as 
"...most a g r e e a b l e . . . ."30 t w o  months later, however, he 
made a comment which reflected the British disdain for the 
colonies, noting on December 16 that Charles Rose, son of a 
Customs Commissioner, had been given a lieutenancy, which
28"Walpole, Horace," DNB, XX, 627-33.
^Horace Walpole, The Letters of Horace Walpole, Mrs. 
Paget Toynbee, editor (16 vols., Oxford, 1903-1905).
3®Walpole, Letters, I, 112-3.
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saved him from the "dishonor" of refusing a post in the 
West Indies.^ Mr. Rose's willingness to risk dishonor and 
unemployment in that honor conscious and preferment hungry 
age rather than go to the West Indies also reflects how 
little he, too, thought of America.
The ministry's willingness, despite the continued 
demand for positions, to find a post which would permit Rose 
to avoid the unpleasant consequences of refusal, indicates 
that his attitude toward America was considered "reasonable" 
by those in power.
On June 30, 1742 Horace Walpole repeated a joke about 
a Methodist Minister and an Indian c o n v e r t , ^2 which was at 
the expense of the Methodist (a sect not then terribly pop­
ular in England).33 After a six year hiatus, Walpole found 
another American subject "worthy" of his attention. He 
mentioned that Admiral Vernon had given him some confidential 
information about the effect West Indian conditions would 
have on the negotiations at Aix-La-Chapelle.
31-Walpole, Letters, I, 142-3.
^^Walpole, Letters, I, 245.
^"Methodism," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1973 edition, 
XV, 302.
3*walpole, Letters, II, 319, July 14, 1748.
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Walpole's passing references to America suggest that 
the colonies were, to him, of little importance. His only 
extended comment on American affairs indicates that his 
disdain for the colonies was liberally mixed with scorn for 
their institutions. On February 25, 1750 he described the 
activities of the House of Commons:
We have been sitting this fortnight on the 
African Company: we, the British Senate, tem­
ple of liberty, and bulwark of Protestant 
Christianity, have this fortnight been ponder­
ing methods to make more effectual that horrid 
traffic of selling negroes. It has appeared 
to us that six-and-forty-thousand of these 
wretches are sold every year to our planta­
tions alone! —  it chills one's blood. I 
would not have to say that I voted in it for 
the continent of America..."35
Walpole's revulsion with the Americans apparently was, 
however, of no more consequence than his other feelings 
toward the colonies, for, despite the horrified tone of the 
above letter, Walpole ignored the slave trade in his subse­
quent correspondence. Two weeks later he matter-of-factly 
reported Rear Admiral Charles Knowles' opinion that the re­
cent London earthquake was more severe than the West Indian 
upheavals.
35walpole, Letters, II, 432-3.
^ ^ W a l p o l e ,  Letters, II, 434, March 11, 1750.
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The Journal of George Bubb Doddington (first baron 
Melcombe) confirms that English politicians were almost 
totally unconcerned with the colonies. Doddington aspired 
to join the small group which dominated the English govern­
ment, and apparently he devoted much of his energy to 
reaching that goal. He had all the qualifications for high 
office: a seat in Parliament, wealth, experience in foreign
and financial affairs, and powerful friends,3? but, despite 
a lifetime of efforts which "raised toadyism to almost sub­
lime proportions"38 he never obtained the august posts he so 
badly desired.39
The Journal contains a fairly large number of refer­
ences to America; some reflect his overwhelming concern with 
obtaining office, and others the lack of a more interesting 
subject for the daily entry in the Journal; none, however, 
betray any real interest in America.
When Doddington was out of office he was interested in 
finding ways to embarrass the government. Consequently he
3?George Bubb Doddington, The Political Journal of 
George Bubb Doddington, John Carswell and Lewis Arnold 
Dralle, editors (Oxford, 1965), p. ix.
38sasil Williams, The Whig Supremacy, 1714-1760, 2nd 
edition, revised by C.H. Stuart, vol. XI, The Oxford History 
of England, George Clark, editor (Oxford, 1962), p. IF!
39Doddington, Journal, pp. xi, xvi-xviii, xxiii.
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paid considerable attention to the ministry's project to 
increase the number of English settlers in Nova Scotia 
which had been acquired from France in 1713),4® which 
Doddington believed was open to criticism. On February 5, 
1750 he wrote that only his inability to substantiate his 
charges kept him from raising the Nova Scotia question.4^
He did not, however, abandon the Nova Scotia settlement as 
a source of political advantage42 and on February 13, 1753, 
just three years after he began to consider the political 
uses of Nova Scotia, Doddington noted in his Journal that 
his ally, John Russell, fourth duke of Bedford, had "ably" 
presented the motion requiring the government to present the 
records of Nova Scotia to the House of Lords.42
Surely Doddington was not interested in the welfare of 
the people of Nova Scotia. His only goal was to improve his 
political position, and he was as willing to use the adminis­
tration of Dunkirk to reach that end as he was the adminis­
tration of Nova Scotia.44 His sanguine attitude toward the
40Wi lliams, Whig Supremacy, p. 311.
41Doddington, Journal, p. 45.
^Doddington, Journal, pp. 52, 77, Feb. 9, 1750, July 2,
1750.
43Doddington, Journal, p. 205.
44Doddington, Journal, p. 45.
44
colonies was reflected by the complete indifference with 
which he reported the decision of the Trustees for Georgia 
to surrender their charter to the Crown,4 5 and of the House 
of Commons to delay consideration for a year of hearings on 
the Sugar Colonies.4®
Thus the papers of Compton, Knatchbull, Perceval, 
both Campbells, Walpole, and Doddington, men whose service 
in Parliament spanned the period from 1720 to 1750, men of 
different political persuasions, all unmistakably demon­
strate the English legislator's almost complete unconcern 
for the American colonies. All these men, despite the differ­
ences, agreed that the colonies were worthy of note only when 
they could be of "advantage" to residents of the British 
Isles. Apathy toward the colonies was not merely limited to 
members of Parliament. At least two of the Secretaries of 
State, the officials charged with administering the colo­
nies, 4  ̂demonstrated almost complete indifference toward the 
territories which they were theoretically supervising.
For example, the papers of Charles Townshend, second 
viscount Townshend, who served as Secretary of State for the
45ooddington, Journal, p. 141, Dec. 19, 1751.
4®Doddington, Journal, p. 114, April 22, 1751.
4^Williams, Whig Supremacy, p. 471.
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Northern department from 1714 to 1716, and from 1721 to 
1730^® contain only passing references to the colonies,48 
and summaries of reports on colonial affairs received by 
the Board of Trade and the Privy C o u n c i l .^0 Although the 
Northern Secretary was not normally responsible for colo­
nial affairs, Townshend's complete lack of interest in the 
colonies indicates that the colonies were not judged worthy 
of even passing attention from high British officials.
John Russell, the fourth duke of Bedford's lack of con­
cern for the colonies was even more remarkable than 
Townshend's. His papers indicate that he almost completely 
ignored the colonies during his service as First Lord of the 
Admiralty in the War of the Austrian Succession, a conflict 
which involved the Royal Navy in America. This apathy was 
also apparent during his service as Secretary of State for 
the Southern Department, the official directly responsible 
for colonial administration.51
48Williams, Whig Supremacy, p. 471.
^Townshend, MSS, pp. 356, 372.
^Townshend, MSS, pp. 254-306.
51"Russell, John," DNB, XVII, 447-52, Bedford served 
in the admiralty from 1744 to 1748, and as Secretary of State 
for the Southern Department from February, 1748 to June,
1751.
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Only twice did Bedford officially recognize the exis­
tence of America in his four years at the Admiralty. On 
June 26, 1745, he used the success of the expedition against 
Louisbourg to justify recommending Sir Peter Warren, who had 
commanded it, for promotion to flag rank.^^ Nine months 
later, Bedford and the other admiralty commissioners sent 
Thomas Pelham-Holles, first duke of Newcastle, their eval­
uation of a plan to invade C a n a d a . ^3 These memoranda were, 
of course, not the only mention of the colonies in Bedford's 
papers during his tenure as First Lord. On November 6, 1747, 
Governor George Clinton of New York had written to him to 
complain that the province's Chief Justice James Delancey 
was obstructing New York's war effort; he asked Bedford to 
secure Delancey's removal from o f f i c e . ^4 Yet the Duke ap­
parently did not feel that Clinton's complaint was important, 
for he did not respond to it.
Bedford's failure to answer Clinton’s letter indicates 
that he had little inclination to concern himself with colo­
nial affairs, and a memoir he wrote after becoming Southern
52sedford, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of 
Bedford, Lord John Russell, editor (3 vols., London, 1842- 
1846), I, 28-30 (hereafter Bedford, Correspondence).
^Bedford, Correspondence, I, 65-9, March 20, 1746.
^ B e d f o r d ,  Correspondence, I, 285-6.
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Secretary provides definite evidence of his contempt. In 
September, 1748 Bedford sent the Duke of Newcastle a long, 
detailed analysis of the Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle, in which 
he carefully examined its effect on European affairs. He 
never even mentioned America in his analysis,55 a clear in­
dication of how little value was placed on the Crown's 
American possessions.
In 1751 Bedford, who had now left office, commented 
that the Spanish efforts to curb the illegal trade between 
British and Spanish subjects in America might be a cause of 
war between Britain and Spain. He seems to have felt, how­
ever, that responsibility for the conflict would lay with 
the Americans, who might not be willing to permit the com­
plete suppression of the illegal trade. Elimination of the 
illegal trade would end Spain's justification for maintaining 
the Costa Guarda fleet, the direct cause of the tensions 
between the two n a t i o n s . ^6
If Bedford, an official whose responsibilities were so 
closely related to the colonies could ignore them almost 
completely, it is not difficult to imagine how little weight 
colonial affairs carried with those Englishmen who were not 
forced by their official responsibilities to deal with them.
^ B e d f o r d ,  Correspondence, I, 529-38, Sept. 28, 1748. 
^Bedford, Correspondence, II, 71-2, Feb. 7/17, 1750/1.
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British lack of interest in her colonies was also 
reflected by the almost complete unavailability of infor­
mation about them. The autobiography of Richard Cumberland, 
the noted dramatist, records how little an educated, in­
telligent, and interested Englishman could learn about the 
colonies. Cumberland's father had recruited two companies 
for a regiment being raised by George Montagu Dunk, second 
earl of Halifax, and had supported the earl in the election 
of 1748. To repay the Cumberland's for their loyalty, 
Halifax who was President of the Board of Trade, appointed 
Richard his private and confidential secretary in 1748. ̂
To prepare himself for his duties, Cumberland (a Cambridge 
graduate) set out to learn as much as possible about colo­
nial government. He found that books about the colonies 
were "most discouragingly meagre and most oppressively 
tedious in communicating nothing." The plaucity of the 
material did not discourage young Cumberland, who "got a 
summary but sufficient insight into the constitutions of 
the respective provinces, for what was worth knowing was 
soon learnt...."
Perhaps it was fortunate that Cumberland was not forced 
to devote himself too strenuously to preparing for his post 
as even his slight effort was wasted. His duties consisted
57"Cumberland, Richad," DNB, V, 291.
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only of copying an occasional letter for the earl,58 who 
despite his reputation as an activist leader of the Board 
of Trade,59 found little for his secretary to do.
Nor was the Royal Court interested. John Hervey,
Baron Hervey of Ickworth was a supporter of Robert Walpole. 
He regularly visited with Queen Caroline to insure that her 
considerable influence over the King would benefit the min­
istry and its friends.5® Retaining the Queen's good will 
required Hervey's almost continual presence at St. James 
Palace, which in turn led him to become familiar with all 
the Court's concerns.81 His papers indicate that the colo­
nies were important to the Court only as sources of place 
and profit.
The small island colonies of St. Kitts and Nevis were 
useful to the Crown principally because sale of their Crown 
lands provided the £80,000 marriage portion which King
58Richard Cumberland, Memoirs of Richard Cumberland 
(2 vols., London, 1807), I, 137-8.
59oiiver Morton Dickerson, American Colonial Govern­
ment 1696-1765 (New York, 1962, reprint of 1912 edition), 
p. 49.
60"Hervey, John," DNB, IX, 735-9.
51John Hervey, Some Materials toward the memoirs of the 
reign of King George II by John, Lord Hervey, Romney Sedgwick, 
editor, (3 vols., London, 1931), I, 1 (hereafter Hervey, 
Memoirs.)
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George gave his eldest daughter Anne.®2 Even the island 
colonies were not useful or interesting to Courtiers. The 
Privy Council's discussion of "...the Indies, Plantations, 
ships, troops etc..." made it difficult for Hervey, who was 
"...half dead to-day with a headache, the consequence of 
dancing, supping, and sitting up late last night at the 
Duke of Newcastle's" to concentrate on the letter he was 
w r i t i n g .®2 jf the matter before the Council had been more 
important, Hervey might have put off his correspondence.
What little interest Hervey had in the colonies was 
in colonial offices. On November 25, 1736, he wrote his 
friend and political ally, Henry Fox, first baron Holland, 
that he had been told there would be no changes in the 
personnel of the colonial governments,®4 and a year later he 
notified his friend of the good fortune of Francis Seymour 
Conway, first marquess of Hertford, who secured the govern­
ment of Minorca, and William Anne Keppel, second earl of 
Albermarle, who was appointed governor of Jamaica.®®
®2Hervey, Memoirs, I, 194.
6^John Hervey, Lord Hervey and His Friends, 1726-1738, 
Earl of Ilchester, editor (London, 1950) , pp. 113-4,
November 25, 1731.
64Hervey, Hervey and Friends, p. 2 56.
®®Hervey, Hervey and Friends, p. 273, Sept. 24, 1737.
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A dowry, a hangover, and two appointments, certainly 
do not indicate an overwhelming interest in colonial affairs.
As Hervey was a courtier in the traditional sense, a man
whose position depended directly on the good will of the 
Queen, it is probable that neither the Queen, nor the King 
(whom she influenced greatly) were much concerned with 
"their" colonies. The Royal couple's attitude reflected 
the apathy toward America which was rampant throughout the 
government.
Even the law courts paid little attention to the colo­
nies. The memoirs of Philip Yorke, first earl of Hardwicke, 
Solicitor General from 1720 to 1724, Attorney General from 
1724 to 1733, Chief Justice of King's Bench from 1733 to 
1737, Lord Chancellor from 1737 to 1764 and an active member 
of both Houses of Parliament®® mentions the colonies only 
twice. Yorke's first, and only professional contact with the
colonies occurred in 1725, when as Attorney General, he
argued that the American colonies were not "conquered coun­
tries," but "colonies of English subjects" who retained 
their rights as Englishmen.®^ The colonies came to Yorke's
®®"Yorke, Philip," DNB, XXI, 1261-6.
®^Philip C. Yorke, The Life and Correspondence of 
Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor of 
Great Britain (3 vols., Cambridge, 1913), I, 89-91 
(hereafter Yorke, Life).
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attention, for the second and final time, twenty-five years 
later when he dissuaded his ally Henry Pelham from proposing 
a Parliamentary tax on the American colonies.®®
As Yorke was preeminent in his profession, his memoirs 
are also a detailed examination of his mid-eighteenth cen­
tury Enqland's judicial and political history. The lack of 
references to the colonies indicates that America was of 
very little or no interest to the English government. This 
conclusion is supported by the papers of Philip Dormer 
Stanhope, fourth earl of Chesterfield, and Robert Hampden, 
first Viscount Hampden, and fourth baron T r e v o r . Although 
both men had active and successful c a r e e r s , 70 neither saw 
fit to mention America in their correspondence, clearly 
indicating how little the colonies affected the British 
political process.
The willingness to ignore the colonies, manifested in 
the papers of British politicians of all persuasions, was
®®Yorke, Life, II, 8 .
^Chesterfield, The Letters of Philip Dormer Stanhope, 
fourth Earl of Chesterfield, Bonamy Dobree, editor (6 vols., 
London, 1932) , Great Britain Historical Manuscripts Com­
mission, Fourteenth Report, Appendix, Part IX, Trevor 
Manuscripts (London, 1895).
7 0"Stanhope, Philip Dormer," DNB, XVIII, 911-24, 
"Hampden, Robert," DNB, XIX, 1153-4.
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a product of mid-eighteenth century England's "political 
philosophy." From the Tudor period to the death of Queen 
Anne the English political community devoted its attention 
to significant issues, the break with Rome, the religious 
settlement, Elizabeth's successor, the limits of Royal 
authority, the Civil War, the Restoration, the Glorious 
Revolution, and the problem of who would follow Anne, the 
last Protestant Stuart, on the throne of England. The 
accession of King George I insured a Protestant monarchy, 
and for the first time in almost two centuries English 
politicians found themselves without basic philosophic 
differences. Consequently the political community which for 
so long had concerned itself with the nation's fate, occu­
pied itself by turning to self-aggrandizement. By the mid­
eighteenth century, virtually every one in England viewed 
politics solely as a system for advancing private interests; 
the concern for the nation's well-being which had so long 
been paramount in England had disappeared from the political 
consciousness.
The dominant place of self-interest in English politics 
is well illustrated by the behavior of the voters of the 
borough of Tewkesbury in the election of 1753. The
^Lewis B. Namier, The Structure of Politics at the 
Accession of George III (London, 1968), pp. 16-7.
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community's roads were in execrable condition and the voters 
decided to secure their repair by agreeing to support only 
candidates who would pledge 41,500 each for road improve­
ments. The incumbants, Lord William Hall Gage, and his son, 
Thomas, refused to accede to Tewkesbury voters' demands and 
were defeated by John Martin and Nicholson Calvert who were 
more generous than the Gages.
The behavior of the Tewkesbury electors might have been 
extreme, but it was not at all unusual for many members to 
"buy" their seats in the Commons.73 no more than 80 of the 
558 members of the House of Commons were "independent coun­
try gentlemen," serving in the House without thought of per­
sonal gain or advancement, every other member was in the 
House to gain status, and to open the way to profitable 
offices. As the "independents" (who were in any case a 
small minority) were much less regular in their attendance 
than those who hoped to profit from service in Parliament, 
there was nothing to restrain the avarice of the other mem­
bers, and the House of Commons became a body dedicated to 
advancing private, not public, interests.74
As the government of Great Britain was drawn from the 
Houses of Parliament, it too was comprised of men who placed
72Namier, Structure, p. 131.
^Namier, Structure, chapter 2.
^*Namier, Structure, pp. 12-7, 63.
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their own interests before the nation's. It is, therefore, 
not surprising that they neglected Britain's colonies which 
were far away, and could provide little profit for the 
English politicians. The government dealt with colonial 
affairs only when they were inescapable, resolved them as 
rapidly and as quietly as possible, and returned to its 
primary duty of ruling England.75 No one had the time or 
inclination to develop a coherent colonial policy.7®
The member of the English government most directly con­
cerned with the colonies was the Secretary of State for the 
Southern Department. Originally the monarch's private sec­
retary, the Secretary of State had charge of the signet seal 
which authenticated government correspondence.7? The Sec­
retary's duties included transmitting the monarch's instruc­
tions to the various departments of government. The acces­
sion of Queen Anne, and the first two Georges, rulers who 
had no inclination to actively control their governments 
resulted in the Secretaries "inheriting" the Crown's author­
ity to determine governmental policy in all but financial
75Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Government in America 
(New York, 1958, reprint of 1930 edition), p. 3.
75Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 10-11.
77Mark A. Thomson, The Secretaries of State, 1681-1782
(Oxford, 1932), p. 1.
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and military affairs.7® Simultaneously they obtained con­
trol of the Board of Trade. The Board, which had been 
created to advise King William 111,79 began to advise the 
Secretary, who, like the King, could delegate as much, or 
as little authority to the Board as he wished.®®
In 1702 Daniel Finch, second earl of Nottingham, Queen
Anne's Secretary of State for the Southern Department, began 
to retrieve the authority over colonial patronage which King 
William had delegated to the Board.81 t w o  of King George I's 
Southern Secretaries, James Stanhope, and Thomas Pelham- 
Holles (first duke of Newcastle), continued to retrieve the 
Crown's authority in colonial affairs until, ultimately, the 
Board had none.®^ The Duke of Newcastle officially confirmed 
the Board's decline, when, in 1738, he instructed it to refer
78"secretary of State," Chamber's Encyclopaedia, new
revised edition (Oxford, 1967), XII, 399.
7®Derek Jarrett, Britain, 1688-1815 (New York, 1965),
p. 28.
®®Thomson, Secretaries of State, pp. 45-47.
81Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", pp. 24-5.
®2Dickerson, American Colonial Government, pp. 107-8, 
Edward Raymond Turner, The Privy Council of England, 1603- 
1784 (2 vols., Baltimore, 1927-1928), II, 358.
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all important matters to his office, and to act only on 
matters referred to it by the Secretary of State or the 
Privy Council.88 The elimination of the Board of Trade's 
authority in colonial affairs meant that the colonies would 
receive little attention from the British government. The 
Secretaries of State for the Southern Department, who had 
assumed the Board's duties, were too involved in British 
and European affairs to have the time or the inclination to 
interfere in the colonial g o v e r n m e n t s .
The Duke of Newcastle's pre-eminence firmly established 
political expediency, not ability as the basis of the dis­
tribution of offices in Britain and the c o l o n i e s . c o l o ­
nial posts worth as much as £8,000 per annum®® were awarded
88Dickerson, American Colonial Government, pp. 36-7, 47.
8^Williams, Whig Supremacy, pp. 311-2, Henretta, 
"Salutary Neglect", p. 32, Thomson, Secretaries of State, 
p. 49.
8®Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", p. 165, Plumb, Walpole, 
II, 92.
8®Plumb, Walpole, II, 98, Great Britain, Public Record 
Office, Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America 
and West Indies, W. N. Sainsbury and others, editors (42 
vols., London, 1860-1963), XL, xv-xviii (hereafter CSP) 
contains a list of the colonial offices controlled bythe 
Secretary of State.
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to English politicians whose support was useful to 
N e w c a s t l e ;  S’? and colonial revenues, which might have been 
used to strengthen the colonial governments, were diverted 
to England where they would be politically beneficial to 
the ministry.88 In short Newcastle made the colonial govern­
ments a mere adjunct of the British political patronage sys­
tem, 89 and virtually no one in England questioned his ap­
proach. Even the internal politics of the colonies (when 
they were noticed at all) were treated as extensions of 
British p o l i t i c s . 80 in 1733, William Cosby, the Governor 
of New York, wrote Newcastle to suggest that opponents of 
the ministry were attempting to embarrass it by stirring 
up trouble in New E n g l a n d . 81
The use of American offices to support English poli­
ticians naturally meant that Americans could not hope for 
positions in their governments,82 and so the governors were
87nenretta, "Salutary Neglect", pp. 52-3, CSP, XL, xv.
®®Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", p. 18.
®8nenretta, "Salutary Neglect", p. 130.
80cSP, XL, xv.
91CSP, XL, 25.
8 2Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", p. 134.
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deprived of an inducement useful in obtaining the cooper­
ation of colonial leaders. It also meant that colonial 
offices were often filled by deputies who abused their 
powers and thereby created resentment of British authority 
in the colonies.93 The British government, however, cared 
so little about the colonies that it never considered the 
possible ramifications of its exploitive policy in the 
colonies.9*
The English politician best known for his willingness 
to subordinate the colonies to the exigencies of English 
politics was Thomas Pelham-Holles, first duke of Newcastle. 
For a while after he was named Secretary of State for the 
Southern Department, on April 6, 1724, Newcastle devoted 
considerable attention to colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 95 He 
soon realized, however, that pursuing a coherent colonial 
policy would make the realization of his basic goal, com­
plete dominance of the British political system more diffi­
cult, so he adopted an exploitive attitude toward the colo-
^•^Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", pp. 237, 242-45, 254.
9*Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 12, Henretta, 
"Salutary Neglect", pp. 134-5, 281.
9^Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", pp. 73-4.
96Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", pp. 47, 93, 259.
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Newcastle was so unconcerned with colonial government 
that he had no qualms about subordinating the basic prin­
ciples of colonial administration to political consider­
ations. When William Burnet was appointed governor of 
Massachusetts Bay in 1728, his instructions required him 
to obtain a permanent revenue from the colony's General 
Assembly. The colonists were unwilling to create a per­
petual revenue, and a dispute developed. Burnet informed 
Newcastle of the situation and of his determination to se­
cure obedience to his instructions. Newcastle responded in 
a "private letter" dated June 26, 1729, urging Burnet to ig­
nore his instructions and accept a revenue grant which would 
expire when he left office. The Southern Secretary favored 
this "compromise" because, despite its adverse effects on 
the governor's authority, it would resolve the dispute and 
spare him the politically inexpedient necessity of asking 
Parliament to intervene in the situation in M a s s a c h u s e t t s . ^ 7 
Newcastle's treatment of Lewis Morris, of New York, who 
traveled to London in 1734 to lodge complaints against 
Governor William Cosby of that Province was also motivated 
by the exigencies of English politics. The dispute had its 
origins on July 1, 1731 when Rip Van Dam, the senior member 
of the colony's council assumed control of the government
9?Labaree, Royal Government, pp. 361-3.
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after the death of Governor John Montgomerie9® (as required 
by the late governor's instructions)®9 and collected all of 
the governor's salary and perquisites. When Cosby arrived 
in New York as its new governor, he produced his instruc­
tions and claimed half of all of Van Dam's profits. Van 
Dam refused, and a bitter quarrel developed in which Lewis 
Morris, Sr., who had been the colony's chief justice since 
1715,I®9 supported Van Dam.l®!
Cosby responded by removing Morris from office in May, 
1733,I®2 When correspondence with London failed to secure 
reinstatement, Morris decided personally to press his suit 
in the capital. The Privy Council, after hearing Morris,
Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the 
Eighteenth Century (4 vols., Gloucester, Mass., 1958, re­
print of 1924-1925 edition), II, 443, (hereafter Osgood, 
Eighteenth).
99Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Instruction to British 
Colonial Governors, 1670-1776 (2 vols., New York, 1967, re- 
print of 1935 edition), I, 78-9.
100New York State, Secretary of State, Documents Rela­
tive to the Colonial History of the State of New York,
Edmund B. O'Callaghan, and Berthold Fernow editors Tl5 vols., 
Albany, N.Y., 1861-1887), V, 419 (hereafter NYCD).
^°^For detailed treatment of the dispute see, Katz, 
Newcastle's New York, pp. 61-132.
102Cosby's letter informing Newcastle of Morris' re­
moval is dated May 3, 1733, NYCD, V, 942-50.
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ruled in November 1735, that Cosby had acted improperly; 
but it did not restore the former chief justice to o f f i c e .  
Morris' triumph was consequently empty; yet the responsi­
bility had been Newcastle's. The Duke had used his enor­
mous influence to protect Cosby-*-^ simply because George 
Montagu-Dunk, second earl of Halifax, an important member of 
Newcastle's i n t e r e s t , w a s  Cosby's brother-in-law.106 
Morris, unwilling to accept defeat, still hoped to secure 
reinstatement by bringing his case to the King. Newcastle, 
whose duties as Secretary of State included accepting peti­
tions to the Crown, refused those of Morris.^-®7 No other 
official would bring Morris' address to the King,!®® and the 
case was effectively closed and Cosby was protected from em­
barrassment, and Newcastle's alliance with Halifax was fur­
ther secured.
The next governor to serve in New York, Admiral George 
Clinton, also became embroiled in a somewhat similar dispute,
!®®0sgood, Eighteenth, II, 464-5.
104Katz, Newcastle's New York, P- 125.
insNamier, Structure of Politics, pp. 41-2, 227-8.
106Katz, Newcastle's New York, P- 61.
107Katz, Newcastle's New York, P- 113.
108Katz, Newcastle's New York, P- 124.
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and Newcastle again intervened to protect his English 
interests.
When Clinton arrived in New York on September 20, 
1743,1^9 he promptly formed an alliance with James Delancey 
(Lewis Morris' successor as chief justice). Apparently 
Delancey felt that he, not the governor, should dominate 
the colony's politics, and when Clinton, in February 1746, 
induced the Assembly to pass a bill (intended to prevent 
desertions from the regiments on the frontier) of which 
Delancey disapproved, the chief justice had the Council re­
ject the bill. This was the immediate cause of a quarrel 
which once again paralyzed the colony's government.H O  
Newcastle supported Clinton in his dispute with Delancey 
because the governor's nephew, Henry Clinton, ninth earl 
of Lincoln, controlled a number of parliamentary seats 
which were important to Newcastle, and the earl would have 
been offended, perhaps to the point of finding new political 
allies, had Newcastle not supported the governor.m Al­
though the War of the Austrian Succession prevented New­
castle from supporting Clinton as vigorously as he had 
Cosby,H2 the Board of Trade's report on the dispute did
109NYCD, VI, 247.
H^Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 165-70.
HlHenretta, "Salutary Neglect", pp. 216-7.
H2Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 198.
not propose any action against Clinton^^ so the Duke's ties 
to Lincoln were safe.
Considering the relative unimportance of the North 
American colonies to the British Empire, it is, perhaps, un­
derstandable that the Secretaries of State who were deeply 
involved in the myriad problems of governing Britain and 
managing her foreign affairs could devote little attention 
to the problems of colonial government. Certainly the 
neglect of colonial government was no greater than the 
neglect of British local government, and the exploitation 
of American patronage no worse than the exploitation of 
Britain's.
The failure of the Privy Council, which should have 
been deeply involved in the management of the colonies, to 
deal with the problems of colonial administration cannot, 
however, be excused in this way.
Originally the "private council" which assisted the 
soverign in making policy and administering justice, the 
Privy Council, had, by 1712, grown too large to be an effec­
tive policy making body. The responsibility for shaping 
policy had been transferred to a smaller "cabinet council," 
and the whole Privy Council restricted to the role of the
113NYCD, VI, 614-36.
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Kingdom's highest ecclesiastical c o u r t . The establish­
ment of the Committee for hearing appeals from the plan­
tations in December, 1696^5 extended the Council's authority 
to the colonies.
Since a court should not act without knowledge of the 
circumstances which shape the events it judges, and as the 
Privy Councillors (like almost everyone else in England) 
had no experience in colonial aifairs, they turned to the 
Board of Trade for information about colonial conditions.
The Board's role was, however, purely advisory; and the 
committee on appeals and the whole Privy Council was never 
legally bound by its advice.
The Privy Council's authority over colonial affairs 
was further extended in 1709 when the Committee for hearing 
appeals from the plantations was authorized to hear com­
plaints, as well as formal appeals from the colonies, 
and again in 1714, when the Privy Council was authorized to
H4" p rivy Council," and "Privy Council, Judicial 
Committee of," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1973, XVIII, 567.
H^Great Britain, Public Record Office, Acts of the 
Privy Council-Colonial Series, W.L. Grant and James Munro, 
editors (6 vols., Hereford and London, 1908-1912), II, 
vi-viii, xiii-xiv (hereafter APC).




establish its own committee on colonial affairs. This freed 
the Council from dependence on the Board of Trade and con­
tributed to the Board's decline. The Privy Council's 
committee on colonial affairs became more powerful as the 
Board of Trade's influence was reduced by the Secretaries 
of State; by 1729 the "Lords of the Committee of Council" 
were supervising the B o a r d . I n  1738, in accordance with 
Newcastle's instructions, the Board began referring all 
petitions to the Council for a c t i o n , an(j in the 1740's, 
Lords of the Committee completely engrossed the Board of 
Trade's responsibilities as the Council's advisor on colo­
nial a f f a i r s .  ^-20 B 0 a r d  merely continued to transmit
specific information and advice to the whole Council^2 -̂ 
through the Lords of the Committee.^22
The decline of the Board of Trade greatly increased 
the Privy Council's role in colonial administration, and 
the Council was diligent in attempting to meet its new
118Turner, Privy Council, II, 359.
^^Turner, Privy Council, II, 365, Dickerson, American 
Colonial Government, pp. 26-7, 27n., 47.
120Turner, Privy Council, II, 359.
^^Dickerson, American Colonial Government, p. 104. 
122<purner  ̂ Privy Council, II, 359.
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responsibilities.123 yet it never became an effective in­
strument of colonial administration. The Councillors, 
despite their diligence in processing colonial business, 
were apparently not interested enough to attempt to create 
a coherent colonial policy.324 ^he Council was consequently 
willing to accept whatever solutions the Board of Trade pro­
posed for problems involving the c o l o n i e s . 125 Unfortunately, 
the Board could not propose imaginative solutions. It had 
been created to fulfil (and had been specifically restricted 
by Newcastle) to an information-gathering role, and so when 
asked for advice it would report what had been done in the 
past, not attempting fresh analysis. Thus, the Privy Council 
tended to perpetuate the existing system of ad hoc involve­
ment in the colonies simply because, like so much of English 
society, its members simply had little real interest in 
America.
The interest of Parliament, "the principal organ of the 
nation's will,"126 like that of other agencies of the British
123APC, III, vi-vii.
124APC, IV, viii.
126APC, III, 187 records the only instance in which the 
Council did not accept the Board's recommendation on colonial
policy. The Council disagreed with the basic premise of the 
Board's report and returned it for redrafting.
126wiHiams, Whig Supremacy, p. 22.
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government, was also self serving. The members of the 
House of Commons had gone to Westminster to improve their 
f o r t u n e s , ^^7 an(j they regarded the colonies only as a 
possible additional source of profit. As profits could 
best be obtained with consent of the House, and as a number 
of members were more likely to be able to influence the 
House than could a single individual, Parliamentarians 
formed associations based on family, geographic, or economic 
ties to pursue their "interest."128 Most of the members of 
the House were tied to one or more interests. 3-29 Decisions 
were shaped by negotiations among the various groups which 
could, when they united, force policies on the government.130 
Consequently, most legislation which passed the House 
was intended to benefit one or more of these interest groups. 
Even statutes which dealt with seemingly national concerns, 
such as customs duties, or trade regulations, were often
127Namier, Structure of Politics, p. 4, see above.
3-^Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest (Philadelphia, 
1970), pp. 8-11, George Louis Beer, The Commercial Policy of 
England Toward the American Colonies, vol. Ill, Columbia 
College Studies in History, Economics and Public Laws (New 
York, 1948, reprint of 1893 edition), p. 32.
129Kammen, Empire and Interest, pp. 13-4.
^^Karnmen, Empire and Interest, pp. 63-4.
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drafted and advanced by interests which were totally un­
concerned with the welfare of the nation. Only the rule 
which prevented members from proposing the expenditure of 
public monies kept the Commons from becoming an overt 
servant of private interests.131
Even colonists attempted to influence Parliament. By 
the 1670's, New Englanders considered themselves as inde­
pendent "interest." By 1680, the proprietors of Penn­
sylvania and Maryland were defending their interests in 
London, and by 1690, New York had agents in London to pro­
tect its i n t e r e s t s . 132 Although the colonies' interests 
were clearly a factor in British politics by 1716, their 
distance from the center of power, their lack of parlia­
mentary representation, and their rivalries, kept them from 
exerting much influence.133
The colonies' inability to sway the House meant, there­
fore, that Parliament's interest in the colonies was re­
stricted to enacting legislation aiding British interest 
groups, merchants, manufacturers, or planters, which hoped 
to profit thereby. The practice of passing legislation 
which served the needs of disparate groups of Englishmen
13^Richard Pares, King George III and the Politicians 
(Oxford, 1963), pp. 3, 3-4n.
l^Kammen, Empire and Interest, pp. 37-40.
133Kammen, Empire and Interest, pp. 55-8.
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probably strengthened the British economy, but it also 
resulted in the development of a "colonial system" which 
had neither order nor direction.^34 This was, however, 
unimportant to the English government as the agencies 
which had authority over the colonies had no interest in 
colonial administration, and the Board of Trade, which 
was interested in colonial administration, had little 
influence. ̂ 33
Parliament's exploitive attitude had had a long history.
During the Portectorate, merchants had convinced the nation
that trade was essential to England's prosperity,33® and so
Parliament had come to regard colonial legislation primarily
as a method for protecting the interests of British mer- 
137chants. It was completely willing to act when merchants
asked for protection, or for advantages in the colonial 
market.338
334Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", pp. 105, 105-6 n.
135Stock, Proceedings, III, xx.
136Godfrey Davies, The Early Stuarts, 1603-1660, 2nd 
edition, vol IX, The Oxford History of England, George 
Clark, editor, (Oxford, 1959), p. 336.
1 37Stock, Proceedings, III, 1 1 1, the Acts of Trade and 
Navigation were also intended to improve England's ability 
to wage war, and to raise some revenue, Davies, Early 
Stuarts, pp. 316-7, Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 15-18.
338Stock, Proceedings, III, xiii.
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The objective of England's first navigation act, passed 
during the Commonwealth, was to protect the English carrying 
trade from Dutch competition, by requiring that all African, 
Asian, or American goods shipped to England travel in ships 
owned by English subjects, and manned by crews at least half 
English. European goods could be imported to England only 
in English ships, or in ships of the nation which produced 
the goods. ̂ 39
After the Restoration, the Stuart monarch continued the 
protective policies of Cromwell's g o v e r n m e n t . T h e  first 
Stuart Navigation Act even strengthened the older statute, 
by requiring that the crews of English ships be at least 
three-quarters English, and that foreign goods be shipped to 
England directly from the place where they were produced, or 
from the usual shipping point. Those English merchants who 
dealt in colonial sugar, tobacco, cotton-wool, indigo, fustic, 
and dye woods, were protected from foreign competition which 
would drive costs up and profits down, by the "enumeration" 
of those products. The requirement that enumerated goods be 
shipped only to England or English colonies, prevented for­
eigners from purchasing them in the colonies and thereby re­
served the market for English merchants.
1 3 9Davies, Early Stuarts, pp. 220-1, the act was passed 
in October, 1651.
l^Beer, commercial Policy, p. 36.
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To insure compliance with the act, bonds were required 
of all shippers.1^1 Bonding did not, however, effectively 
prevent the sale of enumerated commodities to foreigners, 
and in 1672 the act was strengthened by the imposition of 
duties on enumerated goods shipped in intercolonial trade, 
and the specific prohibition of the re-export to Europe of 
enumerated goods which had been shipped between colonies. 
Even these more stringent rules were not successful in pro­
tecting the English merchants' monopoly of colonial goods 
and, in 1695, another law, requiring colonists to post a 
bond which would insure that goods being reshipped from a 
colony would, in fact, reach England was passed. The colo­
nial market for English merchants was protected in 1663 by 
a law which required all goods destined for the colonies 
to be shipped from English parts in English v e s s e l s . ^ 2
The Restoration Parliament also endeavored to protect 
English farmers from competition, by placing prohibitively 
high duties on rye, barley, peas, beans, oats, and wheat 
shipped into England. Six years later, in 1666, imported 
beef, salt pork, and bacon were barred from the English 
market; and in 1679 butter was added to the list of products
141Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 36-8, the act was 
passed in 1660.
142Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 37-40.
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which could not be imported.
These acts were not by any means the end of England's 
efforts to capitalize on the American colonies. As the 
colonies developed, they began to produce goods which found 
markets in Europe, which were useful to England, and which 
competed with the products of English industry. Parliament 
responded to these developments by enacting legislation 
which secured the advantages of the new trades for English 
merchants, and prevented the colonists from competing with 
English industries.
In 1698 Parliament protected the woolen industry, one 
of England's oldest and most important, from colonial compe­
tition by forbidding colonists to ship woolens in the inter­
colonial trade. This prevented the development of a colo­
nial wool manufacturing industry by eliminating most of its 
potential market, and made England the colonies' only source 
of manufactured woolens. (Home weaving, which did not com­
pete with English industry, was not affected by prohi­
bition.) 144
Parliament's willingness to aid English merchants at 
the expense of colonial traders was further demonstrated by 
the enumeration of rice. By the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, American rice had found a profitable market in
■̂4^Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 73-4. 
l44Beer, Commercial Policy, p. 77.
Europe. On February 21, 1705,145 the House of Commons, 
which apparently believed that English merchants deserved 
the profits of the rice trade more than colonials, de­
stroyed the colonial rice trade by requiring colonists 
to ship all their rice to England. This rather arbitrary 
action apparently succeeded in securing the rice trade for 
English merchants, for, between 1712 and 1717 England 
imported an average of 28,073 cwt. of rice a year, and re­
exported 22,936 cwt. In 1729 the colonists were permitted 
to resume selling rice directly to Portugal, a market 
British merchants had not successfully penetrated.^-4®
British sugar policy was equally insensitive to colo­
nial interests. Molasses and the sugar produced from it 
were valuable commodities in the eighteenth century and so 
in February, 170514? Parliament placed molasses on the 
enumerated list. In 1717 France, which resented British 
dominance of the world sugar market, began encouraging her 
West Indian possessions to produce sugar. The program was 
so successful that by 1730 Franch sugar was replacing 
British in England's continental colonies. Naturally this
145Stock, Proceedings, III, 96.
146Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 45, 52-3, CSP,
XXXII, 490.
14^Stock, Proceedings, III, 96.
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disturbed the West Indian planters who were being deprived 
of an important market. They met the challenge of French 
competition by utilizing their interest in the Parliament 
to secure passage of the Molasses Act of 1733 which pro­
tected their North American market by placing prohibitively 
high duties on foreign molasses, sugar and rum. The planters' 
effort was not altogether successful as the Molasses act was 
never str’ fly enforced,148 perhaps because execution of the 
law would have raised the price of American rum thereby ad­
versely affecting the British merchants involved in the 
triangular trades with America.
Only in the production of naval stores and copper was 
British policy toward the colonies influenced by public, as 
well as private, interests. In 1702 England was drawn into 
the War of the Spanish Succession, and, although the war was 
primarily continental, the Royal Navy played an important 
r o l e .149 The activity of the Royal Navy created a demand 
for more naval stores than England could produce, and she 
was forced to meet the deficit with purchases from the 
Baltic. Dependence on foreign sources for supplies essential 
to the fleet, the backbone of England's power, was unde­
sirable because it placed England at the mercy of her
148Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 52, 63-4.
149j4ichael Lewis, The History of the British Navy 
(Fair Lawn, N. J., 1959), pp. 107-111.
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suppliers, and, because it resulted in a trade deficit with 
the Baltic of about £777,000. To avoid these unpleasant 
consequences, the English government began encouraging 
the colonies to produce the required naval stores. In 
1705 the Parliament passed legislation which placed naval 
stores on the enumerated list, and established bounties to 
encourage the colonists to produce them. The bounties were 
set at £6 per ton on hemp, £4 per ton on tar and pitch,
*3 per ton on rosin and turpentine, and £1 per ton on masts.
This policy met some initial difficulties. At first 
the colonists could not (despite the assistance of skilled 
workers whose passage to America was financed by Parliament) 
produce stores which met the requirements of the Royal Navy. 
The Parliament did not wish to spend public money for sub­
standard goods and responded, in 1719, by forbidding the 
payment of bounties for products which did not meet the 
Navy's specifications. By 1728, however, the initial prob­
lems were solved, and the quality and quantity of the goods 
produced had increased so much that it was possible to lower 
the bounties to £2 4s. per ton for tar not of the highest 
quality, £1 8s. per ton for turpentine, and £l per ton for 
pitch.150
As the Navy was the keystone of imperial defense in the 
eighteenth century, attempts to increase the production of
150Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 55, 91-100.
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naval stores (including copper which was enumerated in 
1511722), certainly served the national interest as well 
as the interests of the English merchants who profited from 
the new industries. Even Americans benefited from the new 
naval stores industry, although the Parliament had apparently 
not been concerned with them when it adopted the policy.^ 2
In 1722 the Parliament acted to assist British merchants 
in their search for profits from colonial products by placing 
beaver, and other furs, which found a ready market in Europe 
on the enumerated list^3 thereby assuring English merchants 
of their share of the trade's profits. Nine years later the
15lBeer, Commercial Policy, pp. 56-7, the rumored large 
copper deposits which led to the enumeration of copper, 
never materialized.
152^he preamble of the Naval Stores Act makes the sub­
ordinate place of Americans clear:
"...whereas Her Majesty's colonies and Plan­
tations in America were first settled, and are 
still maintained and protected, at a great ex­
pense of the Treasure of this Kingdom, with a 
design to render them as useful as may be to 
England, and the Labour and Industry of the 
people there, profitable to themselves...."
The Board of Trade had hoped that the production of naval 
stores would provide the New Englanders with a product they 
could market in England in lieu of foodstuffs, and woolens 
which were barred by English law. Events did not develop 
as the Board had hoped, the Carolinas became the center of 
the American pitch and tar industry. Joseph J. Malone,
Pine Trees and Politics (Seattle, Washington, 1964), 
pp. 26-28, 36-38.
l^Beer, Commercial Policy, p. 60.
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Company of Feltmakers petitioned the Houses to assist its 
members by eliminating the colonial competition which was 
reducing the demand for British hats in foreign markets, and 
in Britain itself. The Parliament responded in 1732 with 
the Hat Act which forbade the colonies to export h a t s .
The Parliament was so anxious to encourage English 
trade that it was even willing to disburse public money on 
projects which would benefit only a few merchants. Indigo 
was an important dye in the eighteenth century, and, as 
England did not produce any, it was necessary to import it 
from France. In the 1740's an experiment in indigo produc­
tion was started in South Carolina. The merchants who 
traded with the colony realized that the experiment's 
success would provide them with a valuable new commodity. 
They therefore asked Parliament to establish a bounty on 
indigo which would make producing it more profitable. The 
Parliament agreed and established a bounty of 6 d. per pound 
which enabled American indigo, which was imported and mar­
keted by English merchants, to dominate the English market 
and compete with the French dyestuff in the rest of 
Europe.155
England's third largest industry, ironmaking, also 
looked to the colonies as a source of profit. The
154Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 81-3. 
l^Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 103-4.
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ironmakers, however, faced a dilemma. They wanted to en­
courage colonial production of pig and bar iron (which could 
not be economically produced in England because of shortages 
of ore and fuel), but did not want the colonists to begin 
competing with them in the remunerative production of fin­
ished goods. ̂ 6  jn 1750 the Parliament solved this problem 
by eliminating duties on pig and bar iron imported from the 
colonies, while forbidding the colonists to build the 
rolling and slitting mills, forges, and steel making furnaces 
required to convert the raw iron into finished products which 
would compete with English g o o d s .  ^ 7
The Parliament also felt that the colonies should be 
encouraged to produce goods which were in short supply 
whereby the colonies would free England from dependence on 
foreign sources, lower the price English manufacturers would 
have to pay for raw materials, and provide England with ad­
ditional exports. Thus in 1750 Parliament responded to a 
shortage of Spanish and Italian silk by passing a resolution 
intended to encourage American silk production by admitting 
colonial silk to England without duty.
Parliament was never willing to subordinate English 
profits to the well being of the colonies. In 1750, New 
Yorkers, who produced salt meat and salt fish which were
156Stock, Proceedings, III, 396. 
157Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 83-90.
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exported from the colony, asked the Parliament for per­
mission to purchase their salt from Southern Europe. This, 
they explained, would enable them to purchase better salt 
than British manufacturers could provide at lower cost, 
thereby improving their competitive position. The Parlia­
ment consulted the English salt manufacturers who would be 
affected by the change, and were told that English salt was 
"perfectly adequate" for the Americans' needs, and that per­
mitting them to purchase salt abroad would violate the prin­
ciples of the Navigation Acts. The proposal was thereupon 
dropped.*58
Thus, the Parliament, more than any other agency of the 
British government, used its power over the colonies not to 
benefit them, or to create a balanced colonial system, but 
to force the colonies to advance the economic interests of 
Englishmen no matter what the effect. Colonial resentment 
of Parliamentary interference in their affairs naturally 
followed.
The Parliament's desire to exploit the colonies had, 
however, little practical effect. Although the Houses could 
legislate for the colonies, they could not enforce their 
decisions, and the agencies charged with implementing them 
simply did not bother to do so. The Secretaries of State
*5®Stock, Proceedings, V, xvi-xvii, CSP, XXVI, 519-20. 
159CSP, XXIX, xxiv.
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and the Privy Council apparently never even attempted to 
rigorously enforce the Acts of Trade and Navigation, and 
so, despite Parliament's efforts at regulation, the colo­
nial economy was as free of British control as were all 
other aspects of colonial l i f e . 1^0
160Wiiiiams, Whig Supremacy, p. 317.
CHAPTER THREE
THE BOARD OF TRADE AND THE COLONIES: LIMITED
AUTHORITY AND LIMITED INTEREST
There was, however, one agency of the British govern­
ment, the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantation, 
known more familiarly as the Board of Trade,* which was more 
directly concerned with the affairs of Britain's overseas 
possessions. It's concern was, however, not nearly as over­
whelming as Oliver Morton Dickerson suggests in his highly 
influential study of American Colonial Government 1696-1765 
which was published in 1912. Far from being the powerful, 
influential, ever vigilant supervisor of all aspects of colo­
nial government, the Board was a rather insignificant agency 
which seems to have been the product of a struggle between 
the Crown and Parliament for influence over trade, rather 
than the result of an effort to increase the efficiency of 
Britain's colonial administration.
Competition between the monarch and the legislature for 
control of England's trade policy first emerged when the
■̂ Great Britain, Public Record Office, Acts of the Privy 
Council, edited by W.L. Grant and James Munro (6 vols., Here­
ford and London, 1908-1912), II, v (hereafter APC).
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disruption of the ordinary business of government by the 
Revolution of 1688, and the onset of the War of the League 
of Augsburg in early 1689,  ̂kept the Privy Council from 
exercising its traditional jurisdiction over England's 
commerce. As the European war disrupted trade and dis- 
asterously depressed the English e c o n o m y ,3 the mercantile 
interest began to agitate for the creation of an agency 
which would concern itself exclusively with protecting and 
furthering England's commerce. The House of Commons, tra­
ditionally responsive to merchants' desires and wishing to 
absorb the Crown's authority over trade, had accepted the 
merchants' petition and, in November 1695, established an 
internal committee on trade. The Lords in their turn felt, 
however, that such a trade committee, completely dominated 
by the Commons, was inappropriate, and suggested the estab­
lishment of an "independent" council to supervise commerce. 
The Commons accepted the peers' advice and legislation to 
create the council on trade was introduced. Such Parlia­
mentary energy seems to have disturbed King William III, 
who ended the Houses' efforts to dominate trade policy when 
he created, by Privy Council order, on May 15, 1696, a' Com­
mission of Trade and Plantations, thus meeting the merchants'
^David Ogg, England in the Reigns of James II and 
William III (Oxford, 1963), p. 348.
^Ogg, England in the Reigns of James II and William 
III, p. 305.
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demands for closer government supervision of trade.*
Despite its title, the opening of new markets and the 
developing of new industries was not the Board's only re­
sponsibility. It was also instructed in the Commission to 
find the most effective methods of creating gainful employ­
ment for the poor whose support was a burden on the public. 
It could not, however, act to solve the problems it inves­
tigated. It was an investigative agency which could only 
suggest action to the King or the Privy Council "from time 
to time...as the nature of the Business shall require."
The members of the Board which William had created were 
to insure "...that the Trade of Our Kingdom of England, upon 
which the strength and riches thereof do in a great measure 
depend, should be all proper means be promoted and advanced; 
...." Specifically, they were to
examine into and take an account of the state 
and condition of the general Trade of England, 
and also of the several particular Trades in 
all Foreign parts, and how the same respec­
tively are advanced or decayed, and the 
causes or occasions thereof; and to enquire 
into and examine what Trades are or may 
prove hurtfull, or are or may prove benefi­
cial to our Kingdom of England, and by what 
ways and means the profitable and advanta­
geous Trades may be more improved and extended 
and such as are hurtfull and prejudicial
*APC, II, v, Edward Raymond Turner, The Privy Council 
of England, 1603-1784 (2 vols., Baltimore, 1928-1929),
II, 339-41 (hereafter Privy), Oliver Morton Dickerson, 
American Colonial Government 1696-1765 (New York, 1962, 
reprint of 1912 edition), pp. 21-2.
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rectifyed or discouraged; and to enquire into 
the several obstructions of Trade and the 
means of removing the same: And to consider
by what means the severall useful and profit­
able manufactures already settled in Our said 
Kingdom may be further improved, and how and 
in what manner new and profitable Manufactures 
may be introduced....
As Englishmen generally regarded the colonies primarily
as an adjunct to trade, it was not surprising that the Board
of Trade was also instructed to
take into your care all Records, Grants and 
Papers remaining in the Plantation Office or 
thereunto belonging.
And likewise to inform you selves of the 
present condition of Our respective Planta­
tions, as well with regard to the Administra­
tion of the Government and Justice in these 
places, as in relation to the Commerce thereof;
And also to inquire into the limits of Soyle 
and Product of Our severall plantations and how 
the same may be improved, and of the best means 
for easing and securing Our Colonies there, and 
how the same may be rendered most usefull and 
beneficiall to our said Kingdom of England."
The commercial basis of England's interest in the colo­
nies was manifestly clear, as in the requirement that the 
members of the Board
inform yourselves what Navall Stores may be fur­
nished from Our Plantations, and in what Quan­
tities, and by what methods Our Royall purpose 
of having our Kingdom supplied with Navall Stores 
from thence may be made practicable and promoted;
And also to inquire into and inform your selves 
of the best and most proper methods of settling 
and improving Our Plantations, such other Staples 
and other Manufactures as Our subjects of England 
are now obliged to fetch and supply themselves 
withall from other Princes and States; And also 
what Staples and Manufactures may be best en­
couraged there, which are or may prove preju- 
diciall to England, by furnishing themselves 
or other countries with what has been usually 
supplied from such Trades, and whatsovever else 
may turne to the hurt of Our Kingdom of England.
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The Board's interest in the colonies was, as had been 
mentioned, not completely commercial. It was also to deter­
mine whether any changes were necessary in the governors' 
instructions, to report significant colonial developments 
to the Crown, to recommend suitable candidates for vacant 
colonial offices, to evaluate colonial legislation and to 
advise the Crown as to its suitability.for Royal appro­
bation, to hear complaints from the colonies, and to audit 
the colonies' accounts.
The Board could collect all such varied information 
under oath, but once having accumulated it, all it could 
then do was "report all your doings...in writing...to Us, 
or to Our Privy Council, as the nature of the thing shall 
require."5 Clearly the Board was not intended for a major 
role in Britain's colonial administrative structure. Super­
vision of colonial governments was the least of its duties** 
and it was given no authority over the colonies. It could 
investigate and advise, nothing more.
The limited role of the Board was reflected in its 
working membership, which was composed of men who exerted
^New York State, Secretary of State, Documents Relative 
to the Colonial History of the State of New~lfork, E.B.
O'Callaghan and Berthold Fernow editors, (15 vols., Albany, 
1861-1887), IV, 145-8 (hereafter N£CD).
^Colonial administration occupies less than one para­
graph of the Board of Trade's commission.
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relatively little influence on the decisions of the govern­
ment. Although the Chancellor of England, the President 
of the Privy Council, the first Commissioner of the Treasury, 
the first Commissioner of the Admiralty, both Secretaries of 
State, and the Chancellor of the Exchecquer were named as 
members of the Board by its original commission, at the 
same time it excused them from attending its meetings.? Had 
the Board been conceived as a significant part of the English 
bureaucracy, its prestige would not have been diminished from 
the first by excusing from its meetings seven of the most 
powerful and influential men in England.
As the Board had no authority of its own, it could in­
fluence policy only by presenting suggestions to the Crown, 
or the Privy Council.® The Board's role in colonial adminis­
tration was, necessarily, to a large extent, shaped by the 
attitudes of the agencies which exercised authority in colo­
nial matters.
However, the Board was allowed something of a direct 
role in the supervision of colonial affairs until 1714, when 
the Privy Council was permitted to form its own committee on 
"colonial affairs." This committee soon engrossed most of
7NYCD, IV, 148.
^Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Government in America 
(New York, 1958, reprint of 1930 edition), pp. 29 (here­
after Royal Government), Mark A. Thomson, The Secretaries 
of State, 1681-1782 (Oxford, 1932), pp. 41-4.
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the Board's authority and, by 1729, was directly supervising 
the Board's activities. By 1740, the committee had super­
seded the Board in the conduct of colonial affairs.^ The 
Board still remained active but instead of making decisions 
or recommendations, it was thereafter reduced to supplying 
information to those who actually exercised power.1® The 
Board's increasing subordination was reflected in its ad­
missions in its letters to the colonial governors that it 
was ignorant of its own government's decisions in colonial 
affairs.
The declining position of the Board of Trade in the 
administrative hierarchy was also apparent in its relations 
with the "cabinet," which was then emerging as an important 
part of the government. Although its importance in the 
formation of colonial policy had been generally recognized 
in the early years of the eighteenth century (it was, for 
example, summoned to Whitehall to confer with the Queen and 
Privy Council committee which was then emerging as the
^Turner, Privy, II, 359.
l^Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of 
State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies,
W.N. Sainsbury and others, editors (42 vols., London, 1860- 
1963), XXXVI, x (hereafter CSP).
1;LCSP, XXXIX, xxvi.
89
"cabinet" in July, 1 7 0 2 ) , the development of the cabinet 
system of government in the first decade of the century had 
resulted in a rapid decline in the Board's petition. The 
"cabinet" simply usurped much of its influence over colonial 
affairs. Instead of meeting with the Board, the "cabinet," 
in 1713, instructed it to meet with the merchants who wished 
to comment on the commercial treaty then being negotiated 
with Spain, and to report the results of that meeting to the 
appropriate members of the cabinet.13
By the beginning of King George I's reign in 1714, it 
was customary for the "cabinet" to act on information 
supplied by the Board without asking its advice.14 jn 1 7 3 0, 
the "cabinet" instructed the Board to hasten the evacuation 
of Santa Lucia, which was threatened by a slave uprising in 
Jamaica. Nine years later, in July 1739, the "cabinet" 
decided to dispatch additional military supplies to the West 
Indies without communicating with the Board.15 Perhaps the 
most telling indication of the Board's inferior position was 
the "cabinet's" unwillingness, in December 1739, to even
Edward Raymond Turner, The Cabinet Council of England, 
1622-1784 (2 vols., Baltimore, Md., 1930-1932), I, 183, 
(hereafter Cabinet).
l^Turner, Cabinet, I, 453.
l^Turner, Cabinet, II, 156-7, 169, 195.
l^Turner, Cabinet, II, 176.
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accept advice from Colonel Martin Bladen, the senior member 
of the Board of Trade, and the person who "...was supposed 
to have the most generall knowledg of all the plantations..." 
Members of the "cabinet," who possessed and claimed no ex­
pertise in colonial matters were sharply critical at that 
time of Bladen's estimate of the number of fighting men 
Britain could raise in her colonies.16 Had the Board re­
tained any influence in the British government, members of 
the "cabinet" would have been quite willing to accept 
Bladen's expert advice without debate, no matter how un­
pleasant it might have been.
The Board of Trade was similarly subordinate to the 
Secretary of State for the Southern Department. The Secre­
taries of State had inherited much of the Crown's authority 
during the reigns of Queen Anne and King George 1 , ^  an(j the 
Board became, in many ways, part of the Southern Secretary's 
Department. Until the reign of George I, it had been cus­
tomary for the Southern Secretary, who had always retained 
complete legal authority over colonial affairs to allow the 
Board of Trade to have almost complete autonomy in the con­
duct of colonial b u s i n e s s . ^8
^Turner, Cabinet, II, 294.
1 7See chapter two.
l^Dickerson, American Colonial Government, pp. 107-8.
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James Stanhope, first earl of Stanhope, one of King 
George I's Secretary of State for the Southern Department, 
abandoned his predecessors' passivity and began expropriating 
the Board's authority in colonial administration. He began 
making colonial appointments without consulting the Board 
of Trade, and his successors continued the erosion of the 
Board's authority, until in the 1730's the Board was left 
virtually without power19 or incluence.2® By then the Board 
was required to refer all matters to the Southern Secretary's 
office2  ̂or to the Privy Council for decision.22 Unfor­
tunately, as has been discussed in Chapter Two, neither re­
garded the colonies as worthy of attention.
The Board of Trade had always had even less influence 
on the Houses of Parliament than it had on the "cabinet," 
Privy Council, or the Secretaries of State; for although it 
regularly sent committees of Parliament information, they 
generally failed to utilize the information supplied by the 
Board as the foundation for colonial legislation.22
■^Dickerson, American Colonial Government, pp. 111-4.
20Turner, Privy, II, 358.
2^Dickerson, American Colonial Government, pp.36-7, 47.
22Turner, Privy, II, 365.
22Leo Francis Stock, Proceedings and Debates of the 
British Parliaments Respecting North America (5 vols., 
Washington, D.C., 1924-1941), III, xx.
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Parliamentary interest in the colonies was in any case so 
rare that Benjamin Keene, secretary to the Duke of Newcastle, 
commented on the extraordinary nature of the House of 
Commons' interest in the colonies during the debate over the 
Molasses Act which had begun in 1731.24
The Board's lack of power, and its inability to exert
real influence on the formation of p o l i c y , 25 made it un­
attractive to those ambitious politicians who hoped to play 
a major role in the development of Britain's policies. Con­
sequently, when the Board's decline became apparent after 
1714, it necessarily became a resting place for "deserving," 
if somewhat mediocre, friends of the g o v e r n m e n t . 26 The 
salary of *-1,000 per year2? was sufficiently attractive to 
make a place on the Board much sought after,28 but the Board's 
lack of influence encouraged its members to be lax in their 
duties. From 1741 to 1743, only four of the eight working
24CSP, XXXVIII, xviii-xix.
25James A. Henretta, "Salutary Neglect" Colonial Admin­
istration Under the Duke of Newcastle (Princeton, N.J., 1972), 
p̂  27 (hereafter "Salutary Neglect").
2^Turner, Privy, II, 345.
2?Turner, Privy, II, 343-4.
2®Stanley Nider Katz, Newcastle's New York (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1968), p. 17.
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members of the Board of Trade— the Board's president Sir 
John Monson, Colonel Martin Bladen, Richard Plumer, and 
James Brudenell— attended more than hsTf of the Board's 
meetings, and one of the Board's members, Sir Archer Croft, 
missed all one hundred thirty-eight meetings in 1742.29 
This apparent unconcern with exercising what little influence 
they possessed may indicate that the Board accepted its re­
stricted role in the management of the c o l o n i e s ^ O  passively.
Perhaps the Board's members were unconcerned with their 
lack of influence on colonial administration because they 
were occupied with other matters. All members of the Board 
at any time were also members of the House of Commons, and 
as the House was the font of preferment and profit in eight­
eenth-century England, it was natural for the members to be 
more involved in Parliamentary affairs than they were in the 
work of the Board.^ Nor is it surprising that the members 
of the Board of Trade were, like virtually all other politi­
cally active Englishmen, more interested in the pursuit of 
patronage than in the formation and implementation of p o l i c y . 22
^Dickerson, American Colonial Government, pp. 34-5.
2®Basil Williams, The Whig Supremacy, 1714-1760, 2nd 
edition, revised by C.H. Stuart, vol. XI The Oxford History 
of England, Sir George Clark, editor, p. 311.
2lRatz, Newcastle's New York, p. 19.
32Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", p. 163.
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The lack of concern with colonial business prevalent 
among persons charged with supervising the colonies33 had 
by the 1730's resulted in the displacement of the formal
icolonial bureaucracy-’4 with an informal structure, which 
accurately reflected the personal patronage concerns of 
those who were involved in colonial administration. Instead 
of depending on the Board of Trade to represent their 
interests in England, many occupants of colonial offices, 
or merchants involved in colonial trade, or colonists with 
political aspirations, would make contact with a Londoner 
who himself had contacts on the higher levels of government. 
These allies could present points-of-view to the men who had 
the power to shape colonial policy.3  ̂ This informal system 
enabled all the members of the Board of Trade who had access
to the ministry and to the Privy Council, to affect the
government's policies —  if their "friends" in the govern­
ment were more powerful than those of the others involved 
in the dispute.3^
The greatly reduced role of the Board made its continued 
smooth operation less important to the government, and
33Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", pp. 266-7.
^^Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", p. 145.
^Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", pp. 142-3.
■^Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", pp. 154-5.
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consequently when Allured Popple resigned in 1737, to become 
governor of Bermuda, the position of Secretary of the Board 
of Trade was given to Thomas Hill, a minor poet who had good 
political connections37 but no experience in colonial affairs 
nor any administrative ability at all. Hill's misadminis- 
tration further reduced the Board's effectiveness. It was 
not until 1748 when John Pownall replaced Hill, that the
opBoard began to operate efficiently again. Pownall's 
efficient administration, combined with the ambitions of 
George Montagu Dunk, second earl of Halifax, who was named 
president of the Board in 1748, restored the Board to a 
position of some influence. The informal, "interest domi­
nated" system of colonial administration, which had developed 
in the 1730's, was now superseded by a system which tried to 
evaluate the "effectiveness" of colonial officials.39
Halifax was able to gratify his ambition and enhance 
his status in the government by restoring a measure of in­
dependence to the Board of Trade, only because his own per­
sonal political influence freed him from any fear of the 
Duke of Newcastle who was one of the most influential men
37nenretta, "Salutary Neglect", p. 189. 
^®Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", p. 263. 
•^Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", pp. 282-5, 293-7.
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in England. As powerful as Newcastle was, he could not re­
main in power without Halifax's support, and Halifax made 
the Board of Trade's independence the price of that 
support.40 Indeed, Newcastle was so concerned with retain­
ing Halifax's loyalty that he supported Halifax's quest for 
a seat in the "cabinet" to tie him more closely to the admin­
istration.^ The King, however, refused to seat Halifax in 
1750, on the grounds that the Board of Trade was a subor­
dinate agency, and that the Board's president would be 
obliged to follow the Secretary of State's instructions even 
though he were a member of the "cabinet."42 jn 1 7 5 1, Halifax 
again attempted to secure a place in the "cabinet," and this 
time the King refused his request on the grounds that the 
"cabinet" was already too l a r g e . i t  was not until 1757 
that Halifax finally obtained the "cabinet" seat he so 
badly wanted, and had so long pursued. He was seated, how­
ever, as the Earl of Halifax, not as the President of the 
Board of T r a d e , a  clear indication of the Board's low 
position in England's administrative hierarchy.
40Dickerson, American Colonial Government, p. 40.
^Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", pp. 308-310.
^Turner, Cabinet, II, 29.
43Turner, Cabinet, II, 25.
44Turner, Cabinet, II, 32-3.
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Although the Board of Trade was devoid of authority 
and had little influence over the government's policies for 
most of the first half of the eighteenth century, it was, 
however, not moribund. Although the Board did not exercise 
the influence over colonial policy or administration which 
some have credited it with, it worked hard as a "civil 
service" for the Secretaries of State, for the Privy Council 
committee on colonial affairs, and on occasion, for the 
Houses of Parliament. It investigated, collected infor­
mation, and suggested actions to the Secretary of State for 
the Southern Department, as well as for the Privy Council 
committee on colonial affairs^® which virtually always 
accepted its advice.4?
Since the Board of Trade was primarily an intelligence 
gathering agency, its files were constantly used by other 
agencies of the British government which wanted information 
on the state of England's commerce and c o l o n i e s . 48 t0 keep
45CSP, XXXIV, xi, XL, vii-viii.
4®Dickerson, American Colonial Government, p. 104.
4^Charles M. Andrews, "The Government of the Empire, 
1660-1763," The Old Empire: From the Beginnings to 1783,
vol. I, The Cambridge History of the British Empire, J~ 
Holland, A.P. Newton, and E.A. Benians, editors, TNew York, 
1929), pp. 412-3, APC, III, 45, 54-5, Dickerson, American 
Colonial Government, pp. 81, 101.
48CSP, XL, VI.
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abreast of the continual requests for data, the Board's 
staff actively collected statistics on the colonies, the 
state of their trade, and matters related to trade. To 
insure the reliability of its sources, the Board sent the 
colonial governors detailed instructions on the methods to
a qbe used in compiling all statistics it requested. ^
The Board's diligence in accumulating and dispersing 
information was apparently appreciated by the other agencies 
of the English government. They requested so much infor­
mation that the Board's Secretary was occasionally com­
pelled to apologize for the Board's inability to transmit 
data rapidly.50
The Board's industriousness was fully tested by the 
Parliamentary activity which culminated in passage of the 
Molasses Act of 1733. The question of regulating the sugar 
trade first came to the Board's attention on April 5, 1731 
when the House of Commons asked the Board for copies of the 
Barbadoes Sugar Duty Act of 1715, the Royal confirmation of 
that Act, and the nineteenth article of Barbadoes Governor
49CSP, XXXV, xxi-xxii.
5°CSP, XXXVII, xxvii. The information the Board so 
industriously collected and distributed was largely 
statistical. It kept careful records of the population, 
trade, and internal resources of the colonies. The infor­
mation was obtained from the governors who were required 
to submit regular reports on these matters. It also 
served as a central archive for colonial legislation.
Most of the requests for information came from those who 
were concerned with the colonial economy.
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Henry Worsley's "instructions." The Lords also requested, 
on the same day, copies of Cadwallader Colden's memorial 
on the navigation of Canadian rivers, an extract from a 
1717 report on the sugar trade between New England and 
foreign colonies, the 1694 Massachusetts act for controlling 
Indians, and the 1715 Barbadoes sugar act that the Commons 
had requested. Despite delays which were inevitably 
attendant upon hand copying, the Board was able to deliver 
this wide assortment of information within two weeks.^
Supplying the information requested by the Houses was, 
however, only the beginning of the Board's labors. In May, 
1731, the sugar interest induced the Commons to request the 
Privy Council to order the Board of Trade to investigate 
the trade between England's continental colonies and foreign 
sugar-producing islands. At the initial hearing, the con­
tinental colonies' agents objected to the West Indian request 
for the termination of their trade with foreign sugar colonies. 
To resolve the conflict between the two groups of colonies, 
the Board organized hearings which would permit both sides 
to fully present their positions.^2 The Board's investi­
gations was so thorough that it was dilatory in presenting
51CSP, XXXVIII, 84, 100.
S^Great Britain, Trade and Plantations Commissioners, 
Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 
1704-1782 (14 vols., London, 1920-1938) [1728/9-1734J, pp. 
176-7, 253-4, 257-9 (hereafter Journal), CSP, XXXVIII, 
xiv-xvi.
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its report to the Commons, which requested it for the second
53time on January 28, 1731/2. On February 4, Newcastle 
urged the Board to hasten the completion of its report.
The Board objected to the emphasis on speed; it felt that it 
could conduct an objective investigation only by the time- 
consuming process of supplying all interested parties with 
copies of all relevant material, and of allowing them an 
opportunity to reply.-’-' However, the Board must have decided 
to comply with the Commons' and Newcastle's pleas for speed, 
for on February 15 the complete report was delivered to the 
Commons. 56
Since the Board of Trade had been created primarily to 
protect and encourage English trade,57 it is not surprising 
that the information it supplied to other agencies reflected
53CSP, XXXIX, 32-3.
54CSP, XXXIX, 37-8.
55CSP, XXXIX, 4 5-7.
56CSP, XXXIX, 52-62.
^George Louis Beer, The Commercial Policy of England 
Toward the American Colonies, vol. Ill Columbia College 
Studies in History Economics and Public Law (New York, 
1948, reprint of 1893 edition), pp. 124-5 Thereafter 
Commercial Policy).
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the interests and concerns of British merchants.®9 in 1734, 
for example, the House of Lords asked the Privy Council to 
instruct the Board to report on a petition from a group of 
London merchants, objecting to the duties several colonies 
had laid on British goods. The Board's report was pains­
takingly complete: it examined the history and operations
of Anglo-American trade since 1686, and pointed out the many 
loopholes which existed in the system, and explained how it 
had attempted to protect British merchants.®9 In fact the 
report lacks only a discussion of the American point-of-view, 
a matter which apparently could be neglected because it was 
of no importance in the formation of policy.
All of the Board's proceedings reflect the importance 
of trade and the relative unimportance of the colonies. 
Considerable attention was devoted to projects which would 
benefit Britain's economy,®® but little time to the adminis­
tration of the colonies. Again and again, the Board of
®9Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest (Philadelphia, 
1970), p. 53. The importance of commercial concerns is 
reflected by the Board of Trade's Journal. Although there 
are more entries dealing with the colonies than with trade 
the Journal indicates that the Board dispatched colonial 
business rapidly while it often devoted several sessions to 
considering trade matters. The difference is reflected in 
the length of entries in the Journal. Colonial business 
was usually reported in less than half a page, and often in 
only a few lines. Trade matters usually filled most of a 
page, and often several pages.
59CSP, XLI> 11-25.
®®See, for example, Journal [1718-1722], pp. 16-18, 
19-23, CSP, XXXVI, xxiv-xxv.
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Trade's Journal used the phrase, "...was agreed to and 
ordered to be transcribed..." to describe its pro forma 
handling of colonial business. This was an extremely 
efficient manner of dispatching business, but efficiency 
was possible only because no one, on or off the Board, 
apparently felt that colonial affairs were worth the effort 
involved in a more detailed examination.
Consequently, the Board's only concern with colonial 
legislation, which it was required to review, was to deter­
mine whether a colonial law encroached upon the Crown's 
prerogatives, whether it conformed to English law and judi­
cial practice, whether it contained technical defects which 
would cause confusion in enforcement, and if it would 
adversely affect British trade.61 The Board seems to have 
been completely unconcerned with the intrinsic merits of 
the colonial legislation thus reviewed.
The Board's treatment of the laws passed in the colony 
of New York for example, reflect the limits of its interest 
in colonial legislation. Between January 1717 and December 
1753, New York passed 623 laws of which the Board disallowed 
only 1 9 ;62 and, although the Board considered representation
SlgsP, XXXI, 14 6, 156-9, Dickerson, American Colonial 
Government, pp. 228, 231-61.
^^New York State, Commissioners of Statutory Revision, 
The Colonial Laws of New York from 1664 to the Revolution 
(5 vols., Albany, 1894), I, II, III (hereafter cited as 
NYCL).
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from Governors, Assembly agents, and partisans of colonial 
interests, its reasons for all the disallowances reflect 
the concerns and convenience of Englishmen, not of New 
Yorkers.
The earliest act disallowed was An Act to lay a duty 
of two pounds on every hundred pounds value prime cost of 
all European goods imported into this colony, passed on 
November 19, 1720.®3 Qn April 30, 1724, the Board of Trade, 
having received complaints against the act from merchants 
trading with New York, advised the King (despite Governor 
William Burnet's contention that the duty had been in force 
since 1691, often at higher rates) that "...the said act is 
not fitt for your Majesty's Royall approbation..." The 
Board's report suggested that British merchants be protected 
from colonial taxation by the dispatch of an additional 
instruction, forbidding colonial governors to approve laws 
which placed duties on European goods imported in British 
ships.6* The Board's recommendation was followed, somewhat 
belatedly, in 1732 when the governors were "...expressly 
forbid [sic] to pass any law by which the trade or navi­
gation of this kingdom may be any ways affected, hereby 
declaring it to be our royal intention that no duties shall 




shipping or upon the product or manufactures of Great 
Britain upon any pretense whatsoever65
The same New York Assembly which passed the two 
per-cent duty, which was disallowed in 1724 also pursued, 
under the guidance of Governor Burnet, a policy intended 
to destroy the French trade with the Indians.®*’ The New 
York Assemblies' efforts to implement Burnet's policy 
culminated in 1729 with the simultaneous disallowance of 
ten acts.
Burnet's motives were simple and patriotic. The colo­
nists of New York and the colonists of Canada had long been 
competing for dominance in the Indian fur trade. French 
domination had been based on purchasing English cloth from 
New Yorkers, at lower cost than it could be obtained from 
France, and using it in their trade. Since the Indians 
intended to support whoever provided them with the cheapest 
manufactured goods, the Canadian preponderance in the Indian 
trade created a threat to New York's security. To remove 
that danger, Burnet secured in 1720, passage of An Act for 
the encouragement of the Indian trade and rendering it more 
beneficial to the inhabitants of this province and for
®5Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Instructions to British 
Colonial Governors, 1670-1776.(2 vols., New York, 1967, 




prohibiting the selling of Indian goods to the French.67 
The act was evaded; so in 1722 Burnet sponsored An Act for 
the further and more effectual prohibiting of selling Indian 
goods to the French which tightened enforcement by requiring 
suspects to swear, under oath, that they had not traded with 
the French. Refusal to take the oath was tantamount, under 
the provisions of the law, to admitting guilt. The acts 
were so successful in restricting the French traders that in 
1724 they were extended by An act for continuing the acts 
for prohibiting the selling of Indian goods to the French 
with some alterations.69
Burnet's enthusiasm for the trade laws was, however, 
not universal. Richard West, the Board of Trade's legal 
advisor, agreed that the objectives of the 1722 law were 
laudable but he felt that the enforcement procedure it 
established was so defective that it made the act unsuitable 
for royal a p p r o b a t i o n .70 a group of London merchants were 
also displeased. Unaware that the New York government had
67n y c l , ch. 392, passed Nov. 19, 1720.
68NYCL, ch. 425, passed July 7, 1722, Herbert L.
Osgood, The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century 
(4 vols., Gloucester, Mass., 1958, reprint of 1924-1925 
edition), II, 419-20, NYCD, V, 586-7, 682, 684-5.
89NYCL, ch. 449, passed July 24, 1724.
70CSP, XXXIII, 366-7, Nov. 26, 1723.
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already acted on April 30, 1724, they presented a petition 
to the Privy Council asking that the governor of New York 
be instructed to permit renewal of the Indian Trade Act of 
1720, because, they argued, it brought "...great discourage­
ment on British Trade" without affecting French commerce.71 
The petition was referred to the Board of Trade on July 7; 72 
it suggested that a decision on the petition be delayed until 
information on the actual effects of the act could be 
obtained.73 The Privy Council accepted the Board's sugges­
tion, 74 and the Board embarked on a series of ten hearings, 
which occupied almost a year, on the acts' effects.75
Critics of the law argued that it hurt English commerce 
by reducing New York's beaver trade, raising the prices New 
Yorkers paid for fur, and depriving New York's cloth mer­
chants of the Canadian market, without harming the French 
who could obtain the goods they had purchased from New York 
elsewhere. The law's opponents also contended that commerce 
between private individuals had no effect on their respective
71APC, III, 68.
72Journal [1722/3-1728], p. 104.
73NYCD, V, 707-9, July 14, 1724.
74APC, III, 68, July 23, 1724.
7~*The hearings extended from July 22, 1724 to June 16, 
1725, Journal [1722/3-1728], pp. 108, 113, 162-78, 182-3.
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nations, and that New York's attempt to obtain fur by direct 
trade with the Indians had created competition, which had 
raised the price.
The act's supporters, including the former governor of 
New York, Robert Hunter, argued that the profits of the 
direct fur trade were greater than those which could be 
obtained when the pelts were purchased from French inter­
mediaries; that the French could not obtain furs from the 
Indians without cloth supplied by English merchants; that 
the price of pelts had not increased; that eliminating 
French traders would strengthen New York by attracting other 
Indians to the English interest; and that ending the trade 
would speed the economic collapse of the French colonies.
After hearing all the evidence and examining the sta­
tistics of New York's trade, the Board of Trade concluded 
that the Indian Trade Acts had not reduced the total volume 
of the colony's trade, and that the reduction in fur exports 
from New York which had taken place would soon be eliminated 
with all of the profits of the trade remaining in English 
hands. The Board could not, however, endorse the Indian 
Trade Acts. It felt that the act's enforcement procedures 
(especially the requirement for the establishment of inno­
cence by oath, the assumption that refusal to take the oath 
was an admission of guilt, and that authority might be
76NYCD, V, 745-7.
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given to men of low rank, even common soldiers, to impose 
high £100 penalties) made it objectionable. The Board 
therefore suggested that the governor of New York should 
be encouraged to secure repeal of the objectionable sections 
of the law, and to secure passage of a new act which achieved 
the same goals through a more equitable enforcement pro­
cedure. 77
On November 10, 1725 the New Yorkers, apparently 
ignorant of the Board's opinion, passed An act to revive 
and continue the severall acts therein mentioned relating 
to the prohibiting of selling Indian goods to the French and 
for promoting the trade with remote nations of Indians during 
the time therein mentioned and for the recovery of such pen­
alties as are now directed by the said acts.7** This act 
adopted a system of differentiated taxation to regulate the 
trade; the duties of goods sold to the French were to be 
twice those on goods used in direct trade with the Indians. 
Burnet hoped this would control the trade more effectively 
than the blanket prohibition of the earlier laws had d o n e . 79 
The system of abjurement by oath was, however, retained.




On June 17, 1726 An act to lay different duties on the 
goods therein mentioned and for regulating the Indian trade 
in the City and County of Albany for the term of two years 
and moderating and ascertaining the fines inaur'd by former 
acts if paid within the time limited in this act was
Q  / \passed.ou Governor Burnet informed the Board that this act 
was free of the defects which had marred the earlier legis­
lation. It retained, however, the objectionable system 
assuming that a suspect who was unwilling to protest his 
innocence under oath was guilty.
The intent of the Juen, 1726 law was clarified on 
November 11, 1726 by An act for explaining and enforcing an 
act entitled an act to lay different duties on the goods 
therein mentioned and for regulating the Indian trade in the 
City and County of Albany for the term of two years and for 
moderating and ascertaining the fines incurred by former 
acts if paid within the time limited in this act.82 An act 
for regulating and securing the Indians' trade to the west­






was intended to prevent the French from isolating the Indians 
who lived in the western part of the colony from trade with 
English colonists84 by building an English trading post at 
Oswego, New York85 was passed at the same time.
Apparently maintaining the trading post at Oswego was 
expensive, for the colony was obliged to enact on November 
25, 1727, An act for defraying the cost and contingent 
charges of the trading house erected at Oswego and the main­
taining of it during the time herein mentioned for applying 
several fonds and borrowing a certain sum out of the excise 
for that purpose, for the effectual recovery of former fines 
and forfitures and for continuing the different duties on 
Indian goods during the time herein mentioned and for making 
good the money so to be borrowed out of the excise.88 The 
trading post's financial difficulties were, however, not 
over, for on September 20, 1728, An act for confirming the 
act therein mentioned with some alterations and additions, 
for paying provisions and other stores and services already 
furnished and done for the use of the trading house at 
Oswego and for subsisting it during the time therein men­
tioned for borrowing money for those purposes and providing 






The colony's efforts at securing the Indian trade had, 
however, not gone unnoticed in London. On February 1, 1729, 
a group of merchants complained to the Privy Council that 
New York's Indian trade acts had prejudiced trade between 
the colony and England, a violation of the governor's 
instructions. The Privy Council referred the petition to 
the Board of Trade on November 12, 1729 with instructions 
to report on the merchants' objections and on any similar 
charges.88
The Board of Trade received the Privy Council's request 
on November 13 and immediately asked the Customs Commis­
sioners to transmit detailed information on New York's trade. 
The information arrived five days later and the Board immedi­
ately determined the fate of the New York statutes.89 it 
accepted the merchants' claims that the New York acts reduced 
trade by raising the price of beaver from 3 s to 5 s 3 d per 
pound, making English beaver more expensive than French or 
Dutch beaver which, in turn, enabled French hatters to 
undersell English hat makers thereby depriving England of 
the Spanish and Italian hat trade. The Board agreed that 
the New York laws had reduced the volume of beaver exported 
by two-thirds, and deprived English woolen manufacturers of
88APC, III, 209-14.
"journal [1728/9-1734], pp. 72-3.
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their Canadian customers. It also recognized that the pro­
cedure of enforcing the acts by oaths was unfair because it 
placed suspects in the position of either accusing them­
selves or committing perjury, often before low ranking 
soldiers.
The Board therefore concluded that as the fur trade 
"...appears to be so much affected by the said acts, and 
that the clauses relating to the execution thereof are 
grevious and oppressive..." the King should be advised to
Q  Adisallow them. The Board's report, which was drafted on 
November 18, and approved officially on the next d a y ^ l  was 
accepted by the Privy Council on December 3, 1729,92 and the 
series of ten laws, some of which had previously been 
approved by the Board of Trade, were disallowed by King 
George II December 11, 1729.93
The Indian trade acts were disallowed because they 
adversely affected the interests of British merchants. The 
Board did not, however, limit its intervention in New York's 
legislative affairs to matters of trade. It also intruded
90APC, III, 209-14.




to protect the Crown's prerogatives. On November 25, 1727, 
New York enacted An act for preventing prosecutions by 
informations which forbad the provincial Attorney General 
to bring suspects to trial without first obtaining an in­
dictment from a grand j u r y . 94 The law came to the Board 
of Trade's notice in late May, 1728 and was transmitted to 
Francis Fane, the Board's counsel, for evaluation. On June 
5, 1728 Fane reported that the act was "...a very violent 
and extraordinary attague upon the prerogatives of the 
Crown, for the right of the Attorney Generali to file infor­
mation is delegated to him from the King, and has ever been 
thought a most essential and necessary power with regard to 
the security of the publick tranquility...."95 The Board 
then sent the act to the Attorney General and the Solicitor 
General, both agreed with Fane's evaluation.95 Having deter­
mined that the New York law impinged upon the Crown's pre­
rogative, the Board sent a representation to the Privy 
Council requesting repeal,97 and on November 6, 1728 the 
order for disallowance was signed by the king.99
94NYCL, ch. 502.
95CSP, XXXVI, 112-3.
96CSP, XXXVI, 156, 175.
97Journal [1722/3-1728], p. 429.
"journal [1722/3-1728], p. 433.
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The fall 1737 session of the New York Assembly passed 
and Lieutenant Governor George Clarke signed An act for the 
frequent election of representatives to serve in General 
Assembly and for the frequent calling and meeting of the 
General Assembly so elected. The act, which required the 
Assembly to meet annually, limited the Assembly to a three 
year term, and required election to be held within six 
months of dissolution,99 engendered a strong reaction in 
London. The Board of Trade concluded it "...takes away the 
undoubted Right that the Crown has always exercised of 
calling and continuing the Assembly of that Province at such 
times and as long as it has been thought necessary for the
Publick Service," and on September 4, 1738^^® the Privy
Council disallowed the law.
In the 1740's the government of New York attempted to 
settle the confusion which surrounded the collection of 
quit-rents by legislation. An act for regulating the pay­
ment of His Majesty's quit-rents and for the partition of 
lands in order thereto was passed on May 22, 1742^®^ and was 
modified on September 21, 1744 by An act to amend part of an 





Majesty's quitrents and for partition of lands.102 
Lieutenant Governor Clarke supported the laws which allowed 
the government to collect proportionate shares of the quit- 
rents from each of joint tenants of a large grant because 
it would simplify the collection of the quit-rents, and 
would encourage settlement of the frontier by freeing the 
pioneers from the fear of being sued for huge arrears of 
q u i t - r e n t s . A f t e r  careful consideration of the acts,104 
the Board of Trade concluded that allowing the quit-rents 
to be paid within six months of the due date was incon­
venient for the Crown's officers, and that the fee estab­
lished for issuing a receipt for quit-rents was so low that 
no one would be willing to accept the post of deputy col­
lector. As the laws forgave quit-rents when there was no 
collector, the Board determined they were prejudicial to the 
Crown's interests and suggested they be vetoed. The Privy 
Council accepted the Board's report on May 23, 1 7 4 5.
102NYc l, ch. 733.
103NYCD, VI, 215.
104The Board of Trade held seven meetings on these laws. 
Journal [1741/2-1749], pp. 148-163, Feb. 1, 1744/5, March 5, 
6, 22, April 9, 25, 26, 1745.
105APC, IV, 4-5.
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The Board of Trade was also concerned with insuring 
that the legal systems of the Province of New York remained 
consistent with Britain's. Consequently it was careful to 
ascertain that New York's laws conformed to British statute, 
and that the legal procedures necessary to enforce colonial 
laws would not be burdensome or overly complicated.
Thus when, in 1718, New York passed An act for reviving 
an act of General Assembly entitled an act for the easier 
partition of lands in joint tenancy or in common and making 
the same more useful and effectual for the purposes therein 
mentioned-*-̂  the Board found it was defective because it 
failed to distinguish among the various types of tenancy. 
That omission meant that a tenant who had only a term 
interest in the lands might, under the terms of the law, 
participate in a division of the lands and emerge as the 
absolute owner of a portion of the grant thereby depriving 
the other share holders of land which would have become 
theirs. The Board therefore, on July 19, 1719, recommended 
disallowance.
The New Yorkers did not, however, abandon their desire 
for an act which would permit the division of land grants 
held in common, and, on November 11, 1726, Governor Burnet 
approved An act for the easier partition of lands held in
1Q6n yCL, ch. 362, passed Oct. 16, 1718.
107NYCD, V, 529-30.
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common and promoting the settling and improvement thereof 
and for confirming former divisions of settled townships 
of this colony. T h i s  act had no more success in London 
than its predecessor. The Board of Trade objected to it 
on several grounds. It felt there was no need for a public 
law to accomplish the divisions which could have been con­
veniently arranged by private agreements or private acts, 
that the act did not provide sufficient protection for the 
interests of minors and incompetents whose property might 
be affected by the divisions, that the act did not specif­
ically reserve the Crown’s rights on the lands involved, 
and most significantly that the act would defraud the Crown 
of vast tracts of land by legitimizing exorbitant grants, 
grants which even failed to reserve adequate quit-rents. 
Consequently, it advised d i s a l l o w a n c e an(j the privy 
Council transmitted its recommendation to the King on 
January 18, 1728.
An act to prevent the taking or levying on specialties 
more than the principle, interest and cost of suit and other 
purposes therein mentioned which was enacted on October 29, 





of technical deficiencies. The law forbade the plaintiffs 
who collected more than their just d e b t . m  Governor John 
Montgomerie's letter to the Board of Trade explained that 
the law had been passed to protect defendants from exploi­
tation by plaintiffs, and to spare them bother and expense 
of recovering the excessive damages in chancery.H2 Fane,
the Board's counsel, did not agree with Governor Montgomerie; 
he felt that the act was completely unnecessary. He argued 
that there were remedies available to defendants in the 
ordinary course of the law, and that the act would encourage 
defendants to over pay the plaintiff only to sue for the 
surplus under the advantageous terms of the l a w . T h e  
Board of Trade and the Privy Council agreed with Mr. Fane 
and suggested the King disallow the law because its remedies 
were inappropriate to the problem it was intended to 
resolve. H-4
The Board's concern with guaranteeing that colonial 
statutes conformed to English law decided the fate of An act
to impower the vestry of the Parish of Jamaica in Queens






church wardens of the said parish for the use and benefit 
of that parish which was passed on November 1, 1733.^^
The Bishop of London, who had been given jurisdiction over 
the churches in the American colonies in 1728-H® complained 
to the Board of Trade that the act, which gave the vestry 
control over funds intended for a minister's salary en­
couraged them not to appoint a new minister to their 
church.117 The Board then sent the act to its counsel,
Mr. Fane, who reported on March 5, 173 4, that he saw no 
legal reason to object to the act.H^ nis Lordship was, 
however, not willing to abandon the issue and, on June 5, 
he informed the Board that the New York law violated a 
statute of 28 Henry VIII which required the profits of a
1 1 qvacant benefice to be reserved for the next incumbent.
The Board consequently advised disallowance, and on July 
23, 1734 the Privy Council accepted the Board's advice that 
the law be repealed because there was no pressing reason to 








The Board of Trade's deliberations on New York statutes 
which it permitted to remain in force reflected the same 
concern for English economic interests, the prerogatives of 
the Crown, and the preeminence of the English legal system 
which shaped its decisions on disallowance.
In 1726 New York passed a revenue act which imposed a 
duty of 5 ounces of plate or 50 s paper currency on each 
slave over four years of age imported into the colony 
directly from Africa, and placed a 5 per cent duty on all 
European goods imported from the West Indies.-*-2*- A group 
of Bristol merchants found these provisions objectionable 
and complained to the Privy Council which forwarded their 
petition to the Board of Trade for consideration*-^2 on 
November 1, 1734.123 The Board examined the merchants' 
complaints on July 24, 1735*-24 and concluded that the duties 
were "...greatly prejudicial to the Trade and Navigation of 
this Kingdom, and are likewise expressly contrary to His 
Majesty's Instructions to the Govr. of New York, ... we 
should for these reasons propose to your Lordships that
121NYCL, ch. 467.
*~22Journal [1734/5-1741], p. 6.
123NYCD, VII, 32-4.
124Journal [1734/5-1741], p. 44.
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the Act in question might be laid before His Majesty for 
Disallowance." The Board, however, refrained from doing 
so because disallowance of the revenue act would cause 
confusion in the colony and disrupt the orderly functioning 
of its government. Instead, it recommended that an instruc­
tion ordering the governor to secure repeal of the duties 
be dispatched to New York.125 The instruction was sent on 
August 6, 1735 but the colonists ignored it. The offending 
act expired on September 1, 1737,126 it was, however, not 
renewed.
Since the Board was an agency of the Crown, it was 
naturally concerned with protecting the Crown's interests.
As the Crown's lands were its greatest resource in the 
colony, the Board of Trade was especially careful when it 
considered land grants. On April 7, 1731 Anthony Rutgers, 
a member of the New York Assembly, applied for a grant of 
a piece of land in New York City called the Swamp, which he 
proposed to drain. The Board met on Rutgers' request in May 
and was informed that the Swamp had been excluded from all 
grants because it had been intended as the site of a dock. 
The plan to construct a dock had not proved feasible, how­
ever, and draining the Swamp, the Board was told, would 
serve the public interest. This convinced the Board that
125NYCD, VII, 32-4.
126Ny c l, II, 768, Labaree, Instructions, pp. 152-3.
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Rutgers' project would not harm the Crown and, on June 2, 
1731, it approved the grant.^27 The Order in Council 
conveying the land to Rutgers was signed by King George II 
on August 12, 1731.128
The same care was applied to the application of a 
Mr. Stock for land in New York. The Board of Trade con­
sidered his application at seven meetings before it decided 
to approve the grant on October 28, 1737.129 When Lauchlin 
Campbell applied for land in New York the Board found his 
petition defective and returned it to him.33®
The Board was equally punctilious in insuring that 
private acts passed in New York did not confuse the legal 
system. In 1724 the Board of Trade's counsel, Richard West, 
reported that he had no objection to a New York Act which 
enabled Gilbert Livingston to sell certain lands. He did 
note, however, that the colonists tended to make their 
private acts too general and suggested an instruction 
requiring careful drafting of all private acts be sent to
127Journal 11728/9-1734], pp. 191, 200-1, 203, 208,234.
128CSP, XXXVIII, 223.
129Journal [1734/5-1741], pp. 87, 88, 91, 136, 137, the 
first meeting was held on Feb. 3, 1736/7.
130Journal [1734/5-1741], p. 330.
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The commission of the Board of Trade required it to 
investigate complaints about colonial maladministration or 
misadministration, and it fulfilled these obligations. It 
heard Lewis Morris Jr.'s complaint that his suspension from 
the New York Council by Governor Montgomerie was wrong;^33 
Lewis Morris Sr.'s, Rip Van Dam's and James Alexander's 
complaint that Governor William Cosby had removed them from 
office improperly;334 and Daniel Horsmanden's complaint that 
his removal from the Council in 1747 was unjustified.^33 
After being deluged with letters from Governor George 
Clinton from 1745 to 1751,^3  ̂the Board finally investigated 
the causes of the political turmoil which gripped the prov­
ince of New York. The Board's investigations were, however, 
all pointless. None of the officials who protested their 
removal were restored to office, and the report on the 
"state of the province" made no recommendations at all for
133Journal [1728/9-1734], 77, 81-3.
134Journal [1734/5-1741], pp. 74-7, 111.
135Journal [1741/2-1749], p. 263.
136Journal [1749/50-1753], pp. 66, 74-5, 79, 90, 97, 
117-8, 121, 139, 156, 158, 167, 169, 180-1, 220, 222-3,
257-8, 262-3, 285-6, 325, 381-3, 417-8, 449-50, 452-3. As 
the Journal gives only the subjects of most letters each 
page contains several communications.
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changing those conditions that Cosby had found so objec­
tionable. ̂ 37
Even the Instructions which the Board of Trade dis­
patched with each new governor of New York reflected its 
lack of concern with the day to day problems of colonial 
administration. In the period from 1717 to 1753, 169 
articles of "instruction” were issued to each new governor 
of New York. Of those, 126 dealt with the administration 
of the colony's government, methods of operation, salary, 
administration of justice, militia, reports, and the style 
of legislation; 25 dealt with trade, but only 18 gave the 
governor specific instructions as to what actions he should 
take as the colony's chief executive.I3® Thus, as the 
governors received virtually no guidance from London, they 
necessarily had to find their own way in the colonial 
political system.
Thus, even the Board of Trade, the agency of the British 
government which is generally credited with acting as the 
keystone of Britain's system of colonial administration,-*-3 ̂ 
manifested only limited interest. In accordance with its
137NYCD, VI, 614-36.
See Appendix I.
^3^See Dickerson, American Colonial Government, Charles 
M. Andrews, The Colonial Period of American History, vol. IV 
(New Haven, 1964 reprint of 1938 edition), chapter IX takes 
a much less sanguine view of the Board.
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original commission, it always treated the colonies pri­
marily as a source of wealth for the mother country and, 
consequently, devoted most of its efforts to insuring that 
the colonies would continue to contribute to Britain's 
prosperity. If it fulfilled its obligation to review colo­
nial legislation, to protect the interests of the Crown, 
and to hear complaints from the colonies, it never went 
beyond the letter of these requirements to examine the 
internal developments in the colonies; it did not exert a 
direct influence on the internal affairs of the colonies. 
Thus, the governors' success or failure in any particular 
colony was completely and necessarily their own.
CHAPTER FOUR
AN ENGLISH POLITICIAN IN THE NEW WORLD
A British governor of the province of New York usually 
first set foot on the colony's soil at the "white Hall" 
located near the foot of Manhattan Island, and his entrance 
would be observed by the members of the Council, the Alder­
men and Assistants of the Corporation of the City of New 
York, and the "principal gentlemen" of the town who had 
assembled to welcome their new executive.
This imposing multitude would then form itself into a 
procession to escort the governor designate to nearby Fort 
George. There he prepared to formally take charge of the 
colony's government by reading his commission, and would 
become acquainted with the leading colonists at a series of 
banquets which would be held in his honor.1 These festiv­
ities were punctuated with expressions of esteem for the 
King and his representative in the colony; although a part
iwayne Andrews, "The Tragic End of Sir Danvers Osborne, 
Bart.," New-York Historical Society Quarterly, XXXV 
(October, 1951), 405-6, Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Govern­




of the ritual of arrival,^ they were apparently quite 
encouraging to the new governor whose first letters to the 
Board of Trade usually reflected the optimism generated by 
the apparent good will of the colonists.^
Unfortunately the promise of complete harmony which 
surrounded the governor's arrival rarely endured. "The 
honeymoon was soon over." He soon learned that some of 
the colonists would not willingly cooperate with the ad­
ministration, and that he had to find some way to impose 
his will on them. The governor's strongest weapon for 
meeting opposition was apparently the Commission, which 
ostensibly granted him vast powers (powers unhampered by 
the Bill of Rights, the Triennial Act, the Septennial Act, 
the Act of Settlement, or the traditions which limited the 
Crown's authority in England) over his subjects.^ However, 
the Commission was, unluckily for the governor, a much 
weaker instrument than it seemed to be; its power had been
^Lab^xee, Royal Government, pp. 88-90.
^New York State, Secretary of State, Documents Relative 
to the Colonial History of the State of New York, E.B.
O'Callaghan and Berthold Fernow, editors (15 vols., Albany, 
1861-1887), V, 572-3, 855-6, 936-7, VI, 248 (hereafter NYCD).
^Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics (New 
York, 1968), pp. 66, 69, Evarts Boutell Greene, The Provin­
cial Governor of the English Colonies of North America (New 
York, 1966), p. 92 (hereafter Provincial Governor.
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diluted by conscious and unconscious decisions of the 
British government, and by precedents established in the 
colony. The broad language of the Commission, which had 
convinced historians that the governor dominated the 
provincial political system, has merely served to obscure 
the essential weakness of the governor's position.
Under the terms of his Commission, a governor of New 
York could, on his own authority, do many things: administer
oaths to the colony's officials, suspend members of the 
Council, veto proposed laws, adjourn, prorogue, and dismiss 
the Assembly, act as the province's Chancellor, appoint 
judges and other judicial officials, pardon persons convicted 
of all crimes except willful murder and treason, fill eccle­
siastical vacancies, call up and command the militia, execute 
captured enemies, rebels, and pirates, enforce martial law 
in periods of invasion, appoint naval officers in war time, 
authorize them to enforce martial law, and punish "disorders 
and misdemeanors" committed ashore by officers and men of 
the Royal Navy in accordance with local law.^ A separate 
Vice-Admiralty Commission also entitled the governor to 
appoint the judges and officers of a Vice-Admiralty Court 
which had jurisdiction over a wide variety of nautical 
matters including contracts between ship owners and merchants, 
ship charters, contracts which were outside the competence
5NYCD, V, 92-8.
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of ordinary courts, felonies committed within the colony's 
waters, treasure troves, anchorages, and the Royal fish.
As Vice-Admiral, the governor was also charged with en­
forcing all of England's maritime statutes, and supervising 
the colony's rivers and ports.®
Although this list of powers is long, it is not, on 
closer survey, terribly impressive; none would be likely 
to have much effect on the everyday lives of most New
Yorkers. The governor did possess the power to make
decisions which would touch the lives of his subjects more
directly, but he could not exercise it independently. The
Commission required him to obtain the "advice and consent" 
of the Council before he could call General Assemblies, 
establish courts, build and arm fortifications, issue warrants 
for the expenditure of public funds, grant lands, or "Order 
and Appoint Fairs, Marts and Markets,...[and] Ports, Harbours, 
Bays, Havens, and other places, for convenience and Security 
of Shipping...." He could enact laws only with the consent 
of a majority of the Council and of the Assembly, and his 
decisions were, moreover, subject to review by the Board of 
Trade and by the Privy Council in London. The colony's 
"chief executive" was also required to obtain confirmation 
from London whenever he nominated Councillors, appointed
®Labaree, Royal Government, pp. 26-7.
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acting Councillors, or pardoned traitors and willfull 
murderers.7
Another, albeit minor, restriction of the "unlimited" 
powers in the governor's Commission, was the 1700 Act to 
Punish Governors of Plantations in this Kingdom for Crimes 
by them Committed in the Plantations. This law, intended 
to keep colonial officials "...from oppressing His Majestyes 
Subjects within their respective governments...,"8 appar­
ently was generally ignored, for it was used as the basis 
of only one prosecution (in 1711 against Governor Walter 
Douglas of the Leeward Islands).8 Nonetheless it did remain 
in force and did, at least to some extent, threaten an over- 
zealous governor with retribution, and thereby perhaps con­
tributed to his passivity.
Such restrictions placed on the governor's authority 
by his Commission and the Act to Punish Governors... were, 
however, insignificant when compared to the restraints 
imposed by his "Instructions."
For example, the governor's authority to suspend 
Councillors was limited by the Instruction's mandate that
7NYCD, V, 92-8.
pLeo Francis Stock, Proceedings and Debates of the 
British Parliaments Respecting North America (5 vols., 
Washington, D.C., 1924-1941), II, 339.
8Labaree, Royal Government, pp. 123-4.
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he have good cause for the removal, and that he transmit 
the record of the Council's deposition hearing and the 
evidence against the suspended Councillor to the Board of 
Trade for review.10 The governor's authority over the 
judiciary was similarly limited by his Instructions which 
ordered him to obtain the Council's approval of the men 
he named to the colony's bench, and Royal confirmation of 
his permanent judicial appointments.^ The requirement 
that judges be removed only for "good and sufficient cause" 
further restricted the governor's authority.12 The 
governor's pardoning power was restricted by the Instruction 
which required him to obtain specific approval from the 
Commissioners of the Treasury and the Board of Trade before 
he could remit fines or forfitures of more than ^lO.^2 
His authority over church appointments was circumscribed 
by the requirement that he award benefices only to men 
licensed by an English bishop.1* His powers as commander
^Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Instructions to British 
Colonial Governors 1670-1776 (2 vols.. New York, 1967), 
pp. 60-3 (hereafter Instructions).
^Labaree, Instructions, p. 781.
l2Labaree, Instructions, p. 369.
^Labaree, Instructions, pp. 330-1.
^Labaree, Instructions, pp. 484-5.
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in chief were limited by the Instruction which required 
him to avoid excesses in the training program he imposed 
on the militia,15 an(j by the necessity for obtaining the 
Council's approval for a declaration of martial law.^®
The Instructions even restricted the governor's freedom 
to shape military policy; he was required by the Board of 
Trade to obtain funds to build a fort in the Onondaga 
Country, and to repair forts at Albany and Schenectady 
which it believed were important for the colony's defences.^ 
The Instructions also limited, to some extent, the governor's 
Vice-Admiralty jurisdiction by mandating the appointment of 
a receiver-general to take charge of the admiralty dues 
collected in New Y o r k . 18
The Instructions did not permit the governor and his 
Council to erect or to dissolve a Court without specific 
instructions from London.I9 Their authority to grant land 
was restricted, too. Consultation with the collector of 
customs, the provincial secretary, or the surveyor-general,
l^Labaree, Instructions, p. 393. 
l^Labaree, Instructions, p. 397. 
l^Labaree, Instructions, p. 412. 
l^Labaree, Instructions, pp. 457-8. 
l9Labaree, Instructions, p. 295.
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to insure that all grants had a similar proportion of good 
and bad lands, and that all grantees had access to water 
transport, was necessary before a grant could be made.2®
Even those powers which the governor shared with the 
government in London were curtailed by his Instructions.
His limited power to nominate Councillors was reduced by 
the requirement that he maintain, in the capitol, a list 
of men he considered qualified for a seat on his council.21 
Such a list of potential nominees would allow the Board of 
Trade to suggest new Councillors to the Privy Council and 
King without specific consultation with the governor, and 
thereby reduced the governor's ability to control the future 
composition of his administration.
The most detailed restrictions in the Instructions were, 
however, reserved for the governor's legislative and finan­
cial powers. His authority to "make constitute and Ordain 
laws, Statues, and Ordinances," (which under the Commission 
was shared with the Council and Assembly) was furthered 
limited when he was ordered not to consent to private acts 
affecting private property until the person who petitioned 
for the law presented proof to the Council that he had 
announced his intention to seek the legislation in the
2®Labaree, Instructions, pp. 531-2. 
21Labaree, Instructions. p. 50.
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church of the parish where the property was located for at 
least three successive Sundays before the act was passed.
The governor was required to enclose proof of compliance 
with each act sent to London for approval. These rather 
stringent requirements were not, however, the only limita­
tions on his freedom to approve private acts. After 1723, 
governors of New York could sign only private acts which 
would not take effect until approved by the C r o w n . 22
These restrictions were not, by any means, the only 
restraints on the governor's legislative authority. He was 
required to withhold his approval from any bill of "unusual 
and extraordinary nature and importance wherein our prerog­
ative or the property of our subjects may be prejudiced or 
the trade or shipping of this kingdom any ways affected" 
which had not been previously approved by London unless it 
contained a suspending clause.22 in addition, the Instruc­
tion barred the governor from approving any acts which
placed higher duties on ships and goods owned by non-
O Aresidents than on those owned by New Yorkers.
The governor's ability to control the financial, as well 
as the legislative life of New York was further diminished
22Labaree, Instructions, pp. 140-1.
22Labaree, Instructions, pp. 144-5.
24Labaree, Instructions, pp. 146-7.
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by the Instructions which ordered him to disapprove all 
acts for the emission of "bills of credit" which did not 
contain a suspending clause,25 an<j an  laws which reduced 
the Crown's r e v e n u e s . 26 The Crown further curtailed the 
governor's ability to conduct the colony's financial affairs 
by issuing Instructions which required him to insure that 
all colonial taxes were levied in the King's name,^ and to 
veto any act which challenged the right of the Commissioners 
of the Treasury, the High Treasurer of England, and the 
Auditor General of Plantations to audit New York's accounts. 
The requirement that the governor forward duplicates of his 
accounts to London for semi-annual a u d i t 2 8 indicates the 
extent of London's concern with the colony's finances.
Yet the Instructions which defined and curtailed his 
specific powers were not the most significant restriction 
placed on the governor of New York's ability to control 
"his" government. The most profound restriction simply 
warned:
... if anything shall happen which may be of 
advantage and security to our said province 
which is not herein or by our commission
2^Labaree, Instructions, pp. 218-9.
0 fiLabaree, Instructions, pp. 171-2.
27Labaree, Instructions, p. 170.
28Labaree, Instructions, pp. 174-5.
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provided for, we do hereby allow unto you, 
with the advice and consent of our said 
council, to take order for the present 
therein, giving unto us by one of our 
principal secretaries of state and to our 
aforesaid Commissioners for Trade and 
Plantations speedy notice thereof, that 
so you may receive our ratification if we 
shall approve the same; provided always 
that you do not by color of any power or 
authority hereby given you commence or 
declare war without our knowledge and 
particular commands therein, except it be 
against Indians upon emergencies, wherein 
the consent of our council shall be had, 
and speedy notice given thereof to us as 
aforesaid.
This left the governor no freedom of action at all. He was 
to adhere to his detailed instructions, and if they proved 
incomplete, he was to turn for advice to his Council, a body 
which was rather independent of his interests. Even after 
receiving the Council's advice, he would not be free to act. 
He had to concern himself with presenting his actions in a 
light which would be acceptable to London. Either of these 
limitations would have made it extremely difficult for a 
governor to lead effectively the colony in a crisis; com­
bined, they made it practically impossible. The British 
government seemed more interested in consultation and 
justification than in action.
Perhaps the British government felt that the governors 
could best be managed by keeping them as powerless as
2®Labaree, Instructions, pp. 82-4.
137
possible.30 its policy toward Council appointments seemed 
intended to reduce the governor's already limited influence 
over that body. The governor could, it was true, nominate 
Councillors; but so could many other persons —  merchants, 
army officers, the Bishop of London, colonists who happened 
to be in London, or anyone else who professed an interest 
in colonial affairs. The Board of Trade listened atten­
tively to the arguments presented for and against nominees 
by such individuals, and was sometimes willing to accept 
their advice over the governor's.31 The governor's distance 
from London placed him at a disadvantage in his efforts to 
influence the selection of the members of the very body 
which had a voice in many of his decisions.
Thus, the attitude of the British government toward 
its colonial administrators was ambivalent. On one hand, 
it attempted to control the governors by keeping them as 
powerless as possible, but on the other, it was so disinter­
ested in colonial affairs that it virtually ignored the 
colonies and permitted the governor and the colonists to 
evolve their own political relationships. In practice, the 
desire for control was clearly subordinate to disinterest,
3^The English government had, since the Tudor period, 
been concerned with controlling the "overmighty" subject.
^Labaree, Royal Government, pp. 137-9.
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and so, the governor was left to carry on the administration 
of the colony as best he could.
Despite all the limitations placed on him, the governor
was responsible for the administration of the colony. He
was responsible for raising the money necessary for the
operations of the colonial government, and for pursuing
the various projects London had ordered him to undertake.
As the Parliament at Westminster never appropriated money
for the operation of the colonial government, the governor
was obligated to convince the colonists to supply the
requisite funds.32 This task was more difficult than it
seemed; despite many superficial similarities, there were
rather profound differences between the British and American
33views of New York's government.
There was essential disagreement over the status of 
the Assembly. The British government took the position 
that New York had been granted an Assembly only to encourage 
Englishmen to settle in the p r o v i n c e , 34 and that like any 
other body created by the Crown, the Assembly's powers 
were completely dependent upon the prerogative.35 The
^^Labaree, Royal Government, pp. 269-71.
33fiailyn, Origins of American Politics, passim.
3^Charles M. Andrews, The Colonial Background of the 
American Revolution, revised edition (New Haven, 1931), p.35 
(hereafter Colonial Background).
^^Andrews, Colonial Background, pp. 31-3, Mary Patterson 
Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege in the American Colonies (New 
York, 1971), p. 202.
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colonists adamantly rejected this argument and insisted 
that their Assembly grew from the same right of Englishmen 
to representation in the government as the House of Commons, 
and that it could no more be suspended by the Crown than 
could the lower house at Westminster.^6
This disparity alone would have been sufficient to 
confuse the governor's relations with his "subjects." They 
were further complicated by the British government's ambiv­
alent attitude. Although it insisted that the Assemblies 
had no "right" to exist, it sometimes seemed to recognize 
that "right."37 The government's Instructions ordered the 
governor to deny the Assembly "any power or privilege what­
soever which is not allowed by us to the House of C o m m o n s , "38 
and it never took any active steps to deny the Assembly's 
claims to the authority and privileges of the Commons.
This apparent approval convinced the colonists of the 
justice of their position,^ but left the governor in a
3®Jack P. Greene, The Quest for Power: The Lower
Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies 16S1T- 
1715 (Chapelhill, N.C., 1963), pp. 14-5 (hereafter 
Quest for Power).
^Greene, Quest for Power, pp. 14-5.
3®Labaree, Instructions, pp. 112-3.
O Q Andrews, Colonial Background, p. 41.
^Labaree, Royal Government, pp. 174-7.
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quandry. He could neither confirm nor deny the Assembly's 
authority without violating the wishes of the government.
This paradoxical situation was resolved by the Assembly 
itself. It did not restrict itself to claiming the prerog­
atives of the House of Commons; it actively pursued them,41 
and managed to establish itself as a legitimate and power­
ful element of New York's constitution primarily by obtain­
ing control of the levying and distribution of public 
f u n d s . 42 The Assembly became essential to the continued 
smooth operation of the colony's government. The governor 
was forced to accept it as such.
For example, the Assembly began engrossing financial 
authority in New York (because it said it was responsible 
to the taxpayers)43 very early in the colony's history. The 
commission of Governor Henry Sloughter, drawn in 1690, had 
authorized "the colony" to control the disposition of the 
colony's revenues. New Yorkers thereafter assumed they had 
been given complete control of their finances, and, despite 
all attempts to dissuade them, clung tenaciously to their
41-Greene, Quest for Power, p. 11.
42Greene, Quest for Power, pp. 7-8.
43nerbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the 
Eighteenth Century (4 vols., Gloucester, Mass., 1958), II, 
71, (hereafter Eighteenth).
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interpretation of the commission.44
The Assembly had first demonstrated its intent to 
dominate finances in 1691, when it refused to appropriate 
money for terms of more than two y e a r s , 4^ appointed a com­
mittee to inspect the colony's financial records,4® and 
began appropriating monies for specific uses.47 The system 
of specific appropriations even extended to the salaries. 
Since money was voted to pay the incumbent of each public 
office, the Assembly could easily reduce or eliminate the 
salaries of individual officials. This quite naturally 
increased its influence over all provincial officers.4® In 
1695 the Assembly flatly claimed it was competent to judge 
the colony's needs, ignored the governor's request for funds, 
and appropriated only what money it believed necessary for 
the operation of the government.4®
44Neil Ovadia, "The Struggle for Financial Control" 
(Unpublished M.A. thesis, Queens College, Flushing, N.Y., 
1968), pp. 8-9.
4^Osgood, Eighteenth, I, 247.
4®Osgood, Eighteenth, I, 243.
470sgood, Eighteenth, I, 242.
48Greene, Provincial Governor, pp. 116-7.
4QOsgood, Eighteenth, I, 255.
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Nine years later, the Assembly increased its control 
over finances by specifying, in appropriation bills, the 
precise manner in which the money it granted was to be spent, 
and claimed, for the first time, that the Council could not 
amend revenue bills.50 In 1706 the Assembly's influence 
again increased when, under pressure from the Board of 
Trade,51 Lord Cornbury allowed it to appoint a Treasurer to 
supervise the expenditure of appropriations. Cornbury even 
consented when the Assembly authorized various provincial 
officials to warrant the expenditure of public m o n i e s ,52 
thereby further limiting his own authority to control the 
colony's finances. The Assembly first demonstrated its 
willingness to withhold complete appropriations to force the 
governor to accept legislation it favored during the admin-
C Oistration of Robert Hunter. J
As the governor could not possibly hope for a success- 
full administration and his own continued employment if the 
colony's government was forced into complete chaos because 
of a lack of funds, and as he was in New York primarily for
5^0sgood, Eighteenth, II, 70-1. Although several 
governors vigorously denied the Assembly's claim to exclusive 
control over appropriations, the lower House was immovable 
in its assertion.
51NYCD, IV, 1171-3.
52()sgood, Eighteenth, II, 74.
■^Osgood, Eighteenth, II, 111-2.
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the profits of office,54 the Assembly's control of finances 
was probably its most effective means of influencing him.
It was not, however, the only means.
One of the governor's most important, and inescapable 
responsibilities was defense. To protect the colony from 
Indian raids, and the possibility of invasion from Canada, 
it was necessary at all times to maintain a body of men 
under arms. The discipline and effectiveness of the 
colony's military formations could not be preserved without 
a code of martial law, and martial law could be established 
only by an act of the Assembly. (The New York Assembly, 
like the British House of Commons, refused to pass a 
perpetual mutiny a c t , a n d  so it could coerce the governor 
by threatening not to renew his authority to discipline the 
troops who defended the colony.) Since Britain was involved 
in hostilities which to some degree affected New York for 
much of the first half of the eighteenth century, the main­
tenance of an effective military force was of immediate 
importance to the governors of New York. The Assembly's 
influence increased proportionately.
Since the governor could not hope to rule New York 
without an Assembly —  despite the constitutional theories
5^Greene, Provincial Governor, 117.
55Greene, Provincial Governor, pp. 99-101, David Ogg, 
England in the Reigns of James II and William III (Oxford, 
1963), pp. 230-1.
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espoused by VThitehall —  he had to find some means of 
obtaining its cooperation. He could not use the Provincial 
Council to counterbalance the Assembly, for the Councillors, 
like the Assemblymen, were colonials who shared the desire 
of the leaders of the Assembly to obtain political authority 
commensurate with their leading social and economic positions 
in the colony.56 Consequently, Councillors often supported 
the Assembly rather than the governor when disputes a r o s e . 57
Nor could the governor use his position as the King's 
representative in New York to overawe the Assembly. The 
colonists were fully aware that the governor, despite his
Commission and imposing titles, was not the ultimate polit­
ical authority. They knew that the governor, who was far 
removed from the center of authority and the influential 
friends who had helped him secure his post often had as 
little influence on the decisions the London government 
made affecting New York as the humblest colonists,56 and 
that any decision the governor might make could be
56Greene, Quest for Power, p. 8.
5^Greene, Quest for Power, p. 12.
56Alison Gilbert Olson and Richard Maxwell Brown,
editors, Anglo-American Political Relations, 1675-1775
(New Brunswick, N.J., 1970), p. 93.
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challenged by a voyage to London, or through family or
COpersonal connections. To maintain any sort of psycho­
logical advantage over the colonists, the governor had to 
be able to present concrete evidence that he was "in favor"
/T Ain London, so as to convince them that it would be 
impossible to obtain favorable governmental action without 
his cooperation.61 Yet this was almost impossible, since 
access to the British government was rather easy for almost 
anyone of influence. Being largely unconcerned with colo­
nial matters,62 the government was unlikely to refuse a 
petition simply to protect the prestige of a governor some 
3,000 miles away.
Lacking any more convenient means for obtaining the 
cooperation of the Assembly, it would have been natural for 
the governor to apply the techniques of political manage­
ment, which he learned through his involvement in British
S^The best examples are Robert Livingston's, and Lewis 
Morris' trips to London, and James Delancey's use of Sir 
Peter Warren's influence.
66oison and Brown, Anglo-American Political Relations, 
p. 98.
^Labaree, Royal Government, p. 140.
62James A. Henretta, "Salutary Neglect" Colonial Admin­
istration Under the Duke of Newcastle" (Princeton, N.J.,
1972), p. 266-7 (hereafter Salutary Neglect).
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politics and which had brought him his office.63 In the 
period from 1716 to 1783, the domestic powers of the Crown 
and House of Commons were almost perfectly balanced,6  ̂and 
so a structure to prevent conflicts between the monarch and 
the Commons (which might have immobilized the government) 
was necessary.66 The emergence of such a system was eased 
by the relative simplicity of interests. The Crown and its 
ministers were interested in obtaining the votes necessary 
for carrying the government's business in the Parliament; 
the members of the House of Commons were interested in 
profiting from their service at Westminster. The basis for 
agreement was obvious —  members would provide the votes the 
government so badly desired, and the government would provide 
the posts of profit and honor many members so badly desired.66 
Sir Robert Walpole made this rather crass system of barter
c. 7into one of Britain's fundamental political principles,07
Olson and Brown, Anglo-American Political Relations, 
pp. 5-6.
6^Betty Kemp, King and Commons 1660-1832 (London, 1957), 
PP. 2,5.
^John Harold Plumb, The Origins of Political Stability: 
England 1675-1725 (Boston, 1967), passim (hereafter Origins 
of Political Stability).
66Stanley Nider Katz, Newcastle's New York (Cambridge,
Mass., 1968), p. 8.
6^Plumb, Origins of Political Stability, p. 179.
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and his successors preserved it as the keystone of eight­
eenth century British politics.
The system worked "effectively" because the members of 
Parliament were free to accept employment from the Crown, ^  
and because the government had a large number of posts 
available for distribution to its "friends" and their 
f a m i l i e s . Positions were available in the exchequer, the 
customs service, the excise service, the army, the navy, the 
Royal Court, the households of the King's children, the 
diplomatic service, the church, the judiciary, the govern­
ments of Ireland and Scotland, and, of course the colonies. 
The government could also reward its friends with lucrative 
government contracts. 7J.
The governor of New York was not able to apply these 
principles to his own little government. From 1717 to 1753 
no British government had a budget (exclusive of debt
^Lewis B. Namier, The Structure of Politics at the 
Accession of George III, second edition (London, 1968) , 
passim (hereafter Structure of Politics).
®^Kemp, King and Commons, pp. 5, 43.
70Namier, Structure of Politics, pp. 121, 358, chapter 
8, Plumb, Origins of Political Stability, p. 112.
71piumb, Origins of Political Stability, pp. 108, 114, 
118-9, 122-3.
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service) of less than £2,445,000 a year;72 in the same 
period, New York's annual budget (exclusive of war-related 
expenses) was probably less than £5,00073 and certainly 
less than £10,000.7  ̂ New York s i m p l y  did not possess the 
resources which were necessary to generate the patronage 
which was the sine qua non of the British system.
Lack of money was not the only obstacle a governor of 
New York had to face in attempting to adapt the British 
patronage system to his new home. He could not even control 
what little patronage the colony did have. Officials in 
London abrogated the governor's authority to make appoint­
ments to the more important, and profitable, colonial 
offices. Either they filled the posts directly by obtaining 
commissions for their nominees from the King, or indirectly, 
by ordering the governor to appoint their nominees.73 In 
either case, the colonial governor was deprived of offices
72Brian R. Mitchell and Phyllis Dean, Abstract of 
British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 389-90.
E. James Ferguson, "Currency Finance: An Interpre­
tation," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, X (April, 
1953), 171.
7^Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and
Society in Colonial New York (New York, 1971), p. 80, Osgood, 
Eighteenth, II, 80.
75Labaree, Royal Government, p. 102.
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which could have been used as a reward for political loyalty 
in New York.7** The appointment of colonial officials from 
London further reduced the governor's ability to rule by 
creating an element within his administration which was 
independent of his authority.77
An additional hindrance was the growth of the custom 
which allowed Assemblymen to nominate county officers, even 
though they were appointed by the governor. This practice 
was so firmly established that the governor would unhesi­
tatingly honor the nominations of an opponent, during the 
most acrimonious disputes.7®
Unlike the colonists who were free to engage in 
political controversy, the governor was barred from full- 
fledged participation in partisan politics,7® and conse­
quently was prevented from utilizing the prestige of his 
office to secure the election of an Assembly which would 
do his bidding.
7**Henretta, Salutary Neglect, pp. 242-5.
77Labaree, Royal Government, pp. 104-6.
7®Nicholas Varga, "New York Government and Politics
During the Mid-Eighteenth Century" (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Fordham University, Bronx, New York, 1960), 
p. 274 (hereafter "New York Government").
7®Varga, "New York Government," p. 275.
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Controlling an election was considerably more compli­
cated in New York than it was in Britain. Virtually all 
New Yorkers possessed the forty shilling property qualifi­
cation, 80 and New York had no rotten boroughs, so it was 
impossible to "influence" an election by bribing a few 
v o t e r s . Even if there had been votes for sale, the 
governor, with a small budget controlled by the Assembly, 
could not have bought them, and there were no colonists 
who could afford to support candidates with their private 
fortunes as did the Duke of Newcastle in B r i t a i n .
An additional complication was the lack of stable 
parties.83 secure a friendly Assembly, a governor
could no simply support a "faction;" he had to locate the 
individual colonists who were willing to cooperate, and 
hope they would remain loyal for the Assembly's term. It 
was, in practice, impossible for him to create his own
"faction" in the A s s e m b l y . 84
®®Bailyn, Origins of American Politics, p. 86.
81Bailyn, Origins of American Politics, p. 80, Milton 
M. Klein, "Democracy and Politics m  Colonial New York," 
New York History, XL (July 1959) , 221-246 (hereafter 
"Democracy and Politics").
o ̂Klein, "Democracy and Politics," p. 231.
p  OJVarga, "New York Government," p. vii.
84oison and Brown, Anglo-American Political Relations,
p. 6.
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As the governor could not dominate the Assembly, his 
only remaining option was to bargain with its leaders, the 
men of influence. Yet this was difficult. Because the 
British government had used the prerogative as its main 
argument for denying the Assembly's claims to political 
power, New Yorkers had come to regard the prerogative and 
the man who embodied it as an enemy of their liberties.8® 
Their distrust of executive authority was strengthened by 
the British opposition tradition itself,8® and so New 
Yorkers were less than enthusiastic about cooperating with 
the individual who represented, to them, forces of reaction 
and repression. Fortunately for the governor, New Yorkers 
did accept the idea that the function of politics was to 
create, protect and expand emoluments and profits for 
office-holders.8  ̂ If the governor would assist them in 
pursuing those goals,88 they were willing to subordinate
85Labaree, Royal Government, p. 216.
8®Basilyn, Origins of American Politics, pp. 39-43, 
53-7, for a more detailed treatment of the issue see 
Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revo­
lution (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), and Caroline Robbins,
The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthman (Cambridge, Mass., 
1961) .
8^Lawrence H. Leder, Robert Livingston 1654-1728 and 
the Politics of Colonial New York (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1961), 
p. 174 (hereafter Robert Livingston).
88Varga, "New York Government," pp. vi-vii.
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their distrust to a desire for assistance.®®
If a basis for cooperation with the colonists could be
established, the governor still had to determine who the
leaders of the Assembly really were.9® The inchoate nature
of local politics meant that many individuals and factions
competed for the governor's support,91 and while this gave
him the option of choosing his allies from a number of
competing groups, it also created difficulties. Each
individual faction was rather small and generally no single
political leader could dominate the Assembly. Consequently,
building and maintaining an alliance large enough to control
the Assembly was rather difficult. Politicians once wooed
might leave the governor's alliance on little or no provo- 
9 2cation. Only an astute governor could utilize the system 
effectively.
The first governor of New York to adapt himself fully 
to the colony's politics was Robert Hunter. He recognized 
the importance of the Assembly by approving a naturalization
99Leder, Robert Livingston, ch. XIV-XV.
9®Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 43.
9^Leder, Robert Livingston, p. 77, Milton M. Klein, 
"Politics and Personalities in Colonial New York," New York 
History, XLVII (Jan. 1966), p. 7.
92Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 46.
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bill (which although contrary to his Instructions was 
important to the Assemblymen), and he recognized Lewis 
Morris' and Robert Livingston's role as leaders of the 
Assembly by satisfying their ambitions. Morris was 
appointed Chief Justice, and Livingston Manor was made 
an Assembly district.93 in return, the Assembly under 
the guidance of Morris and Livingston, voted a five year 
revenue for the government.9  ̂ The agreement was durable, 
and Hunter's administration which had begun in discord 
ended in harmony.
Hunter was able to resolve the colony's political dis­
putes only because the British officials charged with the 
supervision of colonial affairs were willing to permit 
deviations from the letter of British colony p o l i c y . 93 The 
success of other governors in taking advantage of similar 
opportunities determined to a large degree how peaceful 
and profitable their administration would be.
93Leder, Robert Livingston, pp. 236-7, Varga, "New York 
Government," p. 3l.
9^Leder, Robert Livingston, pp. 227, 235-6, 241.
9301son and Brown, Anglo-American Political Relations, 
p. 97.
CHAPTER FIVE 
BURNET AND MONTGOMERIE: A STUDY IN CONTRASTS
After Governor Hunter surrendered to the Assembly's
demands for effective control of New York's finances in 1715,
his relations with the Assembly smoothed considerably. His
supporters were not, however, in control of the Assembly, and
on August 11, 1715, Hunter dissolved the House and called for
new elections.^ He was apparently encouraged to take this
step by the success of Lewis Morris and Robert Livingston in
forging a disparate group of Hudson landowners into a polit-
2ical coalition which was committed to supporting him. The 
ensuing campaign was hard fought,^ but the Morris-Livingston 
league triumphed. It was to dominate the Assembly for almost
^Patricia U. Bonami, A Factious People (New York, 1971) , 
p. 85, Appendix C [p. 302],
2Lawrence H. Leder, Robert Livingston 1654-1728 and the 
Politics of Colonial New 7ork (Chapel Hill, , IS'6lit ,
p. 284 (hereafter kobert Livingston).
^Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the 
Eighteenth Century (4 vols., Gloucester, Mass., 1958, reprint 
of 191Z4-S edition) , II, 412 (hereafter Eighteenth) .
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4ten years, until Governor Burnet's political ineptness 
destroyed the very fabric of the alliance that Morris, 
Livingston and Hunter had created.
The victory of the pro-Hunter group quieted New York's 
bitter political conflicts, and once it became clear that his 
allies were firmly in control of the Assembly, Hunter appar­
ently decided that he could leave New York without too great 
a risk of a renewal of the political strife which had marked
the early years of his administration.^ He left for England 
6in July, 1719, and Peter Schuyler, the senior member of the 
Council, took charge of the government.^ Schuyler was asso-
gciated with the group which had opposed Hunter, and encour-
9aged by Adolph Philipse, he set about insuring that his 
allies would profit from his administration. As the acting 
governor of New York, Schuyler had the authority to appoint 
the mayors of the cities of Albany and New York, and when the
4Leder, Robert Livingston, p. 284.
^Bonomi, Factious People, p. 87.
^New York State, Secretary of State, Documents Relative 
to the Colonial History of the State of Newjfork, b. &.
O'Callaghan and BertKold F^ernow, editors (15 vols., Albany, 
1861-1887), V, 529 (hereafter NYCD).
7Leder, Robert Livingston, p. 249.
0Osgood, Eighteenth. II, 415-6.
9NYCD, V, 534.
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one year terms of Hunter's appointees expired, he replaced
them with his partisans. Replacing officials with his friends
was, however, apparently not the only way in which he hoped to
change the political balance in New York. It was widely
rumored that Schuyler intended to dissolve the Assembly, and
call for new elections which, he hoped, would result in his
allies taking control from the Morris-Livingston associa- 
10tion. Naturally, Morris, Livingston and their friends were 
disturbed at the possibility of being deprived of the politi­
cal advantages they had worked so hard to obtain. They re­
ported the ominous developments to Hunter. He described the 
developments in the colony to the Board of Trade, and it 
responded by forbidding Schuyler to make any changes in New 
York's government.
While in London, Hunter had arranged to exchange offices
12with comptroller of customs William Burnet, who hoped to
13recover his lost fortune in New York. Hunter had briefed
^Osgood, Eighteenth, II, 415-6.
^^Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 87-8, NYCD, V, 535.
12Leder, Robert Livingston, p. 250.
^William Smith Jr., The History of the Province of New 
York, Michael Kammen, ed. (2 vols., Cambridge Mass., l!V72) , 
1, 166 (hereafter History) Burnet, like many other 
Englishmen had been badly hurt financially by the collapse 
of the South Sea Bubble.
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14Burnet before the new governor left England, so when Burnet 
read his commission on September 8, 172015 he was better 
acquainted with conditions in the colony than were most new 
admins trators«
Since Burnet had learned about New York from Hunter, it 
was not at all surprising that he had adopted the ex-governor's 
political prejudices. He decided to be guided by the advice
of Lewis Morris, Cadwallader Colden, James Alexander,^ and
17 18Robert Livingston who had all been close to Hunter. The
decision was wise. Lewis Morris managed the pro-governor
alliance in the Assembly and he had taken pains to maintain
its coherence and loyalty during the "interregnum". He had
advised Surveyor General Cadwallader Colden to delay all land
grants to Assemblymen, thereby keeping the members dependent
19and amenable to discipline, and had cautioned Colden against
14Bonomi, Factious People, p. 88.
15NYCD, V, 572-3.
^Smith, History, I, 166.
17Bonomi, Factious People, p. 87.
18NYCD, V, 576-80.
19Beverly Me Anear, "Politics in Provincial New York, 
1689-1761" (2 vols., unpublished Ph. D. dissertation Stanford 
University, January, 1935) , I, 314-5 (hereafter "Politics").
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turning Assemblymen against the administration by disallowing
20grants they had already obtained. Consequently, when 
Burnet arrived in New York his "friends" still controlled the 
Assembly.
Their position was, however, not as strong as it had 
been when Hunter left for England. Schuyler had controlled 
the executive for fourteen months, and consequently his asso­
ciates had managed to improve their position at the expense 
of the Morris-Livingston group. Morris apparently felt his 
allies would be defeated if an election were held, and con­
sequently advised Burnet to ignore the custom which required 
new Assembly elections at the start of an administration, and 
to continue the sitting Assembly which was dominated by men
who were willing to cooperate with the governor. Burnet
21accepted the suggestion.
The Assemblymen, who were spared the expenses of an
22election campaign and the risk of defeat, repaid the gov-
23ernor by being unusually amenable to his request. The
20New York Historical Society, The Cadwallader Colden 
Papers, New York Historical Society Collections, 1917-1923, 
l9V4-l93n r  vols". ;~N~ew York, T 104-5
(cited as Colden Papers).
21NYCD. V, 572-3.
22Milton M. Klein, "Domocracy and Politics in Colonial 
New York," New York History. XL, no. 3 (July, 1959), 228-31.
23Smith, History. I, 167.
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2 4Assembly extended the colony's revenue for five years,
raised Governor Burnet's salary to b 1,560 (N.Y.), selected
25Burnet's ally Robert Livingston as Speaker, voted new
2 6duties on imported goods to repay New York's debts, and
27unhesitatingly followed suggestions for other legislation.
Its loyalty even extended to expelling one of its members for
criticizing the Governor. (Samuel Mulford, a representative
from Suffolk County, and a member of the opposition was so
incensed by Governor Burnet's refusal to dissolve the Assembly
that he refused to participate in its deliberations. The
Assembly, which was dominated by members of the Morris-
Livingston group which supported the governor, responded by
expelling Mulford. This rather harsh reaction apparently
2 8cowed the opposition in the Assembly. )
Mulford's expulsion from the Assembly did not completely 
eliminate opposition to Burnet's policies. Several leaders
24NYCD, V, 601.
25Osgood, Eighteenth, II, 417-8.
26New York State, Commissioners of Statutory Revision,
The Colonial Laws of New York from 1664 to the Revolution 
(5 vol's”  Albany . IW47V H T, 3T ‘(hereafter MYCt) THew-York 
Historical Society, The Rutherfurd Collection, vol. I, p. 57.
27NYCD, V, 576-81.
28Bonomi, Factious People, p. 89, Mulford was expelled 
on October 26, 1726.
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of the opposition held seats on the Council and they utilized
its sessions as a forum in which to express their opposition
to Governor Burnet's tax on imports and his continuation of 
29the Assembly. The Governor responded to some of these
attacks in a simple and effective way. On November 26, 1720,
he asked the Board of Trade to remove Adolph Philipse, and
Peter Schuyler, the two leaders of the opposition, from the
Council. His request was supported by New York's agent in
London, George Bampfield (who was the Board of Trade's
30Secretary, William Popple's cousxn ) and by Robert
Livingston's son-in-law, Samuel Vetch, a London merchant.
Bampfield and Vetch were apparently effective advocates for
the Board acted on Burnet's request with unusual dispatch;
the two offending Councillors were removed on February 10,
311720/1 and replaced by Burnet's allies, Cadwallader Colden
32and James Alexander.
The Governor did not, however, take such Draconian action 
against George Clarke, the third opposition Councillor. 
Apparently Burnet felt that the Board would not be willing
29Rutherfurd Collection, vol. I, p. 47.
30Lawrence H. Leder, "Robert Livingston: A New View of
New York Politics," New York History, XL, no. 4 (October, 
1959) , 364.
31Leder, Robert Livingston, p. 257.
32Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 89-90.
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33to deprive Clarke (whose uncle, William Blathwayt, had
served as the Secretary to the Board of Trade until his death 
34in 1717 ) of his seat, for he did not ask it to act against
Clarke. Instead, he contented himself with removing Clarke
35from his post as Clerk of the Circuits. Clarke thereupon
abandoned his active opposition to the governor and so the
adminstration's antagonists were effectively, albeit terapor-
36arily, silenced.
The addition of Lewis Morris Jr., Philip Livingston,
37and William Provoost (Alexander's son-in-law ) to the
Council insured that it was as firmly committed to Burnet's
38interest as the Assembly. This placed the Governor and 
his allies in the enviable position of having virtually un­
challenged control of the colony's government. Securing 
political supremacy was useful to Burnet because, unlike 
other governors of New York, he had a specific program. He
hoped to encourage the colony's growth, and to expand its
33"Clarke, George," D.A.B.. IV, 151.
34"Blathwayt, William,” D.N.B., II, 668.
35Rutherfurd Collection, vol. I# p. 47.
JOBonomi, Factious People, p. 90.
3^Boncmi, Factious People, pp. 89-90.
38Mc Anear, "Politics" I, 321.
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39influence over the Indian nations.
Control over the Indian nations not already committed to 
England could best be secured by encouraging them to become 
dependent upon New Yorkers for the European goods they 
desired. The English colonists were not the Indians' only 
source of manufactured products; the French colonists in 
Canada, who were as anxious as the Englishmen to secure the 
friendship of the Indians, were also more than willing to 
supply them with manufactured goods. Thus, eliminating 
French competition in the Indian trade was a necessary pre­
requisite to New Yorkers securing uncontested domination over 
the Indian nations in the north. Since New York merchants 
supplied the French with the goods they used in their trade 
with the Indians, eliminating competition would seem to have 
been simple. All the English had to do was to stop supplying 
trade-goods to the French. The Five Nations of the Iroquois
Confederacy, which were allied with New Yorkers, had asked
40Governor Hunter to take this step, but he had refused 
because he feared the political consequences of cutting off 
the trade with Canada. Merchants in Albany and New York City 
were deeply involved in the trade and they would have been 
adversely affected by its elimination. Rather than give the
^Smith, History, 1,4.
40Osgood, Eighteenth, II, 419-21.
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merchants (who generally did not support him) further reason
to oppose his adminstration, Hunter allowed the trade in
Indian trade goods to continue.**
Lacking Hunter's political astuteness, Burnet decided to
42destroy the Canadian trade on Indian goods, but immediately
encountered opposition. The Commissioners for Indian Affairs
(Albany merchants responsible for supervising the Indian
trade) objected to the Governor's proposal to close off the
trade with Canada which they felt would do them irreparable
damage. Since no legislation affecting Indian affairs could
reasonably be submitted to the Assembly without the approval
43of the Commissioners, it was necessary to overcome their
unwillingness to sanction the governor's proposals. Burnet
did so by replacing the recalcitrant Commissioners with men
who would not oppose him.** The governor then presented
his plan to the Assembly which loyally passed it on
45November 19, 1720.
■»onomi, Factious People, pp. 87-8, Leder, Robert 
Livingston, p. 251.
42Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 90-1.
43NYCD, IV, 177-8.
44Leder, Robert Livingston, p. 253-4.
*5NYCL, ch. 392.
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Governor Burnet had managed to impose his will on the 
merchants but his triumph sowed the seeds which were to 
destroy the political calm that Hunter had so carefully 
nurtured* Callously disregarding the interests of the mer­
chants of New York City and Albany, and circumventing the 
authority of the Indian Commissioners, he had given a rather 
large, influential section of the colony's political commun­
ity reason to actively oppose h i m . T h e  opposition would 
eventually triumph.
The Indian Trade Laws were not, however, the only cause 
of the breakdown of the political alliance structure which 
Hunter had so laboriously created. Finances, which were the 
pervasive and often festering issue in New York, also con­
tributed. Hunter had eliminated control of finances as an 
issue only by surrendering to the Assembly. In 1714 he rec­
ognized the right of the Assembly to appoint a Treasurer for 
the Colony. The colonial official usurped the duties and 
income of the Royal Auditor General, William Blathwayt, and 
his deputy in New York, George Clarke, but both men apparent­
ly accepted the change, and the accompanying loss of income, 
philosophically. When Blathwayt died in 1717, the post of 
Auditor General was given to Horatio Walpole. (Walpole, the 
Prime Minister's brother, was not so sanguine and he set 
about recovering the lost prerogatives of his position as 
Auditor General.)
46Mc Anear, "Politics," I, 331-3.
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In 1721, Walpole reminded Governor Burnet that the 
accounts of the colony had to be transmitted to him for audit, 
and ordered the colonial Treasurer to submit his accounts for 
audit by Royal officials. As might have been expected,
Abraham De Peyster, the Treasurer who had been appointed by 
the Assembly, did not obey Walpole's order; instead, on 
June 15, 1721 he turned it over to the Assembly. Uhder the 
leadership of Lewis Morris Sr., who apparently was more con­
cerned with the interests of his fellow colonists than of his 
patron, the Governor, the Assembly now drafted a memorial 
which explained that the New Yorkers had not submitted their 
records for audit because they were unable to afford the 
auditor general's five per cent fee. Although there is no 
indication that Walpole believed the colonists' cries of 
poverty, he did not permit himself to become involved in a 
debate with the Assembly. Instead, he secured an order from 
the British Treasury (headed by his brother) which instructed 
Governor Burnet to persuade the Assembly to recognize his 
right to audit the colony's records and to receive the lawful 
fee for his work.^
Burnet was obviously in a difficult position. He could 
not support the Assembly's refusal to allow Walpole to audit 
the colony's books without making an extremely powerful enemy 
in London, and he could not support his authority to conduct
47Leder, Robert Livingston, pp. 262-5.
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the audit without alienating the Assembly by denying one of
its most important privileges. His sense of duty as a Royal
official, and Walpole's influence with those who had the power
to terminate Burnet's career in New York (and his hopes of
recouping his lost fortune), apparently combined to convince
the Governor to support the Auditor General's claims. But a
decision was not action. Burnet still faced the problem of
convincing the Assembly to surrender some of its authority
over finances by submitting to (and paying for) an audit of
the colony's books.
His task was complicated by the voters of Westchester
County. In a by-election they had returned Adolph Philipse
(whom Burnet had removed from the Council) as one of their
4 8Assemblymen. His entry into the House on June 22, 1722
49provided the opposition with a nucleus. The strengthened
opposition, anxious to embarrass the governor, now combined
with members of the Governor's "alliance" to defeat a bill
appropriating funds to pay Walpole for auditing the colony's
50accounts in the recent Assembly session. However, the 
Governor's defeat was only temporary. Despite their
48Bonomi, Factious People, App. C [p. 303].
49Rutherfurd Collection, vol. I, p. 63.
50Osgood, Eighteenth, II, 424, NYCD, V, 682-3. Bonomi, 
Factious People. A p p .  C )e>. 302] f Journal of the Votes and 
Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Colony of New 
Vork.l651-l->65 (S vols., New York, 1764-4. reprinted 1904) ,
I, 473,4VS.
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resistance to accepting Walpole's claims, Burnet's friends 
in the Assembly were still willing to listen, and the gov­
ernor was eventually able to convince them of the futility 
of resisting the claims of the Auditor General. On June 21,
1723, the Assembly voted h 1,600 to satisfy Walpole's claims
51for auditing the colony's accounts.
Burnet had been faced with an extremely difficult posi­
tion, and had handled it as well as possible. He had man­
aged to avoid a complete break with his supporters in the 
Assembly, and had obtained the results demanded by the 
authorities in London. He had not, hcwever, been victor­
ious; he had defended the prerogative against the interests 
of the people of New York, and had convinced the Assembly 
to abandon its defense of one of its most treasured prerog­
atives. His actions demonstrated to New Yorkers that de­
spite the tranquillity achieved by Hunter, the interests of 
the Governor and his subjects were not necessarily identical, 
and that opposition to the executive might serve the colo­
nists' interests. They were encouraged to support candi­
dates for office who opposed the Governor. The opposition
52grew rapidly in the next three years, and Burnet's posi­
tion in the colony deteriorated quickly.
5^Leder, Robert Livingston, pp. 275-6.
52In 1725, Burnet explained that the Assembly had turned 
against him because he had supported Walpole's demands.
Leder, Robert Livingston, p. 287.
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The decline in Governor Burnet's influence was by no 
means due solely to popular reaction to his handling of the 
audit dispute. His clumsy handling of a revenue issue which 
developed contemporaneously with the dispute between the 
Auditor General and the Assembly, had a much more direct ef­
fect on the decline of his political fortunes. Although 
Burnet had "inherited" a revenue which would adequately 
support the government tax collections in New York were 
chronically deficient, and the colony was soon in debt. By 
1722 the deficit had reached b 1,700, and in May of that 
year, Governor Burnet announced that he favored a land tax 
which would discriminate against the owners of unoccupied 
tracts, as the means of eliminating the deficit. Burnet 
apparently advocated the tax because it would help solve two 
nagging problems simultaneously. It would eliminate the 
province's debt, and would help the colony to grow by en­
couraging owners to reduce their tax burden by finding 
tenants for their unoccupied lands. Although the existence 
of large tracts of unoccupied land was an endemic problem, 
and although the discriminatory tax was a reasonable method 
of encouraging landlords to find settlers for their lands, 
Burnet was rather unwise to suggest the tax. His support 
came from an alliance of Hudson River landowners. These 
men possessed large areas of empty land, and were adversely 
affected by the proposed tax. It was unreasonable for the 
Governor to expect his allies to vote against their own 
interests. Assembly Speaker Robert Livingston
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(who was close to Burnet) attempted to dissuade him from 
presenting the tax to the Assembly. When he failed to do so, 
Livingston led the fight against it. As the Assembly was 
dominated by landowners who would have been hurt by the tax, 
Livingston's task was not difficult, and the tax was easily 
defeated. Governor Burnet's precipitate action in attempt­
ing to force the Assembly to accept his land tax proposal 
did not result in a complete breakdown of the Assembly asso­
ciation which supported him, but the Livingston-Morris group
53was weakened somewhat, and the Governor's ability to in­
fluence the Assembly, which was essential to govern New York 
effectively, was consequently weakened also.
The debilitating effect of the Governor's actions was 
mirrored by the growth of the opposition faction's influence 
in the Assembly in 1723 and 1724.^ In an effort to secure 
the good will of the Assemblymen who were not supporting 
him, Burnet had diverted some patronage to them, and support­
ed legislation which they favored. His concessions were,
however, insufficient to convince the opposition to ally
55itself with his supporters in the Assembly. The conces­
sions weakened Burnet's hold over his "friends". Every 
office he gave to a member of the opposition was taken from
53Leder, Robert Livingston, p. 265-7.
54Mc Anear, "Politics," I, 336.
^Mc Anear, "Politics," I, 322-4.
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one of his allies in the Assembly, and as New York politi­
cians were hungry for office, and extremely sensitive to 
real or imagined slights, his attempt to woo the opposition 
could only have hurt his position.
The vulnerability of Governor Burnet's position, which 
had been unassailably strong in 1720, became apparent when 
one of the Albany Assemblymen died in 1724. Six candidates 
announced their intention to see the seat; four of them were 
strongly opposed to the Governor's policies. The prepon­
derance of candidates opposed to the Governor simply re­
flected the attitude of the voters of Albany. Opinion was 
so strongly opposed to the Governor that the Speaker's eld­
est son, Philip Livingston, refused to run as an advocate of 
the administration's policies. He excused himself from the 
race by claiming that service in the Assembly (which met in 
New York City) would adversely affect his business, but he 
probably avoided making the race because he did not wish to 
be forced to endorse publically the Indian Trade Laws he 
privately opposed, and because he did not feel he could win 
the election.
This left Burnet's supporters with the problem of find­
ing a candidate. Eventually, Robert Livingston Jr., the 
Speaker's youngest son, was convinced to represent the 
Governor's allies in the election. The governor did not, 
however, endorse him, but endorsed David Van Dyck, whose
5^Bonomi, Factious People, p. 92.
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candidacy was sponsored by Councillor Francis Harison. 
Predictably, Livingston and Van Dyck divided the voters who 
still supported the Governor's policies, and so the election 
went to Myndert Schuyler, an avowed, extreme opponent.
Burnet had contributed to Schuyler's victory by encouraging 
his supporters to run two candidates. He could have in­
creased their chance of success if he had convinced either 
Livingston or Van Dyck to withdraw, but apparently he made 
no attempt to do so. His apparently arbitrary decision to 
support Van Dyck was especially unwise. It alienated Philip 
Livingston who had been a loyal supporter of the administra­
tion in the opposition stronghold of Albany.^
The growing strength of the opposition, which was re­
flected in the growing unwillingness of the Assembly to 
support the Governor, became apparent in the summer of 1725. 
When illness prevented Speaker Robert Livingston from reach­
ing New York in time for the opening of the Assembly's ses­
sion, Adolph Philipse, a leading opponent of the Governor
58was elected as speaker in hi3 place.
Governor Burnet's position, and his ability to influence 
the Assembly, deteriorated further in the fall of 1725, when 
Stephen DeLancey was elected to the Assembly by the voters 
of New York City. DeLancey had rarely agreed with the
57Leder, Robert Livingston, pp. 276-9.
58Leder, Robert Livingston, pp. 282-3, Osgood,
Eighteenth, II, 425.
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Governor; he opposed Burnet's Indian Trade Policy, and the 
two men had come into conflict again early in 1725 when 
Burnet ruled that the Consistory of the French Church of 
New York City, which included DeLancey, could not remove
59Reverend Louis Rou from his post as minister of the church.
When DeLancey appeared before the Governor to take the oath
of office on September 13, Burnet declined to administer it,
60and challenged DeLancey's citizenship. The Governor's 
action, which apparently was an attempt to usurp the 
Assembly's right to determine the qualifications of its mem­
bers, was incredible in light of the fact that DeLancey had 
first served in the New York Assembly in 1702.^* The Assembly 
was naturally, (and predictably) offended by the Governor's
action. It immediately responded by unanimously passing a
62resolution condemning the Governor's action. Burnet's
political advisors were appalled by his action, and urged
63him to make amends as rapidly as possible. He accepted
59New York State, Secretary of State, The Documentary 
History of the State of New York, Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed.
(4 voIs., Albany, N.Y., lSUjd-l) , III, 284-6, Smith, History,
I, 180, Me Anear, "Politics," I, 324.
®^Osgood, Eighteenth. II, 425-6, Leder, Robert 
Livingston, pp. 284-7.
6*Bonomi, Factious People, App. C [p. 299], NYCD, V, 769.
62NYCD. V, 769, Osgood, Eighteenth, II, 425.
63Leder, Robert Livingston, pp. 284-7.
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64their advice and swore DeLancey in on September 25, but
the damage had been done. A number of Assemblymen who had
previously been completely loyal to the governor were driven
into opposition by his blatant disregard of the House's
p r i v i l e g e s a n d  DeLancey, (who had merely been Burnet's
opponent) was now transformed into an implacable and venge- 
66ful enemy.
The Assembly's negative reaction to Burnet's attempt
to exclude DeLancey was immediately apparent. The Governor
had requested the Assembly to extend the colony's revenue
for five years in the August to November 1725 session. The
angered Assembly demonstrated its increased distrust of the
Governor by voting to extend it for only two years. Although
Burnet was not pleased by the Assembly's action, he did ac- 
6 7cept it. He was not, however, willing to passively surren­
der the influence he had exerted over the Assembly for so 
long. He attempted to restore his influence over the Assembly 
by threatening to strip Assemblymen who stopped supporting 
him of the "honors" he had given them. The Assemblymen re­
sisted the Governor's attempt at coercion. For the first
6 4Bonomi, Factious People. App. C [p. 303],
65NYCD, V, 769.
66Mc Anear, "Politics," I, 180-1.
®^NYCD, V, 773, Leder, Robert Livingston, pp. 284-7.
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time in his administration, Burnet was faced with an 
Assembly dominated by a group which opposed him.
When the House reassembled on August 6, 1726, the oppo­
sition was finally in a position to obstruct effectively the 
Governor's policies. In addition to refusing to grant the 
five year extension of the revenue (which Burnet had again 
requested), the Assembly added insult to injury by reducing
6 othe colony's budget. Some of the reductions were appar­
ently politically motivated. It seems likely that the 
Assembly's decision to reduce the salary of Chief Justice 
Lewis Morris, (who had also led Burnet's allies in the 
Assembly) from £300 to £250 per year, was politically 
motivated.
Despite its attack on Morris, the Assembly was not
blindly opposed to the Governor. Although it refused to im-
69plenient a land tax which Burnet had proposed, i cs action 
should not be ascribed purely to political malice. An 
Assembly dominated by Burnet's supporters had defeated a 
similar proposal in 1722, and so it is reasonable to assume 
that the land tax was simply unacceptable to most members of 
the Assembly. The willingness of the House to cooperate with 
the Governor was clearly demonstrated by its decision to
68NYCD, V, 775.
69Leder, Robert Livingston, p. 289.
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renew the Indian Trade Acts.7** Although unpopular with 
many members of the dominant Philipse group, these were im­
portant to the Governor. Despite the Assembly's apparent 
willingness to "do business” with him, Burnet decided that 
he could not continue to deal with an Assembly dominated by 
his opponents, and, on August 10, 1726 he dissolved it.7* 
The Assembly election, the first in ten years, was a
triumph for opponents of the Governor. Every newly-elected
72member was opposed to the Governor, and Adolph Philipse 
was again selected as Speaker. The differences between the 
Governor and the Majority of the Assembly had, however, 
little effect on the session which began on September 27, 
1726. The Assembly concerned itself primarily with the 
construction of a trading post at Oswego. Because the 
Assemblymen and the Governor agreed that it was a necessary 
barrier to the French, they cooperated. Perhaps the second 
session of the Assembly would have been marred by conflicts 
between the Governor and the Assembly, but it never met.
The death of King George I on August 21, 1727 dissolved the
70NYCD, V, 775.
7*Bonomi, Factious People, App. C [p. 302], Me Anear,•Politics,” i, m-i:
72John F. Burns, Controversies Between Royal Governors
and Their Assemblies in the horfcnern American Colonies
(Boston, 192 3), p. 3lS.
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73Assembly, and new elections were now necessary.
The membership of this new Assembly, although not 
identical to its predecessors, was also dominated by oppon­
ents of Governor Burnet, and Adolph Philipse was again
74selected as Speaker. The session began peacefully, but
before it ended the Governor and the Assembly were plunged
into the most acrimonious political dispute of Burnet's
administration.
The conflict centered around the Chancery Court, and
Burnet's exercise of his authority as Chancellor;75 it was
all the more severe because Chancery jurisdiction had long
been an area of contention between the Governor and the
Assembly in New York. New Yorkers objected to the Chancery
Court because it had been created by the Crown, not by their 
76Assembly, and because they feared the judicial authority 
which the governor derived from his commission as Chancellor. 
Specifically the New Yorkers feared the Chancellor's power
7^Osgood, Eighteenth, II, 426-8.
74Bonomi, Factious People, App. C [pp. 303-4].
75Mc Anear, "Politics," I, 367-8.
75Lawrence, M. Friedman, A History of American Law 
(New York, 1973), p. 47.
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77to compel payment of quxt-rents which were chronically in 
arrears in the colony.
The colonists' objections to Chancery were not complete­
ly selfish. The Chancery Court was generally an inefficient 
means of dispensing justice because the governor, who sat as 
Chancellor, generally was not trained for the position, and 
consequently had little inclination to attempt to conduct a 
court. Even when the governor felt competent to sit as 
Chancellor, the Court could not function effectively. The
Court could not function properly without subordinate offi-
7 8cials to guide its operations. Although there was provi­
sion in New York for the appointment of a Master of Rolls
and Registrar in the Chancery Court, the office was vacant
79from 1687 to 1774. Proceedings in Chancery were, conse-
80quently, bedeviled by long delays which discouraged use of 
the Court.
77Stanley N. Katz, "The Politics of Law in Colonial 
America: Controversies over Chancery Courts and Equity Law
in the Eighteenth Century," Perspectives in American 
History, V (19 71) , 272 (hereafter wPolitics of Law"T.
78Katz, "Politics of Law,” 264.
79Paul M. Hamlin, and Charles E. Baker, The Supreme 
Court of Judicature of the Province of New York, 1691-1V04, 
volumes 7S, 7$ New-York Historical Society Collections 
(New York, 1952) , I, 16 (hereafter Supreme Court).
80Friedman, History of American Law, p. 48.
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The objections to Chancery jurisdiction in New York 
were, however, not completely, or even primarily practical. 
Chancery jurisdiction was closely associated with politics 
in New York, and so objections to the Court were often tied 
to the state of politics in the colony. Although Lieutenant 
Governor John Nanfan and Governor Combury had issued ord­
inances establishing a Court of Chancery for non-political 
reasons, the effective life of the Court was closely tied 
to political considerations. In 1711, David Provoost 
(a political ally of Governor Hunter) had been imprisoned. 
Although he was charged with debt, apparently the real
reason why Provoost had been incarcerated had been to pre-
81vent him from attending the Assembly. As Hunter had few 
allies at that point in his administration, it was import­
ant for him to secure Provoost's freedom. He did so by
having the Council confirm that his instructions authorized
82him to create a Chancery Court, to open the Court, and to
exercise his authority as Chancellor (thus freeing his 
83friend.) Having weathered the storm of protest which 
accompanied the creation of the Court, Hunter had decided
8*Mc Anear, "Politics," I, 30 3.
82NYCD, V, 297-302.
83Me Anear, "Politics," I, 30 3, Katz, "Politics of Law,"
273.
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to continue it although he apparently was not an especially
active Chancellor.®4
William Burnet, on the other hand, enjoyed sitting as
Chancellor, and did so more than any other governor of New
York. He apparently had carried out his duties rather well
despite his lack of legal training and his injudicious
85habit of making quick decisions. His fondness for exer­
cising Chancery jurisdiction was one of the causes of the 
political difficulties which Burnet experienced in the last 
years of his administration. The jurisdiction of the
Chancery Court included hearing cases relating to the col-
86lection of quxt-rents, and because Burnet frequently sat 
as Chancellor, he consequently often issued decrees compel­
ling landowners to pay back taxes. Naturally, the Hudson 
River landowners (who were the backbone of the Governor's 
political strength) resented being compelled to pay their
taxes, and their resentment was reflected in the decline of
87the Governor's influence in the Assembly.
84Me Anear, "Politics," I, 303.
®5Smith, History, I, 165-6.
86Friedman, History of American Law, p. 47.
87Solon Dyke Wilson, "Courts of Chancery in the 
American Colonies," Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal 
History, vol. II, (Boston, 1908), p. 7^5, katz, "Politics 
o£ Law," 275.
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Increased resentment was, hcwever, not the only conse­
quence of Burnet's penchant for acting as Chancellor. In 
1725, Adolph Philipse, the Speaker of the Assembly had
become involved in litigation involving recovery of quit-
88rents and a land grant in the Chancery Court. Although
the case had been argued earlier, Burnet did not complete
his judgment in the case (which was against Philipse) until
November 23, 1727. Having learned of the order on
November 25, 1727, Philipse induced the Assembly, which was
almost universally unsympathetic to Chancery, to pass a
89series of resolutions attacking the Chancery Court. The
Assembly's resolutions, which had been drafted by Colonel
90Isaac Hicks of Queens County, claimed that some New 
Yorkers had been ruined by the Court, that other residents 
had fled the colony to escape being bankrupt, that the 
Chancery Court demanded excessive bail, and that the fees 
for litigation in the Court of Chancery (which had been set 
by Governor Burnet) were excessively high. The Assembly 
concluded that the Chancery Court had never been properly 
established in New York, and that its judgments were, 
therefore, illegal and of no force. The Assembly
88Siegfried B. Rolland, "Cadwallader Colden Colonial 
Politician and Imperial Statesman, 1718-1760” (Unpublished 
Ph. D dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1952), p. 245 
(hereafter "Cadwallader Colden").
89Rutherfurd Collection, vol. I, p. 61.
90Rolland, "Cadwallader Colden," p. 246.
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resolution concluded by expressing the House's intention to
91consider establishing a proper Chancery Court in New York.
This attack on the Chancery Court, and on his activities as
Chancellor, so angered Governor Burnet that he immediately
92dissolved the Assembly.
The Council, dominated by members of the Morris- 
Livingston alliance which had been displaced in the Assembly, 
now leapt to the Governor's defense. It concluded that the 
Assembly's resolutions were an unwarranted attack upon the 
prerogative, which, if recognized, would only serve to de­
prive the people of the Equity Court (an institution which
93had long been considered a basic right of Englishmen).
It did not agree that the Chancery Court was imperfect, but
suggested a reduction in the fees charged by the Court.
Although considerably lower than those demanded by English
Chancery Courts, they were simply too high for the resources
94of the people of New York.
91New York Gazette #113, Dec. 25, 1727 - Jan. 1, 1727/8.
9^Nicholas Varga, "New York Government and Politics 
During the Mid-Eighteenth Century" (New York, Unpublished 
Ph. D. dissertation, Fordham University, 1960) , p. 34 
(hereafter "New York Government") . The Assembly was 
dissolved on Nov. 25, 1727, Bonomi, Factious People, App. C 
[p. 304].
9^New York Gazette, #114, Jan. 1-8, 1727/8.
9^New York Gazette, #115, Jam. 8-15, 1727/8.
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Burnet's anger was understandable, but his decision to
dissolve the Assembly over the politically explosive
Chancery issue was an error. The Assembly's criticisms of
the Court apparently reflected the voters' sentiments. The
election resulted in an Assembly more firmly dominated by
the opponents of the governor than its predecessor. Even
Lewis Morris Sr., the leader of Burnet's supporters in the
95Assembly, was defeated in his bid for re-election.
The new Assembly would have no conflicts with William
Burnet. Its tranquillity was not due to a change of heart;
it was the result of King George II's accession. The new
King wanted to reward those who had supported him in his
incessant quarrels with his father, and making room for his
special friends necessitated displacing some incumbents.
Burnet had the misfortune to hold an office coveted by one
of the men the new King wanted to reward. John Montgomerie
had served as groom of the Bedchamber to the King before he
came to the throne, and as a mark of the King's "particular
esteem" Montgomerie was permitted to choose the position he
desired. He selected the government of New York as the most
profitable, and least burdensome of the posts offered to 
96him. Burnet was now unceremoniously transferred to
95Varga, "New York Government," p. 34.
96Stanley N. Katz, "Newcastle's New York Governors," 
New-York Historical Society Quarterly, XL, no. 1
(Jan.', "1957) , 10-11.----- ---------
183
97Massachusetts Bay.
William Burnet had arrived in a colony which was polit­
ically tranquil, and, by his continuous unwillingness 
(or inability) to accept its political system, had managed 
to destroy the harmony which Hunter, Livingston, and Morris 
had worked so hard to establish. He had created a situation 
which pitted the executive against the lower House of the 
legislature, and thereby severely curtailed his ability to 
govern effectively. He could have avoided that unhappy
state of affairs (which the Historian William Smith suggest-
9 8ed was responsible for his removal ) if he had only demon­
strated more consideration for the sensibilities of New 
Yorkers. It was his repeated failure to recognize the 
necessity for paying at least some attention to the needs 
and desires of his allies which led to the collapse of his 
support in the Assembly. If he had recognized the need for 
at least occasionally propitiating the opinion of his 
"friends" in the Assembly, he probably could have preserved 
his influence and effectiveness in New York. While this 
would, in all likelihood, not have prevented his removal, 
it would have made the last years of his administration 
more peaceful than they were.
^Smith, History, I, 186. 
98Smith, History, I, 186.
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The new Governor, John Montgomerie, arrived in New York
on April 15, 1728, and, unlike his predecessor apparently
arrived uncommitted to any particular group. He began his
administration by conferring with Burnet, the members of
99the Council, and the leading citizens of the colony. It
seems reasonable to assume that the group he met with
included leaders of the group which had opposed Burnet in
the Assembly, and also George Clarke, a Councillor who was
100to become his leading advisor. As a result of the meet­
ing, Montgomerie decided to dissolve the Assembly which had 
been elected under Burnet. He was apparently careful to 
avoid any action which might offend his subjects.
This careful neutrality was to be the hallmark of
102Montgomerie's administration. His resolution of the
Chancery Court dispute (which had erupted at the end of 
Burnet's term) illustrated this well. The lower House, 
which had opposed Burnet, was still energetically attacking 
the Court, and the upper House, which had supported him,
99NYCD, V, 855-6.
*^°Varga, "New York Government," p. 35.
^^Smith, History, I, 188.
102Colden Papers, I, 259-61, Me Anear, "Politics," I, 
370-3. The pro-Burnet group, which had long been accustomed 
to active support from the executive did not feel that 
Montgomerie was neutral. Letters by Colden and Alexander 
indicate they were convinced the governor was opposed to 
them. See Rutherfurd Collection, vol. I, pp. 71, 77, 93, 95, 
for examples.
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was equally energetically defending it. Neither side 
appeared willing to allow the other the last word in the 
conflict, and the two Houses of the colonial legislature 
seemed to be on a collision course. Montgomerie success­
fully quenched the controversy by asking the Council to 
refrain from publishing resolutions on the dispute until the 
Assembly met. It would be, he told the Councillors, unfair 
for them to present their position while the Assembly, which 
was not in session, could not respond. The Councillors 
wished to retain the Governor's good will and they complied 
with his r e q u e s t . T h e  hiatus thereby engendered allowed
tempers to cool, and Montgomerie's decision not to sit as
104Chancellor terminated the conflict.
The elimination of the dispute over the Chancery Court 
removed the single issue which the group that had supported 
Governor Burnet might have been able to use as an election 
issue. Consequently, the group led by Philipse and 
DeLancey dominated Montgomerie's first A s s e m b l y . T h e  
Governor's scrupulous attention to colonial sensibilities 
at the start of his administration indicated that he would 
do all in his power to cooperate with the Assembly, and,
^^Rutherfurd Collection, vol. I, pp. 101-3.
104Smith, History, I, 188.
*^Mc Anear, "Politics," I, 369.
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indeed, his relations with the House were excellent.
Montgomerie was able to maintain good relations with 
the Assembly because he was willing to accept its evalua­
tion of the needs of the colony, and to act accordingly, 
although he did not always agree with its judgment. His 
decision not to sit as Chancellor was not justified by 
reference to the Assembly's criticism of the legitimacy of
the Court of Chancery, but by the claim that he lacked the
106legal expertise necessary for conducting the Court.
This display of modesty enabled the Governor to protect
his prerogatives as Governor by avoiding the constitutional
issues raised by the debate over the Chancery Court without
angering the Assembly. As practical politicians (not
107theoreticians) the leaders of the Assembly were pleased
by the governor's decision, which seemed to recognize the
justice of their arguments against the Equity Court. They
showed their appreciation by granting Montgomerie the five
10 8year revenue they had stubbornly denied Burnet.
He applied the same principle to his functions as the 
intermediary between the Assembly and the British
10<*Smith, History, I, 188.
^Milton M. Klein, "New York in the American Colonies: 
A New Look," New York History, LIII, no. 2 (April, 1972), 
132-156, Henry tl. Mac Cracken, Prologue to Independence 
(N.Y. , 1964) , p. 26.
10 8Osgood, Eighteenth, II, 249.
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Government. Unlike other governors who included their 
personal evaluation of the "constitutionality" of some of 
the bills they transmitted to London for examination,109 
Montgomerie restricted himself to transmitting the act, with 
an explanation of the reasons for its passage. When the 
Assembly passed An Act to prevent the taking or levying on 
specialities more than the principle interest and cost of 
suit and other purposes therein mentioned in the fall of 
1730, Montgomerie took no position on the law which barred 
plaintiffs and their attorneys from collecting more than 
the principal, legal interest, and costs from defendants or 
from bonds posted by defendants under penalty of double 
damages and triple c o s t s . H e  simply informed the Board 
of Trade that:
This Act took its rise as 1 am informed, 
from some executions lately executed for the 
full penalty of the Bonds, without any regard 
to what is really due, in which case, I am told 
the Defendant has no other remedy but in 
Chancery, which being a tedious and expensive 
way to obtain redress, it was thought proper 
to pass this law, which will be a general bene­
fit to all Defendants in the like cases and no 
injury to Creditors, since their whole princ­
ipal, interest and costs is preserved to them,
and left the decision in the hands of the Board, thereby
10^See, for example, NY CD. v, 416 [Hunter], 664 
[Burnet].
110NYCL, ch. 559 
111NYCD, V, 905.
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freeing himself from any involvement in the Board's decision. 
Whatever happened in London, Montgomerie's relations with 
the Assembly would be unaffected. From the pragmatic view­
point of the colonists, he had endorsed the law.
Montgomerie's precautions were, however, unnecessary; he 
died on July 1, 1731, before word of the English govern-
112ment's decision to disallow the law had reached New York.
The best example of Montgomerie's unwillingness to 
offend the Assembly was probably the dispute over the salary 
of Chief Justice Lewis Morris, which became serious in 1729. 
Morris's salary as Chief Justice had been raised from h 250 
to b 300 per annum in 1715. When the "alliance" headed by 
Adolph Philipse and Stephen DeLancey had obtained control of 
the Assembly in 1726, it had attempted to "punish" Morris by 
reducing his salary as Chief Justice. The attempt was resis­
ted by Governor Burnet, and was a b a n d o n e d . I n  April,
1141729, after Montgomerie became Governor, the Philxpse-
DeLancey group again attempted to reduce Morris's salary to 
115
h 250. Montgomerie felt that accepting the Assembly's
112Disallowance was recommended on May 27, 1731, Great 
Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of State Papers, 
Colonial Series, America and Wesi tncties,fr/.N. Sainsbury, and 
others, editors (42 vols., London l§f>b-l963) , XXXVIII, 104-5, 
114-5.
^^Bonomi, Factious People, p. 95.
114NYCD, V, 877-82 
*^5Osgood, Eighteenth, II, 429-31.
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decision to reduce the Chief Justice's salary would be an 
excellent means of restoring the good relationship between 
the Assembly and governor. He apparently did not wish to
recognize the Assembly's right to determine salaries; a step 
which might have grave political and constitutional implica­
tions on his own. Consequently, he asked the Council for 
its opinion on the question and in June it advised him to 
sign the warrants for the reduced s a l a r y . T h e  Chief 
Justice's son, Lewis Morris Jr., who had been appointed to 
the Council by Burnet, objected to the reduction of his 
father's salary, and read a document which attacked the 
Governor and Councillors Abraham Van Horne, and Rip Van Dam 
in the Council meeting of June 13. The Council was so dis­
turbed by the severity of the attack (and by the younger
Morris's unwillingness to accept the Council's decision),
118that it asked Governor Montgomerie to suspend him despite
119the fact that he had apologized for his intemperate words. 
Lewis Morris Jr., was suspended from the Council on
116NYCD, V, 877-82.
117Colden Papers, I, 274-7, 280-6.
118NYCD, V, 877-82.
119Colden Papers, I, 280-6.
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120June 26, 1729, and was replaced by Philip Van
121 122 Cortlandt, a member of the Philipse-DeLancey group.
The appointment of Van Cortlandt to the Council indi­
cated that the dispute with Morris had caused Montgomerie
to abandon his careful neutrality and turn more actively to
123the Philipse-DeLancey group. This change was, however,
not the product of a desire to became more actively involved 
in politics; rather it was the result of Lewis Morris, Jr.'s 
intemperate words. He had bitterly attacked the members of 
his father's group who had not supported his effort in the 
Council to keep the salary of the Chief Justice at £300
per year. James Alexander, Cadwallader Colden,12* Archibald
125 126Kennedy, and Abraham Van Horne were all so offended by
the younger Morris's attacks that they withdrew from the
12®NYCD, V, 877-82, Smith, History, I, 193 erroneously 
reports Jan. 26, 1729 as the date of his suspension.
121Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 314-5.
122Me Anear, "Politics," I, 377.
123Me Anear, "Politics," I, 377, Bonomi, Factious 
People, p. 100.
12 4Rutherfurd Collection, vol. I, p. 131.
125"Kennedy, Archibald," D.A.B., X, 332, NYCD, V,
766-8.
126Smith, History, I, 166.
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elder Morris's alliance. It consequently became completely 
127impotent, leaving Montgomerie with no option but to turn 
to the Philipse-DeLancey group.
Montgomerie's efforts at retaining the good will and 
cooperation of the Assembly were however, by no means re­
stricted to recognizing it as the leading element in the 
government of New York. He recognized that Assemblymen,
like members of the House of Commons, in which he had
12 8served, regarded politics primarily as a source of in­
come, and that political loyalty was, consequently, directly 
related to the patronage distributed to supporters and their 
families. Although Montgomerie, like every other governor 
of New York, had relatively little patronage at his disposal, 
he utilized what little he possessed and secured the loyalty 
of the leaders of the Assembly. (When the death of James 
Barbarie created a vacancy in the Council in the spring of 
1728, the Governor nominated Mr. James DeLancey whose 
"father is an Eminent Merchant, a member of the Assembly,
land] one of the richest men in the colony" to fill the 
129vacancy. ) In June 1731, Montgomerie expressed gratitude 
to Stephen DeLancey for his service to the administration
127Me Anear, "Politics," I, 375-6.
^ 8Smith, History, I, 187.
129NYCD, V, 856-7.
192
in the Assembly by nominating James (who had been confirmed 
130as a Councillor ) as second judge of the colony's Supreme 
Court. At the same time he rewarded Adolph Philipse for his 
service in the Assembly by appointing his nephew Frederick 
Philipse as the third judge of the Court. It seems cer­
tain tnat the two leaders of the Assembly could have felt 
nothing but increased loyalty to Montgomerie for his 
appointments.
Colonel John Montgomerie died at four in the morning 
132on July 1, 1731 after about thirty nine months in the
colony. He had come to a province "...tired by the mutual
struggles of party rage," and, by the time of his death had
"extinguished the flames of contention," and insured that
New York's "public affairs flowed on in a peaceful, uninter-
133rupted, stream.” He had accomplished all this not by
overt political action, but by understanding, and adapting 
himself to the complex nature of New York politics. He gave 
the appearance of being lazy,*34 even unprincipled*35
*3(*Bonomi, Factious People, p. 314.
131Varga, "Government and Politics," pp. 36-7.
132Colden Papers. II, 23.
133Smith, History. I, 187.
134J Smith, History. I, 188.
135Katz, "Newcastle's New York Governors," 22.
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because he (or his principal advisor George Clarke) recog­
nized that a governor of New York could not afford either 
activity or principle. Montgomerie apparently realized that 
he had little actual power, and could hope to guide events 
only by maintaining good relations with the Assembly leaders 
who possessed real power; that he had to avoid taking stands 
which might cost him their good will. He was successful in 
his efforts. He retained the confidence of the colony's 
political leaders, and his administration was one of the 
few in the century which was spared the racking conflicts 
between the Assembly and the governor which frequently 
threatened to paralyze the government of New York. Perhaps 
the colony would have been better off if all its governors 
had been cut from Montgomerie's quiet but effective mold.
CHAPTER SIX
COSBY AND CLARKE: TWO TYPES OF MANAGEMENT
After the death of John Montgomerie on the night of 
June 30, 1731 the government of New York devolved on Rip Van 
Dam, the senior member of the provincial Council.^ A New 
York City merchant who had served on the Council since 1702, 
Van Dam apparently regarded himself as a caretaker, for his 
thirteen month administration was not marked by the quarrels 
which almost inevitably developed when a governor attempted 
to dominate the Assembly.^ The tranquillity of the admini­
stration was the result of Van Dam's complete willingness 
to accept the decisions of the Assembly, to use his influence 
(such as it was) with the British government to promote
^ e w  York State, Secretary of State, Documents Relative 
to the Colonial History of the State of New York, E.B,
6'Callaghan and &erthold Fewnow, editors (IS vols., Albany, 
1861-1887), V, 921 (hereafter NYCD) .
2Dixon Ryan Fox, Caleb Heathcote Gentleman Colonist 
(New York, 1926) , p. 134.
^Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the 
Eighteenth Century (4 vols,, Gloucester, Mass., 19b8, reprint 
of 192 4-5 edition) , II, 443 (hereafter Eighteenth) •
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policies which met the needs of the colony,4 and of his 
unwillingness to offend colonial sensibilities. The last 
was best exemplified by his refusal to assume the Chancellor­
ship, which effectively suspended the Court of Chancery 
(made it impossible for Royal officials to sue for quit- 
rents5) and undoubtedly gratified the people of New York 
who were adamantly opposed to equity jurisdiction.
The quiescence of the Van Dam administration was dis­
turbed by only one trifling dispute, and it was not related 
to provincial politics. The Instructions of the late gov­
ernor had authorized the acting governor to collect half of 
the salary and perquisites of the governor while the chief 
executive was out of the colony.6 Van Dam was certainly 
the acting governor. Should he collect all the remuneration 
of the governor, or restrict himself to half?^ He took the 
problem to the Council; it advised him to collect the whole
Qsalary and all the perquisites of his post, and he did so.
4NYCD, V, 925-9, for example.
5NYCD, V, 930-1.
6Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Instructions to British 
Colonial Governors 1670-1776 (2 vols.. New Vork,' IS67, reprint 
ot 1935 edition) , pp. 282-3.
7Joseph H. Smith and Leo Hershkowitz, "Courts of Equity 
in the Province of New York* The Cosby Controversy, 1732- 
1736," The American Journal of Legal History XVI, 1 (1972) , 
16-7 (hereatter "Courts of kquity*) .
gWilliam Smith Jr., The History of the Province of New 
York, Michael Kammen, ed. (2 vols•, Cambridge, Mass., 1572),
II, 5 (hereafter History).
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Such an idyll could not endure. The British government 
was continuously besieged by supplicants for office, and it 
would not allow even a relatively unimportant post such as 
the government of New York to remain vacant for long. On 
January 12, 1732, Colonel William Cosby was named Governor
9of New York. He assumed office in the Province in Early 
10August.
Cosby had been given the position for purely personal 
reasons. His wife was the Earl of Halifax's sister, and 
the Duke of Newcastle's cousin. Both men were not unnatur­
ally interested in his career and used their influence to 
keep him employed, despite his apparent lack of ability and 
rumors that King George II disliked him intensely. His 
appointment was noteworthy only because Newcastle had never
before used "imperial" patronage for the benefit of his 
12family.
9NYCD. V, 930.
^Nicholas Varga, "New York Government and Politics 
During the Mid-Eighteenth Century" (New York, Unpublished 
Ph. D. dissertation, Fordham University, 1960), p. 38 
(hereafter "New York Government").
**Stanley N. Katz, "Newcastle's New York Governors," 
New-York Historical Society Quarterly, LI, 1 (January, 
1967) , ll.
12James A. Henretta, "Salutary Neglect" Colonial 
Administration Under the Duke of Newcastle (Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1972) , p. 126 (hereafter ‘'Salutary Neglect").
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Although Cosby had never demonstrated any particular 
political ability, he nonetheless had to make important 
decisions soon after he arrived. Like virtually every other 
colonial governor, he possessed almost no information about 
the land and people he was charged with governing. If he 
were to govern effectively, he would have to select an ad­
visor, some one familiar with the personalities and issues 
which were important in New York, some one to guide him 
while he was engaged in the difficult task of organizing
his administration. His choice of George Clarke was 
13wise. Clarke apparently advised Cosby to follow 
Montgomerie's example and to base his adminstration on co­
operation with the leaders of the Assembly. He quickly
established good relations with the leaders of the lower
14House, Adolph Phxlipse and Stephen DeLancey, which were 
to endure until death ended the administration.
The Governor's choice of advisor and allies was not 
universally applauded of course. Lewis Morris Sr., James 
Alexander, Cadwallader Colden and William Smith had hoped 
that they would fill the places in the administration now 
occupied by Clarke, Philipse, and DeLancey respectively.
13NYCD, V, 936-7.
•'•^Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious People? Politics 
and Society in Colonial New* Vork (hew York, i.9l7i) , p. T07 
(hereafter Factious People).
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Their hopes were born of a common connection with ex- 
governor Robert Hunter, and nurtured by a pressing need.
They had supported Hunter when he was in New York, and 
apparently had expected Cosby to associate himself with 
supporters of the former governor. Their desires for office 
were also fueled by their need for a powerful friend to sup­
port their retaining title to "The Oblong," a tract of more 
than 60,000 acres located in the northeastern corner of 
modem Dutchess County, New York which had been ceded to 
New York by Connecticut at the end of a long border dispute.
The land was exceptionally valuable because it was near 
populated parts of the colony. Almost inevitably, a dispute 
developed. Francis Harison, a member of the Council, con­
vinced the Duke of Chandos and other British investors to 
seek a Royal patent for the land at the very same time that 
the New Yorkers were attempting to obtain it by provincial 
deed. The English patent was issued in May, 1731, a month 
before Montgomerie was to give Morris, Alexander, Colden, 
and Smith title. The value of the land made litigation 
almost certain, and the likelihood of litigation made influ­
ence important. The New Yorkers had counted upon Cosby to 
support their case.^ When they learned that Cosby had 
accepted stock in the English Oblong company sponsored by
^Stanley N. Katz, Newcastle's New York (Cambridge,
Mass., 1968), pp. 80-1.
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Harison,^ their disappointment was turned to anger by what 
they viewed as a betrayal, and they begem opposing the 
Governor in every way they could.
The intensity of their feelings was perhaps best illus­
trated by the behavior of Cadwallader Colden. Colden had 
arrived in New York in 1718, had been named Surveyor General
because of Hunter's influence in L o n d o n a n d  had become a
18member of the Council during Burnet's administration. He
had built a reputation as a strong, almost unyielding support-
19er of the prerogative, but he nonetheless now opposed Cosby
to protect his interests in the "Oblong." Colden supported
his partners' attempts to embarrass the administration in
20the Council and the Assembly, and he attempted to undermine 
the standing of the Governor in the capitol. He not only 
complained to Allured Popple, the Secretary of the Board of
^Bonomi, Factious People, p. 109.
17Alice Mapelsden Keys, Cadwallader Colden, A Repre 
sentative Eighteenth Century Official (New York, l9d6) , 
pp. 3,27.
18x°Bonomi, Factious People, Appendix D, p. 314.
19Siegfried B. Rolland, "Cadwallader Colden Colonial 
Politician and Imperial Statesman, 1718-1760" (Unpublished 
Ph. D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1952), 
pp. 50-5.
20NYCD, VI, 26-7, New-York Historical Society, The 
Cadwallader Colden Papers, New-York Historical Society 
£ol lections** i m - l ^ Y 'T O T - l T O * '( ol s*. TTJew *YoirF, 1918- 
19ii3, lsJT) , II, 80-2 (hereafter Colden Papers).
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Trade, about Clinton's behavior, but even challenged the
propriety of hearing the dispute over the Oblong in the
21Chancery Court in New York. If Colden, the arch-defender 
of the prerogative, was willing to attack a prerogative 
Court to protect his interests, then the other partners, 
who were much less firmly committed to supporting the author­
ity of the Crown, must have been willing to go to almost any 
lengths to protect their investment. This vehemence may 
explain why the opposition to Cosby was so bitter after it
became clear, in January 1732, that he would not support the
22claims of the New York patentees.
Morris, Alexander, Colden, and Smith soon had an oppor­
tunity to demonstrate their opposition to the Governor.
The Instructions which Cosby had brought to New York 
included an article which authorized him to collect half of
the profits of the government from the date of his appoint-
23ment, and on November 14, 1732 he asked Van Dam, who as
we have seen, had collected the governor's full salary and
24perquisites for his share. At first, Van Dam flatly 
refused to consider the request. He then moderated his
2^Colden Papers, II, 114-5, 128-31.
22Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 109-11.
^Smith, History, II, 5.
24Osgood, Eighteenth, II, 446.
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position and agreed to give Cosby half of the £ 1,9 75 he
had collected after Cosby had been appointed, if the
Governor would divide the £ 8,383 Van Dam claimed he had
25collected in the same period. Naturally the Governor 
would not accept a "compromise" which would cost him over 
£3,000. He had to find some means of compelling Van Dam 
to surrender the funds.
The obvious solution, a lawsuit, was fraught with dif­
ficulties. Van Dam was well known and popular. If the 
Governor brought his claims before a jury, it was possible 
that the panel would rule for Van Dam. Cosby therefore 
could not use the civil courts to recover his claim. Nor 
could he avoid facing a jury by taking his case before an 
equity court. The only equity court in New York was the 
Court of Chancery, and it was obviously impossible for Cosby 
to bring his case to a court in which he was the judge. The 
Governor faced a paradox, but he resolved it imaginatively.
He constituted the Supreme Court as a Court of 
Exchequer which could hear the case without a jury. More­
over two of the judges of the "new" court, James DeLancey
and Frederick Philipse, were related to supporters of the 
26administration.
25Smith and Hershkowitz, "Courts of Equity," p. 18 
Smith, History reports the figures as fe 1,975 7 s 10 d, 
and 4. 6,467 18 s 10 d respectively.
26Smith, History, II, 5-6.
202
The solution played into the hands of the opposition. 
The suit against Van Dam was not popular with New Yorkers 
and when the Governor created a special, and seemingly prej­
udiced court, the opposition was able to present Van Dam as
27an innocent victim of arbitrary and tyrannical government.
The success of Morris and his associates in convincing 
the populace that the Governor was wrong to press his case 
against Van Dam did not, however, deter Cosby, and the case 
came to trial in March, 1733. Van Dam's defense, which was 
conducted by James Alexander and William Smith Sr., who 
were partners in the "Oblong," rested on the contention 
that the court had no jurisdiction because it had been cre­
ated improperly. The court, as might have been expected,
2 8ruled against the defense, with Chief Justice Morris, who
had prepared his opinion before hearing the argument, dis- 
29senting. The case was not heard, however. Apparently, 
Cosby decided that the outcry being generated by the case3** 
outweighed the b 8,383 he hoped to recover. He instructed 
the Attorney General to drop the matter.3*
27Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 110-11.
2 8Smith and Hershkowitz, "Courts of Equity," pp. 21-7.
29Bonomi, Factious People, p. 110.
^^Smith, History, II, 6-7.
O 1Smith and Hershkowitz, "Courts of Equity," p. 31.
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But the end of litigation was by no means the end of
the dispute. In May, 1733 Cosby removed Morris from the
bench on grounds that he had shown partiality, oppressed the
people, delayed justice, and attacked the prerogative by
32opposing Cosby's decision to create an Exchequer Court.
Lewis Morris Sr. thus became the second "martyr" to the 
Governor's tyranny.
Passive martyrdom was not, however, Morris's metier.
He was not content with presenting himself as another inno­
cent victim of despotism. The Chief Justiceship, the sec-
33ond most powerful office in the colony, and the last
vestige of his vanished political hegemony, was simply too
important to be surrendered. He therefore responded to his
removal by redoubling his efforts to drive Cosby from the
colony, and to preserve his office and his remaining 
34influence. He soon had an opportunity to strike back.
In October, 1733 Morris presented himself as a candi­
date in the by-election held to fill a vacant Westchester
35County Assembly seat. The only issue was Morris's charge 
32NYCD, V, 942-50.
33Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 144-5.
34Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 73.
35Bonom i, F a c t io u s  P e o p le , p .  114 .
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of tyranny against the Governor. Despite the efforts of the
Sheriff (a Cosby appointee) to influence the election by ex-
36eluding Quaker voters who refused to qualify by oath,
Morris's "plight” had produced so much sympathy among the
37voters that he was elected by a margin of 231 to 151.
His election embarrassed Cosby, and gave him an excellent
38platform for further attacks on the administration.
The election had occurred at an opportune time. Morris
and his friends had decided to found a newspaper to present
their views to the people, and, hopefully, speed the day
when popular opposition would force Governor Cosby either
to leave New York or to turn to them for support. The first
edition of "their" newspaper, the New-York Weekly Journal,
was issued from the shop of John Peter Zenger, an obscure
printer, on November 5, 1733, just in time to report
Morris's triumphant arrival in New York City after his 
39election. The Journal was eminently successful in fanning 
the flames of opposition which had first been kindled by the
^^Smith, History, II, 7-8.
■*7Bonomi, Factious People, p. 115.
3 8Beverly McAnear, "Politics in Provincial New York, 
1689-1761" (2 vols., Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation Stanford 
University, January, 1935), I, 410-2 (hereafter "Politics").
39
N ew -York W eekly  J o u r n a l , N o v. 5 ,  1 7 3 3 .
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Van Dam affair. By the middle of December, the wife of one
of the leading Jewish merchants of the city (who was not
tied to either faction) commented that the Governor was so
disliked that it would be impossible for him to regain the
40affection of the populace.
Cosby, however, seemed completely undisturbed by his 
unpopularity; on occasion he even seemed to court it. A 
good example of his apparent disdain for public opinion had 
been his handling of the dispute involving the Albany 
"flatts". The Mohawk Indians had deeded a 1,200 acre tract 
of land to the city in 1730 to be held in trust for them.
In the summer of 1734, the tribe complained that the city 
had violated the terms of its gift. Cosby responded sum­
marily. He recovered the deed and burned it, angering the 
Albany merchants who were encouraged to join the opposition. 
Similarly, the Governor's decision late in the year to de­
prive an Assemblyman and his supporters of office, because
the Assemblyman had criticized Cosby's favorite also
41encouraged the growth of the opposition.
Such actions had served to heighten distrust of the 
administration in all parts of the colony and, in all
Abigail Franks, The Lee Max Friedman Collection of 
American Jewish Colonial Correspondence: Letters o£ the
Franks Family (1733-1748) , !Leo Hershkowitz and Isidor S. 
Meyer, eds., Studies m  American Jewish History, 5 
(Waltham, Mass., 19B B) , pp. J.7-B (hereafter Letters).
4 *B onom i, F a c t io u s  P e o p le , pp. 1 2 1 -3 .
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likelihood, contributed to the victory of Morris and his
allies in the New York City elections of October, 1734*
There had been no specific issue in the municipal election.
The Morris group simply utilized the general distrust of the
administration by charging the Governor and his cronies with
42dishonesty and corruption. The ploy was successful. Hie
supporters of Morris swept all but one of the Governor's
43allies from office. Hie campaign was also the immediate 
cause of one of the most publicized trials of the colonial 
period.
Since the New-York Weekly Journal had been founded to 
bedevil Governor Cosby, it had vigorously attacked the 
Governor and his friends from its very first edition. Nat­
urally Cosby was disturbed, and in January, 1734 unsuccess­
fully attempted to secure an indictment against Zenger from 
the New York County Grand Jury. The election campaign later 
in the year encouraged the Journal to attack the Governor 
even more harshly, and those attacks led the Governor to 
return again to the Grand Jury in October. It again re­
fused to act, so Cosby took his grievance to the Assembly.
It too refused to act. The Governor then turned to the 
Council which did indict Zenger for publishing seditious
42Mc Anear, "Politics," I, 423-5. 
43Bonom i, F a c tio u s  P e o p le , p .  1 2 1 .
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libels in three editions of the Journal, and in two separ­
ately published ballads. Zenger was arrested on
November 17, and languished in jail until the case came to
44trial in August, 1734.
The principals in the case (with the obvious exception 
of Zenger himself) were not interested in his fate, nor in 
"constitutional principals." They were practicing, prag­
matic politicians with a direct, immediate interest. If 
Zenger were convicted, his newspaper would, perforce, cease 
publication, and the opposition would be deprived of its 
most effective propaganda organ; without a means of commun­
icating with the people, Cosby's opponents would find their
45political effectiveness greatly reduced. If, on the 
other hand, Zenger was acquitted, the "voice" of the oppo­
sition would be safe. Zenger was freed, and his acquittal 
was the issue which enabled the Morris group to carry the 
1735 New York City election,*®
Success in municipal elections, however gratifying, 
did not affect the balance of power in the colony, or bring 
the opposition appreciably closer to its goal of forcing 
Cosby either to leave or to come to terms. Morris and his
44New-York Weekly Journal, November 25, 1734, Bonomi, 
Factious People, pp. 116-7.
45Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 77.
46V a rg a , "New Y o rk  G o vern m en t,"  p .  43
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friends therefore decided to carry their fight against Cosby
47to London where it might be more successful.
Their first effort to undermine the standing of the ad­
ministration failed. They had encouraged Rip Van Dam, when 
in December, he filed a complaint which charged the Governor 
with thirty-four separate counts of maladministration and
A  Qmisadministration, but James Alexander was the only
49Councillor who supported the charges and the Board of 
Trade took no action on Van Dam's complaints.
This failure, and the inability of Morris's "friends" 
in London to secure the removal of the Governor,5** apparently 
convinced the New Yorkers that their only hope was in making 
a direct presentation of their grievances to the Privy 
Council. As Lewis Morris was the most directly aggrieved of 
the Oblong patentees, he was selected to go to London, and 
on Saturday, November 23, 1735 he left for England accompan­
ied by his son, Robert Hunter Morris.5 -̂
47Smith, History, II, 17.
48NYCD, V, 979-85.
NYCD, VI, 6, Colden was not, at that time, actively 
participating in the business of the Council.
50Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 96-8.
^^New -York W eek ly  J o u r n a l,  N ov. 2 5 , 1 7 3 5 .
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Although the ostensible goal of Morris's voyage was his 
reinstatement as Chief Justice of New York, it certainly was 
not the only (or perhaps even the primary) goal of the trip. 
Morris and his allies wanted the British government to in­
struct Cosby to call Assembly elections, to remove Francis 
Harison (the partner of the Governor in the English Oblong 
company), and Daniel Horsmanden from office, to appoint oppo­
sition leaders William Smith and Peter Schuyler to the 
Council, and to refrain from attempting to influence colon­
ial politics. The New Yorkers hoped that the Board of 
Trade would reduce the authority of the Governor by order­
ing him to accept all colonial legislation regarding the es­
tablishment of courts, the procedures of the Assembly and 
Council, and to issue the cities of Albany and New York new 
charters to replace the extant system of appointment of mun­
icipal officials by the Governor with an elective system, and 
to refrain from sitting with the Council when it was acting 
in a legislative capacity. They even wanted the Privy 
Council to order Cosby to appear in court to answer the
52counter-suit Van Dam had initiated in their salary dispute.
The opposition realized that it could not hope to suc­
ceed if it could not demonstrate considerable popular 
53support; therefore it organized a petition drive and
52New-York Historical Society, The Rutherford 
Collection, vol. II, p. 75.
53Bonom i, F a c t io u s  P e o p le , p p . 1 2 3 -9 .
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secured the pledge of about 300 New Yorkers to support its 
54demands. Unfortunately for the New Yorkers a petition did 
not carry much weight in London. Colonial policy was form­
ulated to meet the needs of the complex network of personal 
and political relationships which dominated the English 
political system, and influencing it required powerful 
friends. Morris's only connections in London were his sons- 
in-law. His eldest daughter, Mary, had married Vincent 
Pease, whose brother, Thomas, was connected to the ambitious, 
but ineffectual, George Bubb Doddington. (Thomas was, how­
ever, probably also a minor protege of Robert Walpole, and 
he may have been able to introduce Morris to some of the 
more powerful figures in the government.) Matthew Norris, 
the husband of Morris's second daughter, Eupemia, was some­
what better connected. His father, Sir John Norris, was 
Admiral of the White and the Commander in Chief of the Navy, 
and although Sir John had little real influence, having 
quarreled with Walpole, he enabled Morris to contact members
of the aristocracy who would otherwise have been inaccess-
... 55xb le.
Access was, however, not influence, and at the beginning 
of his stay in London, Morris was depressed by the lack of
^Rutherford Collection, vol. II, p. 75.
55Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 102-3.
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concern shown for his mission. He wrote his friend and ally,
James Alexander:
...We have a parliament and ministry, some 
of whom I am apt to believe, know there are 
plantations and governors —  but not quite so 
well as we do; like the frogs in the fable, 
the mad pranks of a plantation governor is 
sport to them, though death to us, and seem 
less concerned in our contests them we are at 
those between crows and kingbirds.5®
Eventually, access did lead to sane influence. Morris 
became acquainted with Sir Charles Wager, a naval officer 
who had abandoned the sea for politics, and, for reasons 
which remain rather obscure, Wager supported Morris's com­
plaint when it came before the Privy Council in November,
Despite his distance from London, Cosby, who (unlike 
some other governors) had the good fortune to be closely 
tied to men who were willing to support him, was in a much 
stronger position. He and his American allies were well 
represented by powerful men in the capitol. In addition to 
the Dukes of Newcastle and Halifax, there was another power­
ful figure supporting the administration. Stephen 
DeLancey's son, James, had married Anne Heathcote whose
Lewis Morris, The Papers of Lewis Morris Governor of 
the Province of New Jersey from 1^36 to 1746. Wew Jersey 
Historical Society Collections IV, 1852 (Newark, New Jersey, 
1852) , p. 23 (hereafter korrls Papers).
57K a t z ,  N e w c a s t le 's  New Y o rk ,  p . 1 1 3 .
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cousin, Sir John Heathcote, Baronet, was one of Walpole's 
managers for the County of Rutland, a figure of some impor­
tance in the ministry. Although Heathcote did not partici­
pate actively in the dispute, he apparently did watch devel­
opments, and presumably would have intervened if Newcastle
C pand Halifax required assistance.
Intervention was unnecessary as Newcastle was able to
protect the administration. The Duke began by attempting
to convince Morris to abandon his complaint. On November 4,
1735, he offered Morris the government of New Jersey, Which
had recently been separated from New York, as compensation
for the Chief Justiceship of New York. Morris refused this 
59offer, perhaps because he expected to triumph in the 
Privy Council, perhaps because he doubted Newcastle's will­
ingness to keep the bargain, or perhaps because he felt
that such a blatant surrender of principle would prejudice
60his political position at home. The case then went 
before the Privy Council. On November 8, 1735, after con­
sidering Morris's complaints at two meetings,the Council
^®Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 111-3.
59Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 131-2.
®°Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 129-31, Bonomi, 
Factious People, pp. 1^1-2.
61K a t z ,  N e w c a s t le 's  New Y o rk ,  p p . 1 1 0 , 1 1 3 -9 .
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62ruled that Cosby had, indeed, dismissed Morris improperly, 
but it said nothing else; it did not even recommend rein­
statement. Morris had won a moral victory, and the justice 
of his position had been officially recognized, but Newcastle 
and Cosby had won a practical victory. The position of the 
Governor was secured, and his power undiminished. The Privy 
Council had ignored all of the reforms which Morris had re­
quested. Morris had seemingly gained nothing from his trip.
Wager was able to salvage something from the situation. 
Newcastle was interested in preserving the status quo in 
New York, and Morris had demonstrated an ability to make a 
nuisance of himself, so Morris still had a bargaining point. 
In January, 1736, Newcastle and Wager and Morris reopened 
negotiations, and in February, Newcastle again offered to 
secure the government of New Jersey for Morris if he would 
drop all his charges against Cosby. The New Yorker now 
accepted his offer, but Newcastle promptly forgot the mat­
ter, and made no effort to bring the nomination before the 
6 3Board of Trade.
The apparent disinclination of the Duke to redeem his 
promise did not stymy Wager. He turned from Newcastle to 
Horace Walpole (also an important figure in the ministry)
62NYCD, VI, 36-7.
®2Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 129-31.
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to secure the New Jersey governorship for Morris. Walpole
intervened because he hoped to reduce Newcastle's power by
64depriving him of some colonial patronage. Walpole and 
Wager were able to bring the nomination before the Privy 
Council in March, 1738, and their combined influence was 
sufficient to secure the New Jersey government for Morris 
without Newcastle's consent.6^
So the Morris mission to London now had limited suc­
cess. Morris had indeed been given a promotion, but he 
could not accept it without abandoning New York and the 
struggle against Cosby. Nor had the opposition's hopes that 
Morris's activities would encourage resistance to the Govern­
or been realized. Although the New Yorkers who were involved 
in politics considered every development in the unfolding 
drama significant,^ other people seem to have considered 
the whole matter somewhat tedious, and the opponents of the 
Governor self-centered. Abigail Franks commented that 
"...party rage has been Carryed on with Such Violence that 
for my part I hate to hear it mentioned[,] if the Governor
had had his fault the other side have not bin without their
* •,• »67 failings."
®*Henretta, "Salutary Neglect," chapter 4, part 2.
65Henretta, "Salutary Neglect." pp. 190-1.
^ Colden Papers, II, 119-20, Rutgers University Library, 
Morris thoberi) Papers, Box 3, Elizabeth Morris to Robert 
Hunter Morris, Oct. 25, 1735, for example.
6 7Franks, Letters, pp. 40-1.
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The opponents of the Governor had done their best; they 
had carried their case to London and won some concessions; 
but despite their best efforts, William Cosby was still gov­
erning New York, and still supporting the Oblong company 
sponsored by the Duke of Chandos. The reason for their 
failure was apparent. The colonists could effectively em­
barrass a governor only if they could disrupt the function­
ing of his government. This required control of the Assembly, 
where Cosby was always careful never to allow the opposition 
to develop influence. Despite his apparent unconcern with 
colonial opinion, he was always careful to maintain the most 
cordial relations with the leaders of the Assembly. He was 
also sagacious enough to avoid dissolving that body, thereby 
avoiding elections which might have cost his friends control 
of the House. He preserved his good relations with the mem­
bers of the Assembly by rewarding their loyalty with the 
offices he had at his disposal.
Governor Cosby was equally punctilious in his dealings
with the Council, appointing only his friends to that body,
6 8and rewarding their loyalty. He never gave his opponents 
an opportunity to seize the power needed to make his admin­
istration uncomfortable.
Cosby may have realized the importance of the Assembly 
to his administration while he was still in England, for he 
joined the agents of the Assembly in lobbying against the
6 8Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 79, 87-9.
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69Sugar Act, thereby establishing a claim upon the good-will 
of the New York Assembly. He reinforced that good-will soon 
after arriving in the colony, by establishing cordial rela­
tions with DeLancey and Philipse, the leaders of the House. 
His efforts were rewarded amply. The Assembly was almost 
fulsome in its praise of the new Governor in its address of 
welcome,70 and generous in its support. It gave him a five 
year revenue, a salary of £1,560, £400 for fuel and can­
dles for the fort, £ 150 for the expenses attendant on his
voyages to Albany, and a gift of £750 for his efforts in 
opposing the Sugar Act. When he complained that £750 was 
an insufficient reward for his services as lobbyist, the 
Assembly, guided by DeLancey and Philipse, obligingly raised 
the gratuity to £ 1,000.7* The Governor had certainly made 
good friends.
Their importance is well illustrated by the frustrating 
experiences of Lewis Morris and his son. Returned to the 
Assembly by the electors of Westchester, they had hoped to 
use their seats as a rallying point for opposition to the 
Governor. They introduced many bills intended to embarrass
69Smith, History, II, 3.
70Joumal of the Votes and Proceedings of the General 
Assembly of the dolony o£ Sew Vork, 1691-15 vols.,
New York, 1904, reprint of 1764-1766'edition)', 634-6, 
August 12, 1732 (hereafter Ass. Journal).
71Smith, History, II, 3,6.
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the administration, but only one, an act condemning the
Chancery Court (introduced by Lewis Morris Jr. in 1735, while
his father was in London) had become law. The friends of the
72Governor loyally defeated all the other opposition bills.
Cosby, DeLancey, and Philipse did not, however, allow 
their control of the legislature to lull them into compla­
cency or into neglecting the needs of the colony. The 
Assembly devoted itself to "bread and butter" issues, and the 
Governor regularly approved its decisions. For example, when
the Assembly met in April, 1734, the economy was stagnant,
73and trade declining. Cosby faced the problem in his open­
ing speech to the House. He proposed legislation creating 
jobs for the unemployed by embarking on a program of improv­
ing the colony's fortifications, and for encouraging the
flour trade and shipping. The Assembly thanked the Governor
74 75for his suggestions, and enacted them into law. This
responsiveness was politically advantageous. The opposition 
could not gain popular sympathy by emphasizing the adminis­
tration's neglect of the needs of the people.
72Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 86-7.
73Smith, History. II, 11-2.
7  AAss. Jour., I, 654-6.
7^Smith, History, II, 12.
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Nor did the Governor and his allies permit their oppon­
ents to benefit from "popular issues." DeLancey and Philipse 
did not follow their personal inclination to oppose bills 
which embodied issues the opposition had popularized; they 
took the lead in passing them. They gained status by sup- 
porting a triennial act, a bill to regulate lawyers, and a 
bill to select jurors by ballot in the April, 1734
Assembly,^® and resolutions demanding dissolution in later 
77meetings. The Governor, for his part, did not treat these 
bills as attacks on his authority or as reasons to disasso­
ciate himself from DeLancey and Philipse. He apparently 
recognized that they had to support such legislation if they 
were to maintain control of their followers, and that con­
tinued discipline was essential to the long term interests
of the administration. He, therefore, simply killed these,
78and other bills which were unacceptable. Such refusal to 
accept popular legislation may have contributed to a certain 
unpopularity, but as long as his allies controlled the 
Assembly, the Governor had no need for the affection of the 
people.
These actions also disturbed some Assemblymen, and as 
this was to be avoided at all costs, Cosby followed George
76Ass. Jour., I, 660.
77Smith, History, II, 17, Ass. Jour., I, 686.
7ftSmith, History, II, 12,17.
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79Clarke's advice and adopted a more conciliatory attitude
and embarked on an "image building" program. He had the
justices of the Supreme Court (who were closely related to
the leaders of the Assembly) seek support for the Governor
as they traveled the judicial circuit, and he personally
solicited the backing of the Assemblymen from the districts
he passed through on his way to an Indian meeting at 
80Albany. His efforts must have been successful, for the
Assembly remained cooperative until the end of the admini-
81stratxon in 1736.
The willingness of Governor Cosby to accept the
Assembly's occasional refusal to support him is a further
indication that he recognized that the maintenance of the
DeLancey-Philipse coalition was more important than any
other single issue. When the Assembly refused to act on his
82request that it indict Zenger, who had been such a painful 
thorn in the side of the administration, Cosby did not at­
tempt to coerce the Assembly, or to engage in recrimination. 
He accepted its decision, and went on to other matters.
79Rutherford Collection, vol. II, p. 97.
80Rutherford Collection, vol. II, p. 143.
81NYCD, VI, 37-9.
82Ass. Jour.. I, 679.
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Cosby was also enough of a politician to recognize that 
the judicious control of public funds and offices could bol­
ster the administration, and so he cooperated when the 
Assembly proposed legislation directed at that end. In 
November, 1734, for example, he signed an act extending the
militia bill which continued his control over the appoint-
83ment of militia officers, and a bill which emitted 
h 12,000 in paper currency to be spent on improving the
O Adefenses of Albany. Approving the paper currency was a 
violation of his instructions, but he apparently considered 
the creation of a large fund which could be used to purchase 
the political support of the working-men of Albany suffi-
D Ccient cause for ignoring the wishes of the home government. 
The Governor had arrived in New York a political novice, but 
he had learned his lessons well.
Thus, despite all of the furor created by opponents, 
William Cosby's administration was unusually successful. He 
had established good relations with the Assembly at the be­
ginning of his term, and he maintained them until his death. 
There was never a crisis; the government of New York func­
tioned smoothly, and responded to the needs of the colony.
88New York State, Commissioners of Statutory Revision, 
The Colonial Laws of New York from 1664 to the Revolution 
(S voIs., Albany, N.Y., l6£4) , it, 856 (hereafter NYCL)T~~
84NYCL, II, 892-902.
85Smith, History, II, 16-7.
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Few other administrations could make the same claim.
Of course the Governor's success with the Assembly did 
not lead to complete serenity. At the end of his adminis­
tration he removed Rip Van Dam, the senior Councillor
86(and an initial oppenent) from office, but he had not re­
ceived confirmation of his action from London when he became
87terminally ill in December, 1735.
When Governor William Cosby died on March 10, 1736, the 
expected dispute between the suspended senior Councillor,
Van Dam, and his successor George Clarke as to who would
serve as "acting governor" until the arrival of Cosby's suc-
88 . cessor developed almost immediately. Clarke took the ini­
tiative and, as eldest Councillor, called a meeting of that 
body. After being assured that Van Dam had been properly 
suspended by Cosby, the Council (with James Alexander dis­
senting) authorized Clarke to take the oaths of office as
89President of the Council and acting governor.
Who was this Councillor George Clarke who had so art­
fully taken control of the government of the colony? He
86NYCD, VI, 23.
87Franks, Letters, p. 45.
88NYCD, VI, 42-4.
89Osgood, Eighteenth, III, 465.
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had lived in New York since 1702, and had held public office 
throughout his mature life. He had never become involved in 
colonial politics, but had secured office through the inter­
vention of English patrons, and so could not be removed by
90colonial action. Nor would the English government decide 
to replace him; his patrons were too powerful. He had re­
ceived his first appointments through the influence of am 
uncle. William Blathwayt, who was Secretary of the Board of 
Trade. When Blathwayt died in 1717. Clarke had the good 
fortune to come under the protection of Horatio Walpole. 
Walpole had succeeded Blathwayt as Auditor General, and. as 
Clarke was deputy Auditor General in New York, a connection 
developed between the two men. His ties to Horatio Walpole 
brought Clarke to the attention of Sir Robert Walpole who 
also took him under his wing. This association with Sir 
Robert in its turn brought Clarke into the orbit of the Duke 
of Newcastle, and Clarke astutely cultivated his connection
with Newcastle by means of a steady stream of correspond- 
91ence.
Since his position was independent of the colonial 
political system, and strongly defended in Britain. Clarke 
was in the enviable position of being able to pursue his 
goals without interference. His objectives, like those of
90Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 141.
^^Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 142.
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many of his contemporaries, was to build as large a personal
fortune as possible, and the death of Governor Cosby gave
92him his opportunity.
Van Dam, and his allies, the men who had opposed Cosby, 
were, however, not satisfied with the decision of the 
Council, and they attempted to take control of the govern­
ment from Clarke. They began their efforts in the Assembly 
when it returned, in April, from the adjournment engendered 
by the death of the Governor. Lewis Morris Jr. read a 
speech protesting Van Dam's suspension from the Council to 
the House, and he urged the members to subscribe to a peti­
tion supporting the ousted Councillor. Although none of
93the Assemblymen signed Morris's petition, it did create so 
much confusion in the House that Clarke decided an adjoum-
q  4ment was advisable. Apparently the actmg-governor did 
not want to give Morris the opportunity to continue present­
ing his ideas to his colleagues; there was the possibility
that Morris could convince them that Van Dam was the legit­
imate head of the government, and that would have created a 
serious challenge to Clarke's authority. The adjournment 
was, however, advantageous to Clarke only when contrasted 
with the grave risks he ran by continuing the session.




The prorogation of the Assembly prevented any action on the
revenue and payment of the debts of the colony and so it
created almost as many problems for the Council President as
95the sessxon might have.
When the New York Assembly gathered on September 14,
1736 the members who supported Van Dam, although still in a
minority, were able to dominate the meeting, and refused to
allow Speaker Adolph Philipse to take the chair. Lewis
Morris Jr. took advantage of the situation to raise again
the question of Van Dara!s suspension. Although the pro-
Clarke majority was able to assert itself after a few days,
matters were so confused that the House asked to be adjourned
96to the middle of October. Clarke granted their request.
The decision to adjourn the Assembly was undoubtedly a 
wise one, for the month to follow was one of the most con­
fused in the history of the province of New York.
On the very day of the adjournment, word of Lewis 
Morris Sr.'s arrival in Boston from England reached New York, 
and his followers reported that he carried word of Van Dam's 
reinstatement. Naturally this news led to a rapid upsurge 
in Van Dam's popularity, and consequently a pro-Van Dam 
slate carried the New York City elections held on September 
29. The Aldermen and magistrates of the City now recognized
95NYCD, VI, 62-3. 
96NYCD, VI, 74.
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Van Dam as the legal head of the government, and Van Dam 
responded by exercising his newly recognized authority to 
appoint the mayor and other municipal officials of New York,
On October 1, Clarke responded by issuing a proclama­
tion forbidding Van Dam's nominees to take office. The 
colony seemed on the verge of civil war. The Council, which 
supported Clarke, was preparing for the worst. On October 5, 
it authorized the strengthening of the garrison of Fort 
George and the purchase of additional gunpowder. Clarke 
apparently agreed that violence was likely, for he moved his 
family to the relative security of the fort.
On October 9, Lewis Morris Sr. arrived in the city. He 
received a tumultuous welcome from his supporters, but he 
said nothing about Van Dam's status. Three days later, the 
Assembly reconvened and addressed itself to the pressing 
issue. Morris was generally assumed to have relevant infor­
mation, and he played a key role in the discussion. His 
words were, however, curiously anti-climactic. He claimed 
to have no knowledge of the disposition of Van Dam's case, 
or of Clarke's status with the British government. The 
debate then moved to the general question of the legality 
of Clarke's government, and the "acting-governor" adjourned 
the Assembly for a day. The expectations of a resolution 
of the conflict raised by Morris's arrival had been dashed, 
and the colony seemed closer than ever to civil conflict.
Then, on October 13, almost at the last minute, the 
Brig Endeavour arrived in New York with mail from London.
I
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Among the letters was an Instruction from the Board of Trade 
addressed to "George Clarke, Esq., President of the Council 
and Commander in Chief in New York," informing him of modi­
fications in the prayer for the Royal family. The will of 
the British government was thus made known, the danger of
civil war was averted, Clarke's position was secured, and
97the opposition was completely demoralized.
When the Assembly met on October 14, the situation was 
radically changed. Clarke no longer faced the threat of 
internal warfare; his only problem now was the establish­
ment of good relations with the Assembly in the hope that it
would extend the revenue and provide funds to pay the debts 
9 8of the colony.
He adopted the methods Cosby had successfully used in 
dealing with the House. He demonstrated his willingness to 
agree to the reasonable demands of the House by promising 
not to sit with the Council when it was acting as a legisla­
tive body, and showed his grasp of the political needs of 
the Assemblymen by suggesting the construction of a fort on 
the Mohawk River. The fort improved the defenses of the 
colony, provided jobs for mechanics, and created a pool of 
patronage which could be distributed by the administration. 
Unfortunately, despite Clarke's willingness to cooperate,
97NYCD, VI, 82-8, Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 136
8, Smith, History, II, 27.
9 N̂YCD. VI, 65-6.
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and the improvement in his status caused by the receipt of
his commission as Lieutenant Governor, the Assembly would
not give him what he most wanted, an extension of the rev-
99enue. The session ended m  November, 1736.
Since Clarke could not hope to realize his own basic 
objective, profit, if the revenue was not extended, he de­
voted considerable attention and all his political sophis­
tication to the matter of convincing the Assembly to do as 
he wished. Good will had not been successful, so he decided 
to attempt "political blackmail." In 1714 and 1717, the 
Assembly had issued large quantities of paper money, and 
instituted an excise tax to sink the bills. The revenue 
from the excise had, however, been lower than expected, and 
so, although the tax was scheduled to expire in 1739, there 
was still about £ 20,000 in bills in circulation. If the 
excise was not extended, the people would find themselves 
burdened with a hugh amount of worthless paper, and the 
Assemblymen responsible for the loss would have to bear the 
brunt of their constituents' anger.
Clarke now decided to play on the Assemblymen's fear 
of the electorate by announcing that he would refuse to 
approve an extension of the excise until the Assembly passed 
the revenue act he desired.^00 Yet he was no more success­
ful at coercing the House than his predecessors had been.
"Smith, History, II, 28, NYCD, VI, 84-5
100NYCD, VI, 94-5.
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When it reassembled in April, 1737,^°^ it continued to re­
fuse to pass the revenue, which left the government without 
funds^02 and so on May 2, Clarke dissolved it.*0^
As Clarke was politically calculating, and politically 
unprincipled,^-0  ̂it seems reasonably clear that he had de­
cided to dissolve the Assembly because he felt that an elec­
tion would improve his position. Although the DeLancey- 
Philipse group had controlled the Assembly for over ten 
years, the disruptions of the Cosby administration had re­
sulted in the rapid growth of the opposition group headed 
by Lewis Morris Sr., and Clarke apparently felt he could 
benefit by giving the Morrisites (who had long been crying
for an election) an opportunity to test their political
, 105 muscle.
If the Morrisites won, as everyone expected, they would 
be grateful to Clarke for giving them the opportunity to ob­
tain power, and so would be more likely to give the 
Lieutenant Governor the revenue he desired than would the 
DeLancey-Philipse group, which was unbeholden to him. The
*°^Bonomi, Factious People, Appendix C [p. 304}. 




Newcastle's New York, pp. 147-8.
105Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 151-2.
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results of the election met Clarke's expectations. Both 
Stephen DeLancey and Adolph Philipse were defeated in the 
Morrisites' sweep to power.*®^ and in 1737 the Lieutenant 
Governor was confident that he had obtained an Assembly 
which would be cooperative.*®7
He did not, however, take its good will for granted.
He devoted considerable effort to winning over the new
10 8majority party in the Assembly. Adhering to custom,
Clarke gave the leaders of the Assembly control of the pa­
tronage in their districts, and reduced the bitterness left 
over from the Zenger trial by securing the readmission of
Zenger's attorneys, James Alexander and William Smith Sr.
109(who were also leaders of the Morris group) to the bar.
Clarke was also willing to accept legislation which 
reflected the Morrisites' priorities.**® During the years 
they had been out of power, Morris's supporters had contin­
ually demanded frequent Assembly elections, and so it was 
natural for them to pass legislation limiting the duration
*®6Bonomi, Factious People, Appendix C [p. 304].
*®7NYCD, VI, 96.
*®®Morris Papers, pp. 67-9.
109Varga, "New York Government," p. 48.
**®Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 153.
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of the Assembly once they came to power.*** In the fall, 
1737 session, the Assembly passed and Lieutenant Governor 
Clarke signed, An Act for the frequent election of repre­
sentatives to serve in General Assembly and for the fre­
quent calling and meeting of the General Assembly so 
elected. The law, generally known as the Triennial Act, 
required the Assembly to meet annually, limited the Assembly 
to a three year term, and required the election of a new
Assembly within six months of the dissolution of its prede- 
112cessor. The decision of the Privy Council, in September,
1738, to disallow the law because it challenged "...the 
undoubted Right that the Crown has always exercised of call­
ing and continuing the Assembly..."**^ did not mitigate the
good will Clarke had garnered by signing it, and urging the
. . . 114British government to accept it.
The good feeling which Clarke had so assiduously built
up with the members of the Assembly was partially regarded
in December, 1737, when the House passed a revenue act.**5
***Bonomi, Factious People, p. 135.
112NYCL, ch. 650.
**^Great Britain, Public Record Office, Acts of the 
Privy Council-Colonial Series, W.L. Grant and James Munro, 




The bill, which granted the Lieutenant Governor's salary 
for only one year, reflected the distrust of the Executive 
which the legislature had developed during the Cosby admin­
istration, and although Clarke undoubtedly would have pre­
ferred a revenue which ran for more than a year, he accepted 
the innovation (which made him more dependent on the legis­
lature)^-*6 because he believed cooperation between the exec­
utive and the Assembly was the best way to erase the scars 
which the Van Dam dispute had left on the body politic. He 
did, however, feel obliged to protest the adverse effect of 
the one-year revenue on the prerogative.**7
What success Clarke had had in establishing good rela­
tions with the Assembly did not, however, result in the 
creation of complete harmony within the government. Although 
the Morris faction had obtained control of the Assembly, the 
Council was still dominated by friends of DeLancey and 
Philipse, and, as the cooperation of both Houses of the leg­
islature was necessary for the operation of the government, 
Clarke faced the delicate task of preventing their differ­
ences from flaring into open conflict, which would immobi­
lize the government and keep him from reaping the full 
advantage of his position. Fortunately, the politically 




leaders of both factions, and so he was able to moderate 
passions on both sides, and thereby keep the government 
operating smoothly.
In June, 1737, the British government made a decision 
which must have been extremely gratifying to Clarke. It
named John West, seventh baron De La Warr as governor of
119 120New York. A confidant of the King, and an important
figure in the ministry, De La Warr had solicited the ap-
121pointment as a reward for his services, but he would not 
abandon his position in English politics to take up the du­
ties of his relatively unimportant new post. Consequently,
Clarke learned that he was to be left in charge of the gov-
122ernment for an indefinite period.
The additional security provided by De La Warr's 
appointment did not enable Clarke to ignore provincial poli­
tics, for he found himself facing yet another problem. The 
Morris faction which had just gained control of the Assembly 
was beginning to crumble. In September, 1737, the DeLancey 
group had two victories. A pro-DeLancey slate carried the
118Smith, History, II, 30-1 
119NYCD, VI, 96.
^28Henretta, "Salutary Neglect," p. 175.
121Katz, "Newcastle's New York Governors," pp. 11-2.
^22Colden Papers, II, 179.
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. 123New York City elections, and Adolph Philipse defeated a
12 4Morrisite m  a New York City by-election. Such develop­
ments warned the Lieutenant Governor that the pendulum of 
popular opinion was again swinging toward DeLancey and 
Philipse, and so as to insure that he would be on the win­
ning side, Clarke began working to destroy the power of his 
putative allies, the Morrisites.
His approach was indirect. The Morris party had long
been critical of political jobbery, and had even introduced
125a bill forbidding it in the Assembly. If Clarke could
reveal the Morrisite leaders as hypocrites by involving them 
in situations which smacked of the corruption they had long 
attacked, it would discredit and gravely weaken them. For 
example, the Lieutenant Governor offered Simon Johnson, a 
leading supporter of Morris, a post in the New York City 
government. Johnson accepted the offer, and the Council, 
which was apparently in league with Clarke, refused to con­
firm the appointment. Johnson was left with out office,
126and with fewer supporters. Even Lewis Morris Sr.'s
George W. Edwards, "New York City Politics Before 
the American Revolution," Political Science Quarterly, 
XXXVI, 4 (December, 1921), 5^6.
^■^Katz, Newcastle’s New York, p. 153.
*^Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 152.
126Varga, "New York Government," p. 48
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decision to accept control of the patronage for Westchester
County (which had helped Clarke to influence the Assembly)
was presented to the electorate as evidence of a cynical
willingness to abandon principle for gain. By the fall of
1738, Clarke had destroyed the popular following Morris had
127spent years building, and rather than attempt to rebuild
it, Morris abandoned New York. He produced the commission
Wager had secured for him and took office as the Governor of 
12 8New Jersey.
Having eliminated the Morris group as a viable political
force, Clarke had to turn to the DeLancey-Philipse faction.
The Lieutenant Governor opened the way to rapprochement, new
elections, and a return to power by DeLancey and Philipse
when, on October 20, 1738, he dissolved the Assembly, claim-
129ing that it had refused to pass an acceptable revenue.
The "hatchet job" which Clarke had done on the Morris 
faction made the results of the election of early 1739 inev­
itable. The DeLancey-Phi lipse group swept to victory, 
although Stephen DeLancey himself did not return to power.
His son James, the Chief Justice, assumed his mantle as the
127Smith, History, II, 38-40.
128Katz, Newcastle's New York, PP. 15304.
129Katz, Newcastle's New York, P. 152, NYCD, VI, 135.
130Katz, Newcastle's New York, P. 154.
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131 132leader of the Assembly when it met in March, 1739, and
began to develop those skills in managing the Assembly which
were to make him one of the most effective politicians in
all of New York's co-lonial history. The triumph of his
perty was so overwhelming that the remaining leaders of the
Morris group simply gave up. They either withdrew from
134politics, or joined the DeLancey-Philipse group.
Clarke insured that he would have good relations with 
the new Assembly by demonstrating a complete willingness to 
allow the House to dominate the government. His only demand 
was a salary appropriation,33"* and as long as that was forth­
coming, he approved every bill passed by the Assembly. His 
letters to London, protesting that some of the very bills he 
had willingly signed into law were "unconstitutional" because
they did not conform to the Instructions, were apparently
136efforts to protect his standing with the Board of Trade.
131Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 175-8.
132Bonomi, Factious People. Appendix C [p. 305], 
333Bonomi, Factious People, p. 143.
33*Mc Anear, "Politics," II, 653, Smith and Alexander 
chose to withdraw, while Lewis Morris Jr. allied himself 
with his former bitter foes.
135Smith, History, II, 42, 45-8, 55, 58-9.
136NYCD, VI, 141-2, 149-52, 184-6, 206.
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Fortunately for him, the Board of Trade was almost complete­
ly unconcerned about the state of the prerogative in New 
York. In its response to one of Clarke's lamentations on 
the refusal of the Assembly to grant a "proper" revenue, the 
Board ignored the Lieutenant Governor's complaints and con­
gratulated him for achieving "...tranquillity and universal
137harmony...," and expressed the hope it would continue.
From March, 1739, to September, 1743, the political life of
New York was unusually quiet; there was nothing to dispute
and no one to raise new issues.
When George Clinton, successor to the absentee De La
Warr, arrived in New York to take over the government in 
138June, 1743, George Clarke withdrew to the country where
he was to live in semi-retirement until he left for England 
139in June, 1745, His sojourn in New York had been extroard-
inarily successful; he had come to the New World to make his
fortune, and by carefully exploiting all of the perquisites
of his offices, he returned to the Old World with about 
140£100,000. Unfortunately, his successor had neither his








The Board of Trade, which was nominally responsible for 
colonial administration, was informed of the decision to 
appoint George Clinton as governor of New York on April 30, 
1741.^ His nomination was the product of the family loyalty 
and political self interest of the Duke of Newcastle. 
(Clinton was the younger brother of the influential seventh 
earl of Lincoln, and, as Lincoln had married Newcastle's 
sister, Lucy, Clinton had a strong claim on the ministry. 
Even after the death of the seventh earl in 1728, the dow­
ager countess kept pressing her brother-in-law's suit. In­
itially, she had sought to advance Clinton's naval career, 
but when it became apparent that there were few opportunit­
ies in the peacetime navy for a mediocre officer, she began 
to solicit civilian offices.) By 1739, George Clinton was
New York State, Secretary of State, Documents Relative 
to the Colonial History of the State of New York, fe.B.
O'Callaghan and feerthold Fernow, eels. (13 vols. , Albany, 
1861-1887, VI, 187 (hereafter NYCD).
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2on the verge of bankruptcy, and Newcastle, who wanted
to retain the good will and parliamentary influence of
Clinton's nephew the ninth earl of Lincoln"* dispatched the
4nearly destitute officer to New York to recoup his 
fortune.^
He arrived in New York on September 20, 1743,® but 
apparently did not make an overwhelming impression on the 
people he was to rule. A local resident, Abigail Pranks, 
wrote: "...our New Gov[emo]r Seems to be a good sort of a
Gentleman but by what I find his Chief Delight is in Drink­
ing & if he Ke[e]ps on as he has hereto done he will dis-
7patch him Self...." Clinton did, however, seem to be
7Stanley N. Katz, "Newcastle's New York Governors," 
New-York Historical Society Quarterly, LI, 1 (January,
1957};' 12-3.----  ------ ---------
•*The eighth earl had died in 1729, and the title passed 
to his younger brother.
4James A. Henretta, "Salutary Neglect: Colonial
Administration Under the Duke o£ Newcastle (Princeton,
Mew Jersey, 19 72), 216-7 (hereafter "Salutary Neglect").
5William Smith Jr., The History of the Province of New 
York, Michael Kammen, ed. (2 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 
II, 61 (hereafter History).
6NYCD, VI, 247.
^Abigail Franks, The Lee Max Friedmann Collection of 
American Jewish Colonial Correspondence: Letters of the
Franks Family (1733-1746), Leo Hershkowitz and Isidor S. 
Meyer, eds.,Studies in American Jewish History, 5 
(Waltham, Mass., i960) , p. 125 (hereafter Letilers) .
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handling his duties competently. He avoided administrative 
confusion by announcing that he would not displace office­
holders, and only a week after he had arrived pleased those 
of his subjects who believed that elections were the neces­
sary prerequisite to a tranquil administration by dissolving
g
the Assembly.
Having dispatched the more pressing issues, Clinton 
turned his attention to a problem which would profoundly 
affect the course of his administration: the selection of
a local politician to guide and advise him while he famil­
iarized himself with colonial politics. There were only 
two men in the province worthy of consideration, former 
acting Governor George Clarke, and James DeLancey.
Clarke's ambitions disqualified him. He had offered Clinton 
$> 500 per annum to remain in England, so it was obvious that 
he wanted to remain in control of the government. It was 
even possible that Clarke might offer the Governor poor ad­
vice in an effort to drive him from the colony. DeLancey, 
on the other hand, was personally attractive, had no overt 
ambitions which would conflict with the interests of the 
Governor, had been recommended by Newcastle, and could use 
his influence in the Assembly to make the administration
OPatricia U. Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and
Society in Colonial New York (New York, , App. C
rp. 365] (hereafter Factious People), Smith, History, II, 
62, NYCD, VI, 248.
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profitable for Clinton. Predictably, he became "prime 
minister."^
The Assembly election, held in October, 1743,^ demon­
strated the wisdom of Clinton's decision. The election 
confirmed the dominant position of the DeLancey-Philipse 
faction in the Assembly, and Clinton exhibited his faith in 
his allies by giving them control of patronage.11
When the Assembly met, the behavior of the Governor 
clearly indicated that he was following DeLancey's advice. 
Like all the other governors who had established a modus 
vivendi with the leaders of the Assembly, he allowed the
House, to conduct the affairs of the colony virtually with-
12out interference. He signed the Septennial Act, which 
limited his formerly complete control over the duration of 
an Assembly by establishing seven years as the maximum term 
of a House, and an act which reduced the business of the 
Court of Chancery by establishing remedies for the recovery
QNicholas Varga, "New York Government and Politics 
During the Mid-Eighteenth Century" (New York, Unpublished 
Ph. D. dissertation, Fordham University, 1960) , p. 61 
(hereafter "New York Government").
10Bonomi, Factious People, App. C [p. 305J.
11Beverly McAnear, "Politics in Provincial New York,
1689-1761" (2 vols., Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 
Stanford University, January, 1935), II, 580 (herafter
"Politics").
12Varga, "New York Government," p. 61.
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13of legacies in the common law. In addition, he strength­
ened DeLancey's political influence by consenting to in­
creases in the salaries of two allies of the Chief Justice, 
the puisne justices of the Supreme Court, and by approving
the creation of "expense accounts" for the members of the
14Council, who were also allies of DeLancey. Clinton was 
rewarded for his passivity with a salary of £ 1,560, £ 100 
for house rent, b 400 for firewood and candles, b 150 for 
his trips to Albany to meet with the Five Nations, and b 400 
for gifts for the Indians.^ He did not object to the deci­
sion of the Assembly to grant the revenue for only one year.
The next Assembly session began in a spirit of coopera­
tion, but ended in acrimony which presaged the disputes which 
were to characterize so much of the administration. The 
House convened in April, 1744 in response to the (incorrect) 
rumors of an uprising in Scotland, and promptly passed a 
resolution which expressed its abhorrence at the supposed
^^New York State, Commissioners of Statutory Revision, 
The Colonial Laws of New York from 166 4 to the Revolution
TT  voTs': ,  A lbany, ti.T.T  7 T O V ' » g '," ? 0 9=T i------
(hereafter NYCL) .
^Smith, History, II, 61. The salary of the second 
justice was increased to £ 100 per year, and that of the 
third to £ 50. The Councillors were given £ 60, later 
raised to £ 1 0 0.
15Journal of the Votes and Proceedings of the General 
Assembly of the Colony of New York, (2 vols.,
New York, 1/5 4-1766, reprinted 1^54) , II, 6-6 (hereafter 
Ass. Jour.), Smith, History, II, 61.
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r e v o l u t i o n . I t  then turned its attention to more immed­
iate matters. The ministry, which was expecting a renewal 
of active hostilities with France and Spain, had ordered
Clinton to prepare the defenses of the colony, and the gov-
17ernor transmitted the demand to the Assembly, Although 
the Assembly pledged itself to making the improvements in 
the defenses of New York City, Oswego, and Saratoga which 
the Governor had requested, it refused to make appropria­
tions for the projects before it was given specific inform­
ation about them. Clinton (who seems to have been disturbed 
by the failure of the Assembly to follow his orders with the 
alacrity of the sailors he had commanded) ignored its pledge 
of support, and, on May 19, berated the members for failing 
to follow his instructions, warning that "...if therefore
any ill consequences should happen in the Interim, they will
18be justly imputed to you...," and prorogued the meeting.
19When the House reassembled in July, it again turned 
its attention to the problem of defense. It examined the 
suggested repairs and improvements in detail, carefully
16Smith, History, II, 62.
17Varga, "New York Government," p. 6 8 . 
^ Ass. Jour., II, 21-2.
19Bonomi, Factious People, App. C [p. 306],
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20considered financing, and then passed the defense bill 
which the Governor had requested. Its decision did not, 
however, indicate that the Assembly had decided to follow 
meekly the Governor's program. It demonstrated its contin­
ued independence by refusing to accede to a request of the 
British government, relayed by Clinton, for the appointment
of commissioners to negotiate a common offensive policy
21with representatives from Massachusetts. The unwilling­
ness of the Assembly to surrender its hard won control over 
policy, not unnaturally convinced the Governor that the 
House intended to usurp his authority, but unlike his pre­
decessors, who had been willing to sacrifice principle to 
practicality, Clinton clearly indicated he would not stand
idly by while the Assembly usurped his role in the govern- 
22ment.
Governor Clinton apparently did not hold James DeLancey,
the leader of the Assembly, responsible for his difficulties
with the House, for, in September, 1744, he gave DeLancey a
new commission as Chief Justice which gave him tenure during
23"good behavior" instead of at pleasure. This generous 
20Smith, History, II, 62-3.
21Varga, "New York Government," pp. 71-3.
22NYCD, VI, 260.
23Varga, "New York Government," p. 73.
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gesture weakened the authority of the Governor, however, for 
it guaranteed that DeLancey could retain control of the sec­
ond most powerful post in the colony under almost all condi­
tions. It made him virtually independent of Clinton.
If Clinton had given DeLancey the new commission in the 
hope that it would lead to better relations with the Assembly, 
he was grievously disappointed. Tensions with the House, 
which had been increasing, erupted during the session in 
March, 1745. The opening speech was concerned with the war 
against French Canada. The Governor requested a contribution 
toward the expenses of the expedition that the British gov­
ernment was organizing against Louisburg, support for the 
garrison at Oswego, the construction of two forts to protect
the Indians, and (again) the appointment of commissioners to
2 4negotiate with Massachusetts. The response of the Assembly
was not encouraging. It voted less than the Governor had
requested (only b 3,000, for the expedition against
Louisburg), considered reducing the Oswego garrison, refused
to appoint the Commissioners, and ignored the Governor's
25requests for constructing forts. The House was still adam­
antly refusing to surrender any of its prerogatives.
In April, the Assembly begem to consider two bills which 
clearly demonstrated how the House and the Governor
24Ass. Jour., II, 46-7.
25Smith, History, II, 64-6.
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fundamentally disagreed. The first was am act which author­
ized the Assembly to appoint commissioners to supervise the 
distribution of gun powder purchased with funds raised in 
New York. (As gun powder was essential for the conduct of 
military operations, the Assembly was, in effect, giving 
itself the authority to veto any venture it disapproved of, 
and thereby considerably reducing Clinton's authority as 
commander-in-chief.) The second was a measure for improving 
the defenses of New York City. The Assembly agreed with 
Clinton's assertion, that they should be strengthened, but 
it insisted on determining what the specific modifications 
were to be. This too was a direct challenge to the 
Governor's authority as Captain General and Commander-in- 
Chief, and must have been all the more galling because col­
onial civilians were presuming to dictate military policy 
to a senior officer of the Royal Navy. Clinton seemed un­
willing to accept any limitation of his authority, for, on 
May 14, after charging the Assembly with disrespect for
both his and the Crown's authority, and with unwillingness
26to contribute to the war against France, he dissolved it.
The Governor's decision may not have been motivated 
entirely by pique. According to Cadwallader Colden, Clinton 
believed that the intransigence of the Assembly was the 
result of the inability of the nominal head of the House, 
Speaker Adolph Philipse, to lead effectively, and of his
26Ass. Jour., II, 61-2.
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unwillingness to surrender control to James DeLancey, and 
that Clinton had dissolved the Assembly primarily to elimin­
ate Philipse, who was eighty years old, and thereby estab-
27lish DeLancey as its leader.
The new election was held in May, and Philipse was 
eliminated. He was succeeded in the Speakership by David 
Jones of Queens County, a man thought considerably more
2 8willing to accept DeLancey's leadership than Philipse had, 
and relations between the Governor and the Assembly now 
improved dramatically. The House demonstrated its willing­
ness to cooperate by providing the funds for improving the 
defenses of New York City which Clinton had requested at the 
previous session, and by voting an additional h 5,000 for 
the Louisburg expedition. Governor Clinton showed his good 
will by allowing the Assembly to control the distribution 
of powder purchased by the colony. J DeLancey's rise to 
unquestioned preeminence in the Assembly had certainly 
calmed the political atmosphere, but Clinton must have mis­
understood the situation, for, in the very next Assembly, 
the Governor began to disregard DeLancey.
2 7Varga, "New York Government," p. 78.
2 flVarga, "New York Government," p. 79.
29Ass. Jour., II, 64,67.
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The session, which met in August, was short but signif­
icant. Clinton opened the meeting by requesting the House 
for the establishment of a perpetual revenue and tonnage 
duty. The Assembly voted down Clinton's request."*0 It is 
inconceivable that DeLancey, who was a master of the deli­
cate task of guiding the Assembly, would have countenanced 
the decision of the Governor to make such a request, and 
the Governor's action strongly suggests that Clinton was 
already pulling away from DeLancey's guidance. Develop­
ments in the next session of the Assembly probably encour­
aged Clinton to pursue his assertive policy.
When this session opened late in October, the Governor 
again requested funds for the construction of forts on the
31northern frontier, and the Assembly again ignored his call.
It seemed that Clinton would have no success in bending the 
House to his will. Then, on November 20, news of the mass­
acre of the population of Saratoga by Indians on November 17 
reached New York City. The defenses of the Hudson River 
Valley had been breached, and Albany and the rest of the 
colony were opened to raids. Inspired by fear, the Assembly 
became quite concerned with the defensive measures it had 
previously ignored, and provided the moneys for frontier
30Varga, "New York Government," pp. 71-2, 80-1.
31Ass. Jour., II, 77.
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32defenses previously requested. The report of the presence
of a French raiding force ninety miles below Albany further
fueled the House's martial ardor, and it voted to support
any "well concerted" plan for attacking the French strong- 
33hold, Canada.
The willingness of the apparently panic stricken 
Assembly to support defensive proposals which the Governor 
had advocated certainly did not indicate that it had aband­
oned its traditional claims to authority in the government, 
but it convinced Clinton (who had never understood the oppo­
sition to his proposals) that the Assembly was finally will­
ing to "do its duty" and to accept his leadership. The 
brief "success" may have convinced the Governor that he 
could manage the House perfectly without DeLancey's assis­
tance, and that his problems had been the product of taking 
DeLancey's advice. Certainly his letters to London now 
took on a new tone. Clinton had previously either praised 
the Assembly for its willingness to cooperate with the 
administration,^* or claimed that he would be able to bring 
a recalcitrant House to heel with little difficulty.^
32Ass. Jour., II, 86.
33Ass. Jour., II, 89.
~**NYCD, VI, 281-2 for example.
•*5NYCD, VI, 274-6 for example.
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Now he became even less tolerant. He began to ascribe his 
previous difficulties to the unwillingness of the Assembly 
to recognize, and submit to, the authority of the Crown,
and to express his determination to bring it back to a
36proper state of obedience.
This domineering attitude became apparent in December. 
Clinton was so insistent on his right to control the govern­
ment that he refused to grant the customary request of the
Assembly for an adjournment to January, until it provided
37an additional h 150 for the fort at Oswego. He seemed 
unwilling to accept anything less than exact, prompt obed­
ience from the Assembly. Since his attitude was completely 
incompatible with the views of his "Prime Minister," a split 
with DeLancey was inevitable.
It took place in January, 1746. Clinton asked DeLancey 
to support amendments to the militia act which would have 
increased the authority of the governor over the forces by 
increasing the penalties for desertion. DeLancey refused, 
and Clinton, no longer willing to permit the Chief Justice 
to dictate policy, set about securing passage of the act 
despite the objections of his advisor. He enlisted the 
support of Speaker David Jones, who was able to convince 
rural Assemblymen to cooperate with the administration, and,
36NYCD, VI, 2 84-6, 305-7. 
37Smith, History, II, 68.
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3 Ron February 13, 1746, the militia act amendments passed. 
Clinton also convinced the Assembly to pass legislation
authorizing additional defense expenditures and the long
39delayed conference with Massachusetts.
During the following week, Clinton and DeLancey attend­
ed a dinner party and both apparently became somewhat intox­
icated. DeLancey made some uncomplimentary remarks about 
the Assemblymen who had supported the amendments to the 
militia act, and Clinton responded by defending his allies, 
and by attacking DeLancey's supporters as obstructionists. 
The "discussion" continued to degenerate until DeLancey
stalked out threatening to make the remainder of Clinton's
40administration uncomfortable. He kept his promise.
The dispute between the Governor and the Chief Justice 
embodied a basic paradox in British colonial administration. 
Clinton adopted the position that the colony was a subord­
inate part of the empire, and that the duty of its Assembly 
was loyally to implement the policies suggested by the 
British government. DeLancey, on the other hand, took the 
colonial position that the colony was virtually self- 
governing, and that its Assembly had the right and duty to 
control public policy. The specific area of disagreement
38Varga, "New York Government," pp. 88-92.
^9Smith, History, II, 6 8-9.
*°Varga, "New York Government," pp. 88-90.
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between the two men was military policy. Clinton and the
British government favored a strong offensive policy, while
DeLancey and the colonists advocated a passive, inexpensive,
41defensive posture. But the conflict was inevitable, m
any case. Clinton simply would not abandon his views, and 
the colonists would not abandon theirs.
The stage was set for conflict at the February Assembly
A 0meeting. James DeLancey had vowed to make Clinton's ad­
ministration difficult, and, despite the Governor's success­
es in the preceding session of the Assembly, had the 
strength in the House to do so. He was influential in New
York City, and in Albany his uncle, Henry Beekman was a
43potent force among the Assemblymen. This was politically
most advantageous since it was customary to give Assemblymen
44control of local patronage, and that, in turn, enabled 
DeLancey's allies to recruit more support. Clinton had him­
self also contributed to the power of the Chief Justice.
All the available seats on the Council had been given to 
supporters of DeLancey. Clinton was the governor, but much
41Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 150-1
A 0Varga, "New York Government," p. 89.
^Stanley N. Katz, Newcastle's New York (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1968), pp. 174-5.
4*Varga, "New York Government," p. 274.
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of the government was under DeLancey's control.4^
Nor was there any way for Clinton to destroy the influ­
ence of the Chief Justice. Clinton had given him a commis­
sion which was tantamount to life tenure, and DeLancey's 
connections in London (which included Sir John Heathcote, 
M.P., Admiral Sir Peter Warren, M.P., and "the hero of 
Louisburg," Thomas Herring, who was to become Archbishop of 
Canterbury in 1747, and the influential mercantile firm of
Baker and Baker) were so powerful that the Governor could
46not hope to secure action against him there.
Despite the portents, the February meeting of the
Assembly provided a rather quiet beginning for a conflict
which was to dominate New York politics for years. The
opposing forces were-evenly balanced. Clinton's allies
appropriated h 10,000 to continue the war, and assigned most
of the burden of raising the money to the cities of New York
and Albany4  ̂ (the centers of DeLancey's strength). When the
tax law came before the Council, the supporters of the Chief
48Justice insisted on amending it, and the Assembly,
45Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 174-5.
46Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 146-8.
47Ass. Jour., II, 95-6.
4 8Journal of the Legislative Council of the Colony of 
New YorET 16^1-1775 (2 vols., Albany. N.Y. . lggTVTTiVST4.
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predictably, denied the authority of the Council to do so, 
claiming, as it long had, that the upper House had no right
AQto amend money bills. 3 As neither House would give way, 
convention compelled the Governor to prorogue the Assembly 
in the hope that tempers would cool.^ The delay caused by 
the suspension of the session benefited DeLancey and his 
allies, for it gave them the opportunity to reorganize their 
forces.
When the Assembly reconvened in March, the DeLancey 
forces were able to recoup much lost ground. But the prov­
ince was deeply involved in a war, and complete refusal to 
cooperate with the Governor would have reduced the defenses 
of the colony, and endangered their families and property. 
Consequently, the Assembly agreed to improve the fortifica­
tions on the northern frontier, to provide gifts for the
Indians, and to appoint commissioners to plan a joint offen-
51sive with the New Englanders.
The Assembly was not by any means, however, prepared 
to surrender its authority to the Governor. It examined his 
proposal for erecting blockhouses on the frontier at length, 
and did not approve the project until it limited the
49As s. Jour., II, 99.
Varga, "New York Government," p. 89.
51Ass. Jour., II, 102.
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52garrison of each fort to twenty men. The DeLancey domin­
ated Assembly was even more cavalier in its treatment of the 
tax quotas imposed in the previous session. It abandoned 
them completely, and adopted a more equitable system. It 
demonstrated its unwillingness to trust the Governor by
requiring that the Council approve his warrants for the ex-
53penditure of public funds. Clinton was as limited by the 
exigencies of war as the Assembly and had to accept the deci­
sions of the House. In June, 17 46, just as the next session 
of the Assembly was beginning, he wrote the Duke of Newcastle
to request permission to return to England, suggesting that,
54if at all possible, a military command be found for him.
When the Assembly met again in June, it was asked to
contribute to an expedition against Canada. Clinton had
learned of the project in a letter from the Duke of Newcastle 
55m  April, and the House, now introduced to the realities of 
war, endorsed it enthusiastically. It contributed fc 40,000, 
and authorized the recruitment of troops, and their dispatch
52As s. Jour., II, 105, April 9, 1747.
53As s . Jour., II, 109-10.
54NYCD, VI, 309-10.
53Smith, History, II, 89.
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to the rendezvous which had been established north of 
56Albany. It did not, however, forget its self-imposed obli­
gation to control government policy, and to protect the peo­
ples' money. It named commissioners to supervise the expend­
iture of the money it had provided, named the militia compan­
ies which were to be assigned to the expedition,^ refused to 
assume the cost of transporting men and supplies to the gath­
ering place, and would not provide a subsidy for the Indians
5 8recruited to join the campaign. The DeLancey Assembly was
willing to fight, but only on its own terms. Clinton was
59forced to accept them.
He was not, however, completely passive. He apparently 
realized that the insistence of the Assembly on minutely 
supervising the colony's contribution to the expedition 
against Canada was the product of James DeLancey's unwilling­
ness to cooperate, and he therefore concluded that if 
DeLancey could be convinced to endorse the attack, the 
Assembly would become more cooperative. In what was probably 
the most subtle and sophisticated political maneuver of his 
administration, Clinton attempted to secure the support of
56As s . Jour., II, 112, 115.
~*̂Ass. Jour., II, 115.
C OVarga, "New York Government," p. 9 4.
59 Varga, "New York Government," p. 95.
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the Chief Justice in August by offering him command of the 
province's contingent. DeLancey presumably realized what 
Clinton was attempting to do, and politely declined the 
offer,60 thereby preserving his freedom to oppose the gov­
ernor.
Clinton's lack of success in courting DeLancey made it
clear that a reconciliation was impossible. This securely
established Cadwallader Colden, who had been advising the
Governor since July, 1746, as the new "prime minister."61
Colden had associated himself with Clinton primarily
because the Governor had offered to "provide" for him and
for his family, a promise which the Governor's relations
6 2with DeLancey had demonstrated he would keep. Colden was 
the only colonist who was strongly (or for that matter to 
any extent) committed to maintaining t;he prerogatives of the 
Crown. Unfortunately, Colden's main qualification, his
60Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 167, Varga, "New York 
Government," p. 100.
6^Siegfried B. Rolland, "Cadwallader Colden Colonial 
Politician and Imperial Statesman, 1718-1760" (Unpublished 
Ph. D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1952), 
p. 289 (hereafter "Cadwallader Colden") .
®^Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 17 8, New-York Histor­
ical Society, frhe Cadwallader Cofden Papers, New-York 
Historical Society Collections, lSi^-lsSj, 1934-1955 
T9' vols., New York, 19'18"-T9'21, 1937), IV, 31-4, 94-5, 108-9 
for example (hereafter Colden Papers).
®^Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 178.
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zeal for the rights of the Crown, had led him to take stands
which made him unpopular with most segments of the New York
64political community, which preferred to ignore the preroga­
tive when it conflicted with colonial interests. It was 
impossible for him to create an effective coalition in the 
Assembly.
His unpopularity did not disturb Colden in the least.
He brushed it off as the result of slanders aimed at him by
/T  Cthe leaders of the Assembly 3 in retaliation for his opposi­
tion to their efforts at securing complete domination of the 
government.®® His approach to governing New York, by forc­
ing the Assembly into unswerving, unquestioning obedience to
6 7the will of the Governor, would not be popular with the 
Assemblymen, or their leader, James DeLancey.
The conflict was not apparent when Clinton met the 
Assembly in October, however. The opening speech reminded 
the House of the ways in which it had failed to show "due 
obedience." Clinton charged the Assembly with attempting 
to engross all governmental authority, and with failure to 
pursue actively the war against France. He demanded that
64Bonomi, Factious People, p. 15 3.
®®Colden Papers, III, 337-8.
®®Colden Papers, IV, 160.
®7Rolland, "Cadwallader Colden," p. 297.
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it provide camp for the men who had been assigned to the
expedition against Canada (which had been delayed), that it
provide funds for the construction of small forts on the
frontier, and that it provide more presents for the Indians
6 8who were not enthusiastic participants in the war.
The reaction of the Assembly to Clinton's tirade was
surprisingly measured. It may have convinced the Governor
that Colden was correct in arguing that the Assembly had to
be taken firmly in hand. The House denied that it was
attempting to subvert the government, and explained that the
conflicts which had developed were the result of the bad
advice received by the Governor. Their failure to provide
the funds Clinton had requested was not the result of their
unwillingness to support the government properly, but, they
said, of the inability of the colony to bear the expense.**9
The placating tone of the Assembly's response was reinforced
on October 17 when it voted t> 6,500 to satisfy the request
of the Governor for funds for the winter encampment. The
House did, however, continue to refuse to transport the sup-
70plies beyond Albany.
68Ass. Jour., II, 124.
89Smith, History, II, 75-8.
70Ass. Jour., II, 124.
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Governor Clinton had already taken steps which would 
confirm the Assembly's resistance. He had issued warrants 
for the delivery of supplies to the force encamped above 
Albany before the Assembly acted on his request. When the 
commissioners in charge of the supplies stockpiled at Albany 
refused to deliver them on Clinton's warrant, the officers 
of the expedition took matters into their own hands.
On October 16, Colonel John Roberts, the commander of 
the force, ordered Henry Holland, the sheriff of Albany
71County, to seize the supplies at Albany. Holland did so.
News of the sheriff's action reached New York City on
October 27, but the Assembly did not react precipitously.
It waited until November 8, after it received a complete
report on the incident, but then moved forcefully. It
indicted Colden (who had reportedly authorized Roberts to
72seize the supplies ), Roberts, and Holland for "high mis­
demeanors,” and refused to provide additional supplies for
the expeditionary force until it received assurances from
7 1Clinton that the incident would not reoccur. Clinton 
defended his agents, but as he had to obtain supplies for
Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the 
Eighteenth Century, (4 vols. / Gloucester, Mass., i^58, 
reprint of 1924-5 edition), IV, 178 (hereafter Eighteenth).
730sgood, Eighteenth, IV, 178.
73As s . Jour., II, 134. As in England, the term a 
"high misdemeanor" was not restricted to indictable 
offenses.
260
the men encamped above Albany, was forced to agree to the
74demands of the Assembly, which he did on November 28.
But the harm had already been done. The Assembly demon­
strated its increased distrust of the governor by specify­
ing in detail how the money it provided for supplies was to 
75be spent, and showed its disdain for his authority by
76adjourning without his permission.
Clinton's first attempt at applying Colden's overween­
ing approach to the Assembly had ended in failure. When the 
Assembly reconvened at the beginning of December, 1746, it 
was still extremely resistant to the Governor's proposals. 
Clinton blamed its refusal to pass the military legislation 
he had requested on the influence of the DeLancey faction
which (he apparently sincerely believed) had diverted the
77House from its original willingness to support the war. 
Refusal to cooperate with the Governor's legislative program 
was, however, to be the least of its offenses. Under 
DeLancey's direction, the Assembly now attempted to force 
Colden to resign (thereby depriving Clinton of his key 
advisor) by charging that Colden's publication of material
7 Âss. Jour., II, 137-8.
75Ass. Jour., II, 139.
7^Smith, History, II, 78.
77NYCD, VI, 312-4.
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relating to the Indian conference held in September, 1746
was a "...Misrepresentation of Facts, and an invidious
Reflection upon... [some] of the members of his Majesty's 
78Council...." Although the attempt failed, because Colden
was not the sort to bend to pressure, it did, nonetheless,
have political consequences. Clinton was so disturbed by
the Assembly's actions that his antipathy towards DeLancey,
79which was already immense, increased, and consequently 
relations between the executive and legislature deteriorated 
further.
The March, 1747 session of the Assembly reflected the
increased bitterness. The House again limited its support
of the war to maintaining the defenses of the province, and
to provisioning the force committed to the attack on 
80Canada. It again refused to provide funds for offensive 
81operations, and it again attempted to make the position 
of the Governor untenable. The financing of the expedition 
against Canada provided the necessary issue.
After Clinton learned of the proposed campaign, he 
began issuing warrants on the British Treasury to meet the
78NYCD, VI, 330-1, 32 8-9.
79Mc Anear, "Politics," II, 641-9.
80Ass. Jour.. II, 143.
piSmith, History, II, 84-6, Ass. Jour., II, 154-66.
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expenses the British government had agreed to assume. In 
May, 1747 the garrison protecting Albany (and therefore the 
whole Hudson Valley) mutinied and threatened to loot Albany 
and desert, unless it received its back pay in full.
As the Albany garrison was an important element of the 
colony's defensive system, the Governor had to meet the 
mutineers' demands, and he issued additional Treasury bills 
to pay the soldiers. The colony's merchants were, however, 
unsure that the British government would redeem any of the 
bills, and refused to accept them until Clinton backed them 
with his personal credit. He had to pledge h 6,000 to sup­
port the notes. He could not view his increased liability 
with equanimity, and so, on June 2, asked the Assembly to
underwrite the personal notes he had issued to support the
82Treasury warrants. The Assembly refused, * citing its con­
cern for the prerogative as justification. If it agreed to 
guarantee his notes (the Assembly explained), it would be 
"insulting" the prerogative by implying that it was unsure of
the Crown's willingness to repay its debts, and it had no
83desire to make such a "disloyal" suggestion.
The Governor had been neatly hoisted by his own petard, 
but he saw no humor in the situation. He angrily informed
82Varga, "New York Government," pp. 116-8.
®^Smith, History, II, 89.
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the Board of Trade that:
...the publick affairs of this province 
committed to my care are now reduced to such 
a State, by the violent opposition of an inso­
lent faction that his Maj[es]ty's Authority 
is openly dispised, and the Administration so 
far wrested out of the hands of his Gov[erno]rf 
that I can now answer for the safety of this 
Province against the intrigues of that Faction 
within, or the open attacks of Enemies abroad...,
and then went on to detail the ways in which the Assembly, 
under DeLancey's leadership, had attacked his authority. He 
concluded with a strong plea, which again reflected the atti­
tude of his advisor Colden, against the evils of popular 
government.84
Clinton did not, however, content himself with letters 
of complaint. With the assistance of Colden, he tried to 
find a way to turn the tables on the Assembly. On August 31, 
17 47, he announced that he would stop issuing warrants for 
provisions for the militia, thereby placing the entire bur­
den of local defense on the Assembly. The colonists, how­
ever, felt adequately defended by the Royal troops in New 
York, and consequently the Assembly ignored the responsibil­
ity the Governor had attempted to thrust upon it.
The events of early October, however, allowed Clinton 
to take the initiative. The colonies had learned that the 
British government was suspending offensive operations 
against the French, and withdrawing the forces it had
84NYCD, VI, 352
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85stationed in New York. The colonists were thrown back on
their own resources, and the Assembly on October 8 agreed to
assume the costs of defending the frontier, to provide b 800
for gifts to the Indians, and even funds for the fort at
Saratoga which Clinton had planned to abandon. But the
Governor (who apparently intended to use the advantage the
threat had given him to regain all his lost influence) re-
86fused to accept the appropriation!
He informed the Assembly that he would not permit it to 
make any changes in his defense program. The colony was to 
be defended his way or not at all. The Governor was appar­
ently determined to force the House into the subordinate, 
money raising position which British colonial theory (and 
Cadwallader Colden) had assigned to it.
The Assembly refused to submit to such blackmail. On 
October 9, 1747, it passed a resolution which claimed that 
it had willingly supported the war until Clinton's misman­
agement had convinced them they were dissipating public mon­
ey uselessly, detailing their grievances against Clinton and 
Colden, and alleging that Clinton's claim to absolute auth­
ority was an innovation which would destroy the "constitution" 
of the colony, and the "liberties" of its people.®7
85Varga, "New York Government," pp. 121-4.
®**Ass. Jour., II, 172.
87Ass. Jour., II, 173-80.
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Clinton refused to accept the petition. He informed
the Assembly that all its powers were derived from, and
subordinate to, the Crown, and then informed the House that
he would withdraw the four companies assigned to the defense
of Albany unless it agreed to his demand that it relieve the
Crown of the cost of their support. He admitted that he
might be endangering lives, but he made it clear that he
would continue to do so until the Assembly submitted to his
8 8claims to dominance in the colonial political system.
On the twenty-fourth, Clinton went even further. He 
ordered the public not to publish the Assembly's remonstrance 
of October 9, and although the Assembly countermanded his or­
der, it was forced to yield. On October 26, the day it or­
dered publication of the October 9 petition, the Assembly 
passed a bill for supplying Albany, a bill providing £28,000 
for frontier defense, and a message which "...implored...” 
the Governor to accept the proffered funds before winter
weather made it impossible to transport the supplies to the 
89frontier. On November 25, Clinton deigned to accept the
bills, which, he made clear, did not meet his standards of
respect for the prerogative. He then dissolved the Assembly
90which he had brought to heel.
88Ass. Jour., II, 185.
89ASS. Jour., II, 193.
98Smith, History, II, 89-101.
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There was no clear reason for the decision to dissolve. 
Perhaps Clinton, who firmly believed that the faction gained
g ]and held power only by chicanery, warn ted to give the 
"good people" of the colony am opportunity to endorse his 
policy of subordinating the Assembly. If that was his ob­
jective, he must have been sorely disappointed. Despite 
Colden's efforts to build a viable party, the composition of 
the new Assembly was not markedly different from its prede-
Q2cessor's. Colden was so discouraged by his failure to
rally popular support that he retired to his country seat,
but Clinton was made of sterner stuff. He concluded that
the deciding factor in the campaign had been the arrival of
9 3James DeLancey's commission as Lieutenant Governor.
Because the winding down of the w a r ^  had eliminated 
the possibility of invasion, Clinton was deprived of his 
most effective weapon, and so could not treat the new 
Assembly as peremptorialy as its predecessor. When he met 
the House in February, 1748, Clinton abandoned the aggressive 
tone he had assumed under Colden*s tutelage, and attempted to
91NYCD, VI, 312-4, 316-7, 328-9, 350-7.
92Mc Anear, "Politics," II, 659-61
93NYCD, VI, 416-8.
94Basil Williams, The Whig Supremacy, 1714-1760, 2nd
edition, revised by C.H. Stuart, vol. XI, Oxford History
of England, Sir George Clark, editor (Oxford, li)62) , p. 263.
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9 5proceed in a rational, business-like manner. Unfortunate­
ly, the Assembly was unwilling to forget the past, and it
would not cooperate. It refused his request for additional
96funds for frontier defense, appointed its own agent m  
9 7London, and condemned the Governor's decision not to allow
9 8discharged soldiers to sue for back pay.
The House continued to remain unmanageable when it met
in June. It would provide funds for defense, and for a
99prisoner exchange, but little else. The government was 
effectively immobilized, and Clinton was forced to turn to 
the British government for assistance. Although his initial 
attempts to convince the Board of Trade to intervene had 
failed,100 he convinced Governor William Shirley of 
Massachusetts Bay to write a report describing the sorry 
state of the province, and the necessity of English support 
for Clinton in his struggle with the Assembly.101
'Ass. Jour., II# 222
'As s. Jour., II# 226
rAss. Jour., H H 233
lAss. Jour., II# 241
9!)Smith, History, II, 104-6.
100NYCD, VI, 419-20, 42 8-32 for example.
101NYCD, VI, 432-7.
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Regrettably, Shirley's report met the same fate as Clinton's 
complaints, and the Governor had to turn again to colonial 
politics.
He prepared for the October, 1748 Assembly session by 
convincing Colden to come out of retirement,^-®2 and by en­
couraging colonists who were not tied to DeLancey to join
his cirle. His new advisors included James Alexander,
William Smith Jr., and Robert Hunter Morris.^®^ They had, 
however, little apparent influence on the Governor, for when 
Clinton met the Assembly he took the belligerent tone favored 
by Colden. He asked the House to ignore recent precedents 
and grant a five year revenue, to abandon the practice of 
appropriating salaries to individual officials, and to pay 
the salary arrears due to the militia and to Colonel 
Johnson.^®^ The House, not unexpectedly, refused to surren­
der its financial authority,^05 and the bills for salary 
arrears and current salaries were lost in the ensuing 
imbroglio.*®6
102NYCD, VI, 458-60
*®^Bonomi, Factious People, p. 160.
-̂®̂ Ass. Jour., II, 243-4.
*05A s s . Jour., II, 246.
Varga, "New York Government," p. 140.
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On October 19, the Assembly sent Clinton a message 
detailing its reasons for refusing to grant a five year rev­
enue, or to abandon the practice of granting salaries to 
specific officials. The Governor refused it, claiming that 
he was entitled to prior knowledge of the contents of all 
petitions.10  ̂ After considering these novel claims for a 
week, the Assembly responded by denouncing Clinton and
i o pColden for denying their right of access. Another crisis
was developing.
In November the Assembly demonstrated its resentment 
against the Governor's demands for prior knowledge of the 
contents of petitions by informing him that it would not 
appropriate funds for frontier d e f e n s e . C l i n t o n  respond­
ed by denying colonial officials their salaries. He an­
nounced that he would not sign the salary bill (which named 
the officials to be paid) until he received permission to 
do so from London. He was, however, willing to sign the act 
which established local customs duties,*-*® the last piece of 
legislation to be enacted in New York for two years.
Clinton could not convince the Assembly to accept his
Ass . Jour., H H 246.
*ASS. Jour., H H % 249-50.
Ass. Jour., ii, 248, November 1, 1748.
**®Smith, History, II, 107-9.
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leadership, and he proceeded to immobilize the government.***
112He prorogued the Assembly.
The breakdown in relations with the House had no real 
effect on the situation. The British government had still 
not acted on Clinton's complaints, and as no assistance was 
forthcoming the Governor again attempted to build a "party" 
to support him.
Clinton's new approach to this old problem was ambiv­
alent. On one hand he was pragmatic, appointing county 
officers —  judges, clerks, and sheriffs ~  who would up­
hold his interest at election time. On the other hand, he 
alienated the Livingstons, the only family in the province 
which might have been able to challenge DeLancey's control 
of the Assembly. When Philip Livingston died in February, 
1749,**^ Clinton successfully opposed the attempts of the 
family to keep his office, Secretary of Indiem Affairs, in 
the family, and thereby drove them all into DeLancey's 
arms.*** Thus the balance of political power seemed un­
changed.
**1Varga, "New York Government," pp. 140-1. 
332Bonomi, Factious People, App. C [p. 306], 
113NYCD, VI, 60.
***Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 181-2.
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The Privy Council order of February 2, 1749, which
instructed the Board of Trade to investigate conditions in 
115New York, weakened Clinton. To profit from the invest­
igation, he would have to convince the British government 
to remove DeLancey from the Lieutenant Governorship, and 
he was not in a position to exert much influence. His men­
tor, the Duke of Newcastle, having become Secretary of State 
for the Northern Department in February, 1748*^6 had lost 
interest in colonial matters,^7 and could not be counted 
on to support Clinton's case. Nor could the Governor turn 
to the new Secretary of State for the Southern Department 
for assistance. John, fourth Duke of Bedford, had suggested
that Clinton resolve his quarrel with the Assembly by ac-
118cepting its decisions. Bedford's willingness to advise
Clinton was, however, an innovation. His predecessors had 
scrupulously avoided involvement in colonial politics.
DeLancey's position was in fact much strengthened. 
Inaction by the British government would be a victory for 
him, and the British administration was predisposed to 
inaction in colonial affairs. Furthermore, his allies in
115NYCD, VI, 544.
H^Williams, Whig Supremacy, p. 472.
*^7Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 201.
118Varga, "New York Government," p. 151.
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London (Warren, Herring, and Robert Charles, the profession-
119al agent who represented the Assembly ) were still avail­
able to give support.*20
Clinton therefore exerted all his energies to overcom­
ing his opponent's advantages. He enlisted Lewis Morris 
Jr., who was traveling to London to discuss the boundaries 
of New Jersey, as a spokesman, and flooded Bedford, and the 
Board of Trade, and John Catherwood, his agent in London, 
with examples of James DeLancey's pernicious influence on
the political life of New York, and of his brother Oliver's
121disdain for the law.
The investigation did not affect the ordinary political
process and Clinton had to meet the Assembly while it was in
progress. The meeting was delayed (it had been scheduled
122for March but was not convened until June 28, 1749 ), and
the delay did not serve to improve relations between the
Governor and the House. The session was an almost exact
recapitulation of the disasterous October-November, 1749
123session. Clinton again requested a five year revenue.
119Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 146-8 
*2^Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 207-11.
121NYCD, VI, 471, 472-3, 474-6, 513-4, 514-6, 516-8.
*22Smith, History, II, 109.
123Ass. Jour., II, 258.
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The Assembly again refused his request. It again sent the 
Governor a message detailing the reasons for its decision. 
Clinton again refused to accept it because he had not been 
informed of its contents. The Assembly again condemned the 
Governor for violating its privileges, and the Governor 
again responded by claiming that he was not bound to respect 
the rules of the Assembly. The pattern of "agains" was fin­
ally broken only when Clinton agreed to accept the petition, 
explaining that he had learned of its contents inform­
ally.124
125This did not end the paralysis of the government. 
Clinton's failure to secure any action from the Assembly 
indicated that the impasse would not be resolved in New 
York, and so he redoubled his efforts at convincing the 
British government to act. His letters to London emphasized 
that the opposition controlled the House, and was able, 
therefore, to impede even the ordinary business of the gov­
ernment. The letters strongly implied that Clinton would
regard the abolition of the Assembly as the ideal solution
126to his difficulties.
124As s. Jour., II, 261-2.
125NYCL, III, 744-5.
126NYCD. VI, 522-4, 524-5, 533-4, 550-2, 552-4, 
554-6, 556-8.
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Despite Clinton's inclinations, the Assembly was still
a very real part of the provincial government, and, in July,
1750, the need for money forced the Governor to act. His
options were limited. He could either meet the House
(which had twice failed to enact legislation), or he could
call for new elections. As there was little prospect of
obtaining cooperation from the extant House, Clinton opted
12 7for new elections, and ordered a dissolution on July 21, 
1750.128
Although the attitude of the Assembly had made his ac­
tion almost inevitable, Clinton was not in a strong position 
to contest the election; his allies were in disarray.
William Smith Sr. would not participate in politics openly 
until he was named Attorney General. William Johnson re­
fused to involve himself in the campaign until he received 
his salary arrears; and Edward Holland, the mayor of New 
York, was so fearful of Oliver DeLancey that he contemplated 
leaving the province. Consequently, the Governor's allies 
were roundly defeated. DeLancey again dominated the 
House.129
12 7Varga, "New York Government," p. 160.
■̂28Bonomi, Factious People, App. C. [pp. 306-7],
1 2 0 Varga, "New York Government," pp. 156-7, 160-1.
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Yet the Assembly session which began in September^3® 
was not as unprofitable as its immediate predecessors. The 
disputants had learned that after soliciting information 
from all interested parties, the Board of Trade was prepar­
ing its long awaited report on conditions in New York, and 
neither wanted to prejudice its case by taking an extreme 
p o s i t i o n . C l i n t o n  also had replaced Cadwallader Colden 
as advisor with the infinitely more moderate James 
Alexander, had abandoned his insistence on a five year
revenue (which had generated much of the friction with the
Assembly), and even informed the Speaker that, like
Lieutenant Governor Clarke, he would accept a one year rev-
132enue, and all other legislation submitted to him. The
133Assembly responded by funding the government fully.
Such temporary success with the Assembly did not, how­
ever, reconcile Clinton to the overall situation in the 
province, and he repeated his request for permission to 
return to England. His only doubts were about his request
1 Afor a one-year leave. His departure would leave the
*30Bonomi, Factious People, App. C [pp. 306-7), 
■̂33Smith, History, II, 116-7.
132NYCD, VI, 598-9.
133Varga, "New York Government," pp. 161-3.
134NYCD, VI, 606.
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government in the hands of Lieutenant Governor DeLancey, 
and, in an effort to avoid that unpleasant prospect, Clinton 
asked Bedford to secure the removal of the Lieutenant 
Governor. ■*'33 Nothing was done about either request, however. 
The ministrv had long ago decided to refrain from interfer­
ing in New York until the Board of Trade completed its re­
port.
The Board finally delivered its verdict in April, 1751. 
Its long report examined the political history of the prov­
ince, and the dispute between Governor Clinton and the 
Assembly in minute detail. After reviewing all the data, 
it concluded that the Governor's attempts at dominating the 
government had generated animosities which could be salved 
only by the dispatch of a new governor,136 but it did not 
act against.him. (Neither the Board, nor any other agent 
of the British government appears to have suggested Clinton's
removal.) Some new Instructions were prepared and dis- 
137patched, and the Board thereupon seemed to forget the 
situation completely.
Since news of the report of the Board had not reached 
New York when the Assembly met in May, 1751, the session, 
like its predecessor, was influenced by the fear that
135NYCD, VI, 612.
136NYCD, VI, 614-39.
137NYCD, VI, 754, 755-6, 757-8.
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intemperate action would prejudice the Board's evaluation
138of events in New York, and so it, too, proceeded smoothly.
The only conflict (over the amount to be provided for pres­
ents to the Indians) was resolved by the Speaker, who in­
structed the provincial treasurer to deliver £ 200 which the
Governor had requested, but which the House had not seen fit 
139to provide.
The moderating influence supplied by anxiety over the 
Board of Trade's report had been eliminated when the House 
reassembled in October. The conclusions of the report were
public, and the Assembly apparently felt it could resume the
quarrel without consequence. At the beginning of the ses­
sion, several Assemblymen complained that they had not re­
ceived proper notification. It then proceeded to insult 
the Governor, who was already sensitive about his dignity, 
by failing to notify him officially of its actions. Instead 
of presenting the resolution formally, it sent a copy by 
messenger. But Clinton did not react to the taunt.
The Governor had apparently learned moderation, and he 
played no role in the dispute which ended the session.
Colonel William Johnson had been attempting to secure reim­
bursement for monies he had advanced for presents to the 
Indians since 1748 but the Assembly had not acted. He
138smith, History, II, 120-1.
139NYCD, VI, 703-4.
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therefore turned to the Council for redress, and on 
November 18 he presented the Assembly with a Council order 
which required it to appropriate h 500 to settle Johnson's 
account in part. The Council's action was unprecedented 
since the upper house had never claimed the right to ini­
tiate money bills, and, not unexpectedly, a deadlock devel­
oped. The Assembly would not act on the bill from the 
Council, and the Council refused to deal with legislation 
sent from the Assembly until it did so. Clintc.i shunned 
the whole matter. He signed the bills which had been
passed (fortunately including a revenue bill), and, on
140November 25, dissolved the Assembly.
There was no clear reason for Clinton's decision to
terminate the Assembly at that time for he could have ended
the dispute between the houses just as effectively by an
adjournment. Perhaps he still had hopes of securing the
election of an Assembly which would do his will, for he
again devoted himself to politics. He took steps to bring
141the Livingston family into his alliance, and his friends
142did their best to generate support. Unfortunately this
venture was no more successful than its predecessors, 
Clinton's allies were again roundly defeated when the
140Smith, History, II, 121-2. 
l^Bonomi, Factious People, p. 163.
1 AOVarga, "New York Government," pp. 179-82.
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election was held in February, 1752.
Although Clinton was apparently not deeply disturbed 
by the rebuff, he was not anxious to meet yet another 
Assembly dominated by DeLancey, and so delayed meeting the 
House until October, 1752, when the expiration of the rev­
enue made it necessary. Despite the Governor's misgivings,
144the meeting was tranquil, and this may have contributed 
to Clinton's unwillingness to call the Assembly into session 
to deal with Indian affairs on May 30, 1753.*4  ̂ The May 
meeting, Clinton's last with a New York Assembly, was also 
extraordinarily peaceful. He recognized the power of the 
House by asking its advice on the management of Indian rela­
tions, and it reciprocated by quickly providing the neces- 
146sary funds.
Although Clinton had received permission to leave New 
York in the summer of 1752,147 administration did not 
actually end until October 10, 1753, when Danvers Osborne 
arrived to assume the government.148 Clinton had remained
143Bonomi, Factious People, p. 163.
144Smith, History, II, 123.
145Varga, "New York Government," p. 190.




in New York until then because the British government had 
refused his oft-repeated request for permission to suspend 
James D e L a n c e y ; h e  had no intention of leaving the gov­
ernment to his rival.
Osborne's suicide on October 12 must have been a bitter 
pill for Clinton to swallow. In spite of everything James 
DeLancey had become the acting governor.
DeLancey*s accession to the government marked the end 
of an era. A colonial who had built his political power by 
championing the rights of the Assembly, he based his admin­
istration on cooperation with the House, and so the disputes 
which had marked Clinton's administration became memories.
His successor, Sir Charles Hardy, was too preoccupied with 
the French and Indian War to involve himself in disputes with 
the colonists, and Hardy's successors faced the problem of 
growing resistance to British rule.
149NYCD, VI, 761-2.
150NYCD, VI, 803.
■̂5^Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 171-4.
CONCLUSION
The significant role of the governors of colonial New 
York in the provincial political system has generally been 
ignored in the political histories of mid-eighteenth century 
New York. The traditional practice has been to treat the 
Governors merely as obstacles for the Assemblies to overcome, 
and to suggest that their concessions to the Assemblies were 
their only contributions to the evolution of the province's 
political life. Recently, American historians have begun to 
investigate the role that the governorship of New York 
played in the British system of political patronage, but, 
these authors too have neglected the role the governors had 
to play in the everyday operations of the colonial govern­
ment.
Both approaches fail to appreciate the delicacy of the 
situation. Appointed by Royal Commission, with Instructions 
supplied by the British government, and responsible only to 
London, the Governors may have been British officials, but 
they were much more than that. As they had sought appoint­
ment to improve their fortunes, they were always hostages 
to their subjects' good will. They faced the unenviable 
task of having to serve two masters.
The dilemma would have been insoluable if both masters 
were demanding. Fortunately, the British government was
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almost totally disinterested, and it gave the governors of 
the Province of New-York almost total freedom of action.
The Assembly was, however, not as unconcerned, and satisfy­
ing its demands was a difficult task, but one which had to 
be faced by every governor, for it was the only way to sur­
vive and profit from an administration. The essential ele­
ment in this situation was adaptability. A governor had to 
be flexible enough to recognize the situation he faced, and 
to meet it. Unless he could maintain the good will of 
British government while coming to a modus vivendi with the 
Assembly (which dominated the political life of the colony) 
no governor could succeed.
Four of the six governors of provincial New York in 
the mid-eighteenth century —  Montgomerie, Van Dam, Cosby, 
and Clarke —  reached an understanding with the leaders of 
their Assemblies, and supported the colonists' political 
programs in exchange for financial support for their admin­
istrations. Even Burnet and Clinton, who became involved 
in ongoing disputes with their Assemblies, recognized the 
importance of the House. They understood the political 
realities they faced, but were unable to find a practical 
means of reaching an accommodation.
In general, the men who governed New York between 
1717 and 1753 were more perceptive than has been generally 
assumed, although they were, of course, not equally capa­
ble. As all occupied political posts, their success should 
be measured by their political acumen, their ability to
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achieve their goals. One, George Clinton, was an abysmal 
failure. He was completely unwilling to subordinate his 
antipathy towards James DeLancey, and consequently he 
brought the government of New York to the edge of collapse. 
Another, William Burnet, was a failure because he would not 
compromise. He stubbornly insisted on pursuing his Indiem 
Trade policy in the face of growing colonial opposition, 
and his intransigence cost him control of the government.
Four governors of provincial New York, however, were 
eminently successful. John Montgomerie, Rip Van Dam, 
William Cosby, and George Clinton all established and main­
tained good relations with their Assemblies, and avoided 
British intervention in colonial affairs. Perhaps their 
methods did not conform to the niceties of contemporary 
mercantile and political theories, but they resulted in 
practical triumphs, and clearly demonstrate that success in 
governing New York required the ability to simultaneously 
serve two masters.
APPENDIX
The 126 instructions which defined the administrative 
structure and practices of the colony of New York are re­
corded in Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Instructions to 
British Colonial Governors. 16 70-1776, 2 vols. (New York, 
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The 25 instructions which defined trade policy are re­
ported as sections:
537, 538, 539, 666, 845, 848, 852, 853,
908, 910, 912, 920, 929, 1,035, 1,040, 1,043,
1,045, 1,046, 1,058, 1,065, 1,066, 1,067, 1,068, 1,070,
1,071.
The 18 instructions which gave the governors specific 
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